CA Unpub Decisions

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.H.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.K.
Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is the second appeal by L.H. (Father) arising out of his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 modification petition seeking placement of his son, Z.B., with him in Iowa. In his first appeal, we reversed the denial of his section 388 petition on the ground the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard. (In re Z.B. (Jan. 25, 2022, D079559) [nonpub. opn.] (In re Z.B. I, the prior opinion).) On remand, we instructed the juvenile court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on his petition, considering Z.B.’s then-current circumstances.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harold T. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Terin Janae Smith of aid by misrepresentation over $950 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2); count 1) and 95 counts of perjury by declaration (Pen. Code, § 118; counts 2-96). The court suspended the imposition of her sentence and placed Smith on five years formal probation, conditioned on her serving 365 days in county jail on a weekend/work release program.

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 19, 2022, be modified as follows:
1. On page 11, delete the first two sentences of the first paragraph (starting with “Counsel for the City” and ending with “or were disqualified”), replace with the following two sentences, and add new footnote 11 as indicated, which will require the renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
The appellate record does not contain evidence about the current status of the City’s licensing of storefront cannabis businesses.11 However, documents in the appellate record show that subsequent to the City’s denial of CVA’s applications, all of the applicants for storefront retail licenses in Council District One that had been selected to participate in Phase Two either dropped out or were disqualified.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy Casserly, Judge. Affirmed.
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, Kevin F. Quinn; Singleton Schreiber, Benjamin I. Siminou, Alicia M. Zimmerman, and J. Domenic Martini, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Alysia B. Carroll; Peabody & Buccini, Thomas M. Peabody, and Natalie J. Buccini, for Defendant and Respondent Scott M. Boles.
INTRODUCTION
Ramon Camacho died from a ruptured aortic dissection four days after he was released from Sharp Memorial Hospital’s Emergency Department. Surviving family members (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued the hospital, medical group, the emergency room doctor, and Does 1 through 50 for medical negligence and wrongful death.

Appointed counsel for defendant, Gregory Dean Kelley, has asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The People’s complaint charged defendant with driving or taking a vehicle without the consent of the owner (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) with an allegation he had suffered a prior strike (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (b).) (Statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code.) The parties resolved the case with defendant pleading guilty and admitting the prior strike. In exchange, defendant would receive a stipulated sentence to the lower term of 16 months doubled to 32 months because of the prior strike. The stipulated factual basis for the plea was that defendant took his friend’s Ford

Sixteen-year-old defendant Joaquin Segoviano Tapia, while intoxicated and driving too fast, ran a stop sign, causing a collision that killed a Lyft driver and his passenger. Charged with second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and tried in adult court after a transfer hearing, defendant was acquitted of second degree murder but convicted of two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, in violation of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum term of 13 years.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) admission of his prior drunk-driving incident was an abuse of discretion and violated his due process rights, (2) the trial court should have instructed the jury, with respect to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)), that the jury could find gross negligence only if a “reasonable child,” rather than a “reasonable person,” would have known defendant’s action

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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J.R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to D.R. (the child) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, arguing that the order should be conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the initial inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). No interested party filed a respondent’s brief; instead, counsel for father, the child, and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a joint application and

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed, in part, and conditionally reversed, in part, and remanded with instructions.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A.C. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her three children (the children), D.M. (born in 2010), J.M. (born in 2013), and C.M. (born in 2015). Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it concluded the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply and erred by failing to ensure that the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) conducted a sufficient initial inquiry under the the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Conditionally affirmed and remanded with directions.
Robert McLauglin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Mark P.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jamie M.
Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jamie M. (Mother) and Mark P., Jr., (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights over 10-year-old Jade P., five-year-old Mark P. III (Mark), three-year-old James P., and two-year-old Ezekiel P. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The parents contend as to Ezekiel the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. The parents do not challenge the findings as to the other children. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretio

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Susan Ser, Judge. Dismissed in part; conditionally affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Hailie R.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hailie R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over eight-year-old V.R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the maternal grandmother’s section 388 petition heard immediately before the hearing on termination of parental rights. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) contends and we agree that because Mother did not argue at the hearing and does not assert on appeal that an exception to termination o

Jonathan Ledesma appeals the judgment entered following the superior court’s determination that he had violated the terms of his plea agreement. We appointed counsel to represent Ledesma on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. Ledesma did not file a supplemental brief on his own behalf in propria persona.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Kylan Young appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to two counts of first degree robbery. No arguable issues have been identified following review of the record by Young’s appointed appellate counsel or our own independent review. We affirm.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack H. Karpeles for Defendant and Appellant.
Young K. Lim, in pro. per., Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Kap Moon and Leading Town SDUS, Inc. entered into an investment agreement in which Moon agreed to invest $100,000 in two of Leading Town’s retail businesses, in exchange for a 55% ownership interest and certain managerial rights in those businesses. Moon subsequently sued Kyonga Nam (the president of Leading Town), Jongju Na, Sung Joon Na, and Leading Town for breach of contract, alleging Nam and other Leading Town representatives repudiated the contract.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Nichelle L. Blackwell, Presiding Commissioner. Dismissed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant J.O. (Father) appeals from juvenile court visitation orders made on June 25, 2021 and June 29, 2021, in which the court modified Father’s unmonitored visitation with his daughter, Sabrina. P. (born May 2008), to monitored visits, and thereafter refused to return the status to unmonitored. On appeal, Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in restricting his visits with Sabrina. Father also raises issues of compliance with the initial inquiry required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), alleging that the Department should have contacted paternal relatives to inquire about Nativ