CA Unpub Decisions

E.T., mother of now-eight-year-old Isaiah B., appeals the juvenile court’s May 13, 2021 order denying her request for reinstatement of family reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) and the court’s order the same day terminating parental rights (§ 366.26). E.T. contends the court erred in concluding additional reunification services were not in Isaiah’s best interest and the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We affirm.

Eric Ignacio appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate his second degree murder conviction and for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Ignacio argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion he is guilty of second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor under amended sections 188 and 189 and, as a consequence, we should reverse the order denying his petition and direct the trial court to grant the petition and to resentence him as required by section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(1). In the alternative, he contends the case should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing because the trial court erred when it relied on the factual summary and conclusions from this court’s February 2000 opinion in his direct appeal to conclude he was ineligible for resentencing.

Sam Shakib and Hooshang “Sean” Namvar were real estate development partners. Through various limited liability companies, they executed a contract to develop a residential project in Los Angeles. When the project went awry, two of the limited liability companies sued Shakib and a third limited liability company. Shakib filed a cross-complaint. Among other claims, Shakib alleged Namvar breached their oral agreement to personally and equally share certain project development costs that were not included in the written contract. Shakib asserted Namvar stopped contributing half of the costs after construction halted.
Shakib appeals the judgment entered against him following the trial court’s order granting Namvar’s motion for summary judgment or adjudication for Shakib’s cause of action for breach of oral contract. The trial court held Shakib’s breach of oral contract claim against Namvar was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Following Robert Elwood Floyd’s 2017 conviction on 10 counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664) arising from a crime spree targeting businesses in South Los Angeles, the trial court sentenced Floyd to an aggregate indeterminate state prison term of 447 years to life under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). We affirmed Floyd’s convictions, as well as those of his confederate and codefendant, Christopher Augustine, and rejected Floyd’s challenges to his sentence, but remanded the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under new legislation, effective January 1, 2019, to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). (People v. Floyd (Aug. 20, 2019, B284321) [nonpub. opn.].)
Prior to the hearing on remand, the district attorney moved to resentence Floyd by dismissing all prior strike convictions and sentencing enhancements

Defendants and appellants Century Law Group (CLG) and Edward Lear (Lear) (collectively, CLG) appeal from an order denying their motion for attorneys’ fees. CLG contends the trial court erred in denying its motion because: (1) the retainer agreement between CLG and plaintiff and respondent Jonathan Rosen (Rosen) contains a prevailing party attorneys’ fee provision; and (2) that CLG was represented by an attorney who was “of counsel” for CLG does not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees under Civil Code section 1717. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Eduardo Carmona was convicted of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, Carmona contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and, in the alternative, that resentencing is required because of recent amendments to the Penal Code. We affirm the conviction but remand for resentencing.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, appellant LaQuesha Coleman appealed from the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order against her in favor of respondent Alteasha Harris, Harris’s husband, and Harris’s two children. (See Harris v. Coleman (Aug. 8, 2019, B291767) [nonpub. opn.] (Harris I).) We affirmed the order because Coleman failed to provide an adequate record affirmatively showing any abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
In this appeal, Coleman seeks to appeal from a subsequent order denying her application to terminate the domestic violence restraining order. Because the restraining order has now expired, we dismiss Coleman’s appeal as moot.

William and John Heldman are the sons of William Joseph Heldman, who died in 2014. William appeals from probate court orders (1) overruling William’s demurrer to John’s third amended Probate Code section 850 petition; (2) denying William’s motion for a permanent injunction and order to show cause regarding contempt to enforce a partial settlement agreement between William and John; and (3) granting John’s motion to disqualify William’s counsel, Meir J. Westreich. We conclude the first two orders are nonappealable and dismiss the appeal as to those orders.
As to John’s disqualification motion, William contends on appeal substantial evidence does not support the probate court’s finding there was a substantial relationship between Westreich’s representation of John in a 1983 deposition involving real property William Joseph transferred to John and John’s allegation in this case that William Joseph transferred property to William.

This case involves charges against defendants and appellants Brian Boseman Corder, Fredericka Carmouche, and Stephon Crutchfield, based on an attack on Corder’s wife, GiGi. In count 1, Corder and Carmouche were found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1).) All three defendants were found guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder in count 2 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), torture in count 4 (§ 206), and mayhem in count 5 (§ 205). Carmouche and Crutchfield were convicted of burglary in count 3. (§ 459.) The jury also found true the allegations that Carmouche and Crutchfield personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that Carmouche personally used dangerous and deadly weapons within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), in counts 2 and 3.

Sixteen years after defendant La Choy Davis was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate prison term pursuant to a plea agreement, he brought a “petition” in propria persona seeking to “ ‘modify’ ” the $5,000 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) and the $2,603.29 in victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) that were ordered at the time of sentencing, on the ground the trial court failed to make an ability to pay determination. He claimed that, in the absence of any such determination, his due process rights were violated, the restitution fine and victim restitution were unconstitutionally excessive, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the “petition” on the ground it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits, and even if it did, defendant’s claims failed on the merits.
The Attorney General maintains we must dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We agree.
Restitution Fine

Gary Emil Coslovich appeals from a judgment and sentence following his no-contest plea. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. We find no such issues and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Matthew Jensen (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment sentencing him to four years in prison after he pleaded guilty to committing a battery causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code § 243, subd. (d)). He contends the trial court erred in concluding he was ineligible for probation. We conclude the court erred, but the error was harmless because the court expressly stated it would have denied probation if appellant had been eligible. On remand, we direct the court to correct the abstract of judgment in several respects.

Defendant Jose Eduardo Perez appeals a stipulated 26-year sentence imposed after he pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm, with special allegations that he personally used a firearm during the offenses and that he committed them for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Upon defendant’s timely appeal, we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appellate counsel filed a brief stating the case and facts but raising no issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, and he has not done so.
We have reviewed the entire record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440–441.) We include here a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case as well as the conviction and punishment imposed. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123–124.) Finding no arguable issue, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Jose Nieto guilty of two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) ). Nieto had committed the crimes against two children, and the jury found true a multiple-victim sentence enhancement allegation under section 667.61. The trial court sentenced Nieto to two, consecutive 25-years-to-life terms.
On appeal, Nieto claims the trial court erred by instructing the jurors with CALCRIM No. 1191B concerning a propensity inference based on the charged sex offenses and by overruling his hearsay objection to certain testimony from one of the victims. Regarding his sentence, Nieto contends the 25-years-to-life terms were unauthorized because the charging document did not plead the sentence enhancement under the relevant provision, section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2). He further asserts that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.