CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff, Larchmont Village Partners One LLC, appeals from a June 25, 2015 judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] sections 583.310 and 583.360, subdivision (a). Plaintiff contends Judge Stephanie M. Bowick erred in granting the dismissal motion of defendant, City of Los Angeles, because the case was not tried within five years after it was filed. Plaintiff argues the five-year provision of section 583.310 is inapplicable because Judge Soussan G. Bruguera granted defendant’s judgment on the pleadings motionwithout leave to amend on January 30, 2013. We agree.
Plaintiff’s mandate petition and complaint was filed on February 26, 2010. The mandate petition and complaint consisted of claims: to set aside a revocation of a building permit and occupancy certificate for a restaurant; to cancel an instrument because of a cloud on the title; for violation of equal protection; and for violations of civil rights pursuant to title 42 United States Code sec

Defendants and appellants Oscar Tomas Rayos Parra and Hipolito Rayos Parra[1] were convicted of the murder of Irela Quinones in a joint trial before separate juries. Oscar and Hipolito are half brothers. Ms. Quinones was the former girlfriend of Oscar. Both Oscar and Hipolito gave statements to law enforcement admitting involvement in the death of Ms. Quinones.
Oscar raises multiple contentions: (1) the prosecutor made misleading arguments regarding aiding and abetting liability that allowed the jury to convict on an invalid legal theory; (2) the trial court committed error in failing to instruct sua sponte in accordance with Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683 (Crane); (3) the court erred in instructing with CALCRIM No. 372 which contains argumentative, pro-prosecution language; (4) cumulative error; and (5) the court improperly imposed a parole revocation fine.
Hipolito’s sole contention on appeal is that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closi

Henry McCullough (Henry)[1]appeals from an order following trial awarding him spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for 60 months and retaining jurisdiction to make further orders, including after the expiration of the 60 months. Although the trial court considered the factors identified in Family Code section 4320 as required in setting support, there is no reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount and duration of support that the court ordered in light of the disparity in the parties’ post-separation income and lifestyles.[2]The parties were married for over 16 years. At the time of trial, Henry had been ruled permanently disabled and had a disability income of $950 per month. Carolyn was a nurse with a monthly income of $7,833, over eight times that amount. Their children were adults. In light of Henry’s obvious need, Carolyn’s ability to pay, and the marital lifestyle, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order only $500 p

D.B. (Minor) was declared a ward of the court after he admitted he was an accessory to a crime. (Pen. Code, § 32.) The juvenile court placed Minor on probation. Among the terms and conditions of his probation was this: “The Minor shall not be in any ‘specific locations’ where gang members are known by the Minor to meet or gather, or ‘specific locations’ known by the Minor for gang-related activity, or specified by his/her Probation Officer or parent in writing as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he/she participate in any gang-related activity.”
Minor contends the phrase “gang-related activity” is unconstitutionally vague because it does not contain an explicit scienter requirement. He asks us to modify the condition to provide that he shall not “knowingly participate in any gang-related activity or activity specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity.” (Italics omitted.)
Our Supreme Court recently

Defendant Quincy Lewis appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of misdemeanor battery and felony criminal threats. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to the criminal threats conviction to a misdemeanor. We shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant was convicted of numerous sex crimes on September 29,2000. As described in this court’s opinion from the judgment,People v. Hughes (July 11, 2003, H022186) [nonpub opn.][1], “A jury convicted defendant of 12 counts of committing lewdacts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd.(b)),[[2]]4 counts of rape with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)), 19counts of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and 1 count ofmisdemeanor possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd.(a)). The jury found true enhancement allegations on variouscounts for multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), kidnapping(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1)), aggravated kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)), impersonation of a police officer (§ 667.17), andkidnapping of a person under the age of 14 for the purposes of committing a sexual offense (§ 667.8, subd. (b)). The jury alsofound true numerous probation ineligibility allegations (§§1203.066, subds. (a)(3), (6) & (7)). [¶] Defendant was sentenc

Defendant Robert James Markrell was convicted by plea of two counts of second degree robbery and two counts of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)).[1] He admitted havingfour prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b) – (i), 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and that he had served one prior prison term for a violent felony conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (a)) and three other prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
At a sentencing hearing on October 9, 2015, the trial court explained that although the court was going to sentence defendant that day, the court was “not going to sentence [him] completely.” Rather, the court was going to “continue” the matter to January 2016 regarding the calculation of presentence custody credits. The court’s express purpose in doing so was to allow defendant to have a surgery before being sent to prison. Based on the court’s prior ruling on defend

Defendant Todd Peter Howard pleaded no contest to four counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age.(Pen. Code,§ 288, subd. (b).)[1]The trial court imposed a total term of 30 years. The court also ordered general restitution in the amount of $20,000, in addition to a $200 restitution fine and a $200 sex offender fine under section 290.3.
On appeal, Howard contends the $200 restitution fine and the $200 sex offender fine were unauthorized under the versions of the statutes in effect at the earliest time the offenses could have been committed.
We conclude these claims are without merit. We will affirm the judgment.

When a party obtains a judgment dismissing all claims against it, may the trial court deny that party’s motion for contractual attorney fees without prejudice to the party again raising the issue after the court decides the claims among the remaining parties? In this case, we answer that question in the negative.
Here, the underlying dispute involves whether Raymond Harper is a member of two limited liability companies with an obligation to pay capital calls issued by those companies. The KDF Parties[1](KDF) are members of those companies and filed a cross-complaint against Harper for breach of the companies’ operating agreements and declaratory relief. At the trial court’s suggestion, KDF amended its cross-complaint to add cross-defendant and appellant Aurora Western Pacific Advisors, Inc. (Aurora) as a party on the theory Aurora was Harper’s alter ego. After the case was transferred to a different court, Aurora successfully demurred to the cross-complaint on the ground C

A jury convicted defendants Jennifer Lynn Toro and Stevie Theodore Torres of what is commonly known as an “Estes robbery,” in which a defendant uses force or fear after the initial taking of the property.(People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes).) Torres, joined by Toro, contendsEstes was “wrongly decided” because it improperly expanded Penal Code section 211 “beyond its common law meaning.” Toro alsoargues insufficient evidence supports her conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and thus the trial court erred in instructing the jury on that theory. We disagree with defendants’ contentions and affirm the judgments.

A jury convicted defendant Ron Roberson of committing an aggravated assault with great bodily injury. In this appeal, Roberson claims the trial court improperly denied three motions: hismotion to continue (made as voir dire was about to begin); hismotion for mistrial (made by his own counsel based on ineffective assistance); and hismotion for new trial (also based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
We will find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied thecontinuanceand mistrialmotions. The continuance motion was untimely and not supported by good cause; the motion for mistrial did not establish a legal necessity.
As to the motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that Roberson’s counsel provided ineffective assistance. But the court also found noprejudice: the probability of a different result in the absence of ineffective assistance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (St

Defendant and appellant J.B. (Mother) has a history of abusing drugs and domestic violence that led to the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) removing hertwo-year-old son E.B. (the child) from her home. Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] as to the child. Mother argues that the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applies and that the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship instead of adoption.[2]After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reject Mother’s claim and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) She was placed on 36 months of supervised probation with various orders and conditions, including serving one year in jail.
Defendant challenges eight of her probation conditions. She contends that five of the conditions (conditions 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, two of the conditions (conditions 17 and 18) violate her constitutional right to freedom of association with her children’s father,[1] and one of the conditions (condition 22) violates her constitutional right to religious freedom. The People concede, and we agree, that two of the probation conditions (specifically conditions 8 and 9) should be modified, and they are unopposed to a modification of condition 22. In all other respects, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Timothy James Crownover asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On May 15, 2016, Brandon Dozier contacted law enforcement about a friend’s stolen vehicle, as he drove around looking for it. He spotted the vehicle and was following it when he saw it was pulling over. Dozier attempted to block the driver in, while simultaneously getting out of his own car. Defendant was driving the stolen vehicle and, in an effort to get away, drove at Dozier who had to leap out of the way to avoid being hit.