CA Unpub Decisions

In 1999, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Ricardo Estrada of evading a peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant was also found to have served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and suffered two prior convictions as defined in the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12 subds. (a)–(d)). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life.[2]
After the 2012 passage of Proposition 36 (the “Three Strikes Reform Act,” hereafter “the Act”), defendant filed a petition under section 1170.126 to recall his indeterminate sentence and to be resentenced as a second strike offender. The trial court denied the petition, finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Jose Estrada (defendant) appeals from the judgment that was entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the robbery within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court imposed the low term of two years in state prison for the robbery conviction, plus a one-year enhancement term for the weapon use allegation. The court sentenced defendant to a concurrent two-year term for the assault conviction.

William Martin Austin (defendant) appeals his conviction for second degree robbery.
At a preliminary hearing, the People presented evidence that in May 2015, defendant entered a Ralph’s market, took a shopping bag (99 cents for purchase) from the register, and filled it with bottles of shampoo. The manager on duty noted that defendant looked “upset” and was acting “suspicious[ly],” and alerted security. Shortly thereafter, the manager heard a commotion at the front of the store and saw defendant “ranting and raving” and yelling expletives at several employees. When the manager attempted to calm him down and remove him from the store, defendant became “very angry” and grabbed the manager’s shirt, “slamming his fist” into the manager’s chest and repeatedly threatening to “kill” him and “fuck [him] up.” Defendant left the store and walked down the street with the shopping bag filled with shampoo bottles without paying.

Defendant, Alan Eugene Hodge, was convicted in 1996 of cocaine possession. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Because he had sustained three prior convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b), he was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. He is currently 60 years old and has been incarcerated for 20 years. He appeals from an order denying his Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (b) resentencing petition.[1] The parties agree defendant was eligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subd. (e).) However, the trial court found he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order denying the resentencing petition.

Defendant and appellant Eric Hernandez, also known as Rodney Hernandez, was convicted, following a plea of no contest, of one count of attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Defendant admitted he had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant to 30 months in state prison.
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence his 2009 assault conviction qualified as a prior strike and he was therefore entitled to a county jail commitment.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendants Efrain Enrique Villeda and Antoinette Renee Wizar of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The jury also convicted Mr. Villeda of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a))[1] and Ms. Wizar of petty theft (§§ 484, subd. (a), 490.2). The trial court found Mr. Villeda had served five prior separate prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Mr. Villeda was sentenced to 8 years in state prison. As to Ms. Wizar, the trial court imposed and suspended a 42-month sentence. Ms. Wizar was placed on formal probation for 3 years. We affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for resentencing as to Mr. Villeda.

A modification decision.

This is the second appeal by Michele Marie Houston (appellant) from a sentence imposed following her plea of no contest to grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487)[1], and her unsuccessful completion of formal probation. This appeal relates solely to an order of victim restitution imposed on her subsequent to her plea.
Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record relating to the imposition of restitution as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of her right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues she chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.

In a March 25, 2016 felony complaint, the People charged Damian Terrell Strong with one count of attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215, subd. (a)), and further alleged he personally used a deadly weapon (a knife in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and suffered a prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The complaint also charged appellant with one count of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)), one count of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), one count of misdemeanor hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), and one count of driving with a revoked or suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)).
Pursuant to a waiver of his trial rights and advisements as to the consequences of his plea, appellant pleaded no contest to the attempted carjacking count and admitted both the knife use allegation and the prison prior. The parties stipulated to a factual basi

Alex L. moved pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782[1] to dismiss the juvenile petition against him. The juvenile court denied the motion because it believed section 782 did not authorize the court to dismiss a petition involving an offense described in section 707, subdivision (b), as a serious crime. We agree with the parties that this was error, and remand the matter for the juvenile court’s consideration of the merits of Alex L.’s motion.

A jury convicted appellant of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] At a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true a number of prior conviction enhancements: that appellant had suffered (1) three prior “serious felony” or “strike” convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12 (a)-(d)); (2) three “serious felony” five-year prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) eight one-year prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
At sentencing, the trial court dismissed two of the three “strike” prior conviction allegations found true by the jury, pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), finding that they were remote in time and that a life sentence would be cruel and unusual punishment.[2] Thereafter, the trial court sentenced appellant to a second-strike determinate term as follows: three years for the base robbery count, doubled to six years for the remaining strike prior conviction, plu

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Isaac Tesfaye was charged with 15 counts of various offenses related to his management of a nonprofit organization, the African Community Resource Center (ACRC). In a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a single offense, grand theft of property exceeding $400 from the ACRC (count 15; Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)).[1] The remaining counts were dismissed.
The trial court placed defendant on formal probation for a period of three years, with a number of conditions, including that he serve 365 days in county jail. Defendant was granted 120 days of presentence custody credits. The trial court also imposed various fines and fees. In a separate hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $72,600 in restitution to the victim.

In 2015, defendant filed a petition alleging that he had successfully completed his probation term and moved to have the charged reduced to a mis

Appellant Lee Porter Young was charged with nine counts: first-degree burglary of an occupied residence with a person present (Pen. Code, § 459)[1] (count 3); felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4); felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)) (count 5); resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)) (count 6); exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)(b)) (count 7); attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) (count 8); battery by gassing (spitting) a custodial employee (§ 243.9, subd. (a)) (count 9); assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 10); and battery (§ 242) (count 11). As to counts 3, 4, and 10, it was further alleged that appellant had suffered (1) a prior serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); and (2) three prior convictions for which he had served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). As to all counts, it was alleged that appellant ha

A jury found defendant and appellant Vincent Mojica guilty of possessing child or youth pornography, which was discovered on his cell phone. On appeal, Mojica contends that the evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. He also contends that the erroneous admission of evidence he was on probation requires reversal. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.