CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Lee M. Trahan of assault on a child causing death and manslaughter in connection with the death of his six-week-old twin daughter Willow. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 273ab, subd. (a),[2] 192, subd. (a).) The jury found his wife, Jessica Trahan, guilty of misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b)).[3] The trial court sentenced Lee to summary probation on the child abuse homicide conviction and to 11 years in prison on the manslaughter conviction.
Lee contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that, because there was evidence Jessica was an accomplice to his alleged crimes, her testimony requires corroboration and should be viewed with suspicion. We find any error in this regard harmless.

Appointed counsel for defendant Aileen Marie Pena has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the record, we discovered a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment with regard to fines. We shall order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the fines imposed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
A jury convicted defendant Stanley Tillman of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a cohabitant (count one; Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a));[1] rape (count two; § 261, subd (a)(2)); making a criminal threat (count three; § 422); and felony false imprisonment (count four; § 236). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted a prior juvenile strike adjudication.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jessie Mercado asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Kawaun Marques Lloyd of first degree murder and related offenses. At trial, two of his accomplices testified for the prosecution. On appeal, he contends the accomplices’ testimony was insufficiently supported by corroborating evidence. He also contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to delete a fine that was never imposed. We agree with the second contention. We will order a corrected abstract and otherwise affirm.

With regard to the determination of dangerousness, the trial court erred in reaching that issue because there was no notice that the People would argue defendant presented a current danger to public safety or that the trial court would make a dangerousness determination at the March 25, 2013 hearing. Under the circumstances, we need not resolve whether the definition of dangerousness applicable to the Proposition 36 resentencing scheme wasnarrowed in 2014 by Proposition 47. We reject defendant’s other claims aswithout merit.
We will modify the order by striking the findings and determination of dangerousness and affirm the order denying defendant’s resentencing petition as modified.

A Modification decision.

Fleeing to a foreign country to escape detection by law enforcement is risky business, especially for a two-year-old child whose parent is the fugitive. That conclusion is essentially dispositive of this dependency appeal, in which the juvenile court found the actions of F.K. (Mother) demonstrated her son Z.K. should be declared a dependent child and removed from her custody.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Salvador Cristos Escobedo of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm upon a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c).)[1] Escobedo admitted a prior strike conviction, prior serious felony conviction, and prior conviction with a prison term. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12, subd. (b); 667, subd. (a)(1); 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court struck Escobedo’s strike, and sentenced him to a total of eight years in state prison comprised of a three-year low term for the assault, plus five years for a prior serious felony conviction. On appeal, Escobedo contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of assault on a peace officer. (§ 241, subd. (c).) We affirm the judgment.

In thatcontract,Manifesto Records, Inc. (Manifesto), a company controlled by Cohen, paid Mosley to assignManifesto hisostensible rights in one of the band’s albums. When the other members of the band learned of that assignment, because they discovered Manifesto was selling the album without their knowledge, they sued Manifesto and Cohen (collectively “defendants”) for intentionally interfering with the prior settlement agreement. Defendantscountered by filing an anti-SLAPP motion, which the court below denied, and that brings us to the issues presented:is Manifesto’s marketing and sale of the album protected free speech activity, and if so, is there no probability the intentional interference with contract claim will succeed because it is preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976.

Angela Hsiao (buyer) signed a contract to purchase a home from Yanfei Lin (seller). Seller did not sign the contract; her adult son signed it in her name. When seller refused to proceed with the sale, buyer brought suit for breach of contract and related causes of action. Seller, relying on the statute of frauds and the equal dignities rule, prevailed on summary judgment. She also received her attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on a contract which contained an attorney’s fees clause. On buyer’s appeal, we affirm the summary judgment, but reverse the attorney’s fees order, on the basis that seller had not complied with a contractual condition precedent to an award of fees.

Leticia C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 permanency planning and legal guardianship orders relating to her four children, contending the court failed to comply with the notice procedures mandated by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).[2] Finding error in the manner in which statutorily required notices were given, we conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s orders, and remand for compliance with ICWA notice requirements.

Ernesto Nobella Romero appeals the judgment following his conviction by jury of one count of unlawful act with a child under 10 years old (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); count 1),[1] and two counts of lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 2 and 3). The jury also found true the special allegations that the offenses were serious and violent felonies requiring sex offender registration (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(6), 1192.7, subd. (c)(6), 290), and that appellant had substantial sexual conduct with the victim while she was under 14 years old (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8); counts 2-3.)
The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life in prison on count 1, plus a consecutive term of eight years, consisting of the midterm of six years on count 2 and a term of two years on count 3. Appellant was awarded 1,561 days of presentence custody credits.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude his confession on th

Defendant Ralph Lopez appeals the judgment following his conviction for murder, assault with a firearm, and several counts of attempted premeditated murder, along with various firearm and gang enhancements. He argues insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that he caused great bodily injury with a firearm as required to impose the 25-years-to-life enhancement in Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) for one of the attempted murder counts. We disagree. He also contends—and respondent agrees—the 10-year gang enhancements must be stricken and the abstract of judgment must be corrected. We will strike the gang enhancements and direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment. We affirm the judgment as modified.