CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Raul Vega Hernandez appeals from the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for unlawfully causing a fire of forest land (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (c); unlabeled statutory references are to this code) and unlawful possession of an incendiary device (§ 453, subd. (a)). Hernandez argues that the offenses comprise a single indivisible course of criminal conduct for which he cannot be subject to multiple punishments pursuant to section 654, subdivision (a). He also argues, and the People concede, that section 1465.9, subdivision (a), which became effective July 1, 2021, mandates that the portion of the trial court’s order imposing a presentence probation report fee be vacated. Finding both arguments have merit, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.

Husband Jerry Nolan and wife Shawn Nolan bought a new Ford Excursion from a Ford dealership. They chose to buy it with a 6.0-liter diesel engine (6.0L engine), because Ford and the dealership both represented that engine as higher-quality and longer-lasting. In fact, the truck — and especially the engine — required repair after repair. Several times, it lost power. Once, it broke down and left the Nolans and their children stranded halfway to Lake Havasu. By the time it had 120,000 miles on it, it had massive oil leaks and was mostly inoperable.
The Nolans’ expert testified that the 6.0L engine had a defective air management system. Stuck or mistimed fuel injectors caused incomplete combustion. Unburned hydrocarbons built up on and eventually clogged up the turbocharger and the exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) valve. This resulted in loss of power, oil leaks, and early part failures, among other things.

The probation department sought to revoke Smith’s PRCS based on several alleged violations. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Smith had failed to obey laws and had contact with and annoyed and harassed the victim, his former girlfriend.
The testimony offered at the evidentiary hearing is well summarized in the appellant’s opening brief. We will incorporate the summary here for background information.
“According to testimony presented in the contested hearing, at approximately 1:00 p.m. on December 26, 2021, [F.N.] saw a man assaulting a woman in a Pep Boys parking lot adjacent to Imperial Avenue in El Centro. [F.N.] saw the man kick the woman twice, punch her twice, and swing a bag at her.
“El Centro Police Department (ECPD) officer Omar Mandujano arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. He identified the female victim as A.D. A.D., upset and crying, had redness and swelling on her right arm and side.

S.E. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to H.E., her then 20-month-old daughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred in finding the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Because we conclude Mother has not affirmatively demonstrated error, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

In 2008, a jury convicted Meikel Jerome Cooper of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664 & 187). The jury also found Cooper personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury as to the murder count (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and a similar enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (a) as to the attempted manslaughter count. Cooper was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 42 years in prison.
Cooper appealed and this court affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion, People v. Cooper, D058080 (Mar. 8, 2011).
In 2019, Cooper filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court appointed counsel, and held a hearing at which the following comments were made:

Plaintiff LMV Carlsbad Holdings, LP (together with Lennar Multifamily Communities, Lennar) and defendant Presidio Cornerstone QC, LLC (Cornerstone) are both land developers. After Cornerstone sold land to Lennar for the construction of 278 rental apartments, Lennar successfully sued Cornerstone for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The central issue at trial and on appeal is which developer is responsible under the parties’ Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) for paying nearly $1.3 million in “park in-lieu” fees imposed by the City of Carlsbad (City) and paid under protest by Lennar.
Cornerstone owned multiple contiguous parcels in Carlsbad and negotiated to sell one to Lennar for a planned apartment project. But because the desired lot was not large enough for Lennar’s project, the PSA required Cornerstone to enlarge it by moving the boundary with an adjacent lot it also owned. Cornerstone accomplished this task by filing a tentative parcel map with the City.

In 2005, a jury found petitioner Derrick Courtney guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) with a finding that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.2, subd. (a)(1)). Later, after finding true a special circumstance allegation that defendant had a prior conviction for first degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), the trial court sentenced petitioner to state prison for life without the possibility of parole plus an additional year for the section 12022.2 finding. (People v. Courtney (Jan. 4, 2008, C051548) [nonpub. opn.].)
Petitioner’s jury was instructed that it could find him guilty of murder pursuant to the “natural and probable consequences doctrine” if it concluded he aided and abetted the target offense of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury.

Appellant C.C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights and freeing the three minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to consider and apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. Finding the claim forfeited, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant Jacob Michael Dahlem appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his request for probation and sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of six years. He asserts and the People agree that: (1) the trial court erred in determining he was presumptively ineligible for probation; and (2) he is entitled to remand for a full resentencing in light of recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170. For the reasons explained herein, we concur that defendant is entitled to remand for a new probation determination and full resentencing under amended section 1170. Accordingly, we will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Hornbrook Community Services District (District) and defendants Kimberly R. Olson and Peter T. Harrell (collectively defendants) were involved in a prolonged dispute in which the trial court issued a temporary restraining order in the District’s favor. The dispute ended when Olson dismissed her cross-complaint against the District and, years later, the District dismissed its complaint against defendants. Upon dismissal of the District’s complaint, defendants sought costs related to the complaint and the District sought costs related to Olson’s cross-complaint. The trial court found the District timely filed a cost memorandum related to Olson’s cross-complaint and was the prevailing party as to both the cross-complaint and the complaint. In total, the trial court ordered Olson to pay $180 pertaining only to the District’s claimed costs related to the cross-complaint.

T.M., mother of the minor (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 395.) She asserts the juvenile court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and (2) erred in delegating visitation and in making a finding of reasonable services. We need not address mother’s second contention because the juvenile court did not properly comply with the UCCJEA. We will reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant Andrew Kam Lee argues that a punitive damages award equal to the value of his alleged interest in real property held by an LLC of which he was once a member is excessive under California law and not supported by substantial evidence of his ability to pay the punitive damages award. The six Doe respondents failed to introduce any other evidence regarding appellant’s capacity to pay punitive damages, and we agree that this award is excessive given the evidence.
Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a new trial on the punitive damages issue. Because we vacate the punitive damages award as excessive and not supported by substantial evidence, we need not consider this issue.

California laws dissolving redevelopment agencies (RDAs) and providing for their winding-down also provided that loans from a city to its former RDA were unenforceable. (Health & Saf. Code, § 34171, subd. (d)(2).) But some loans to a former RDA may be reinstated and paid if they were “loans for money” with a “required repayment schedule.” (§ 34191.4, subd. (b)(2)(A).)
In this case, the Department of Finance (Finance) disapproved reinstatement of 13 loans from the City of Fresno (Fresno) to its former RDA. However, the trial court granted Fresno’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the loans could be reinstated under section 34191.4, subdivision (b).
Finance now contends the loans cannot be reinstated because (1) the loans were not “loans for money,” and (2) there was no “required repayment schedule” for the loans.

At the jurisdiction hearing, Leo R. (born Oct. 2019) was adjudicated a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j). At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court denied mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) (hereafter 361.5(b)(6)) and set a permanency planning hearing (§ 366.26).
Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services under section 361.5(b)(6). As relevant here, section 361.5(b)(6) requires the court to deny reunification services to a parent when the child or a sibling was severely physically harmed by an act or omission of the parent and the child would not benefit from reunifying with the parent. In deciding whether reunification services would benefit the child, the court must consider any information it deems relevant, including a list of factors outlined in section 361.5, subdivision (i)(1)-(6).