CA Unpub Decisions

Mother J.P. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to children J.H. and A.H., raising only one claim of error, that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) made an inadequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.

Aaron R. (born Dec. 2015) was declared a dependent of the juvenile court in February 2020, when the court sustained a petition in which respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleged that mother and father had a history of engaging in violent altercations in Aaron’s presence. In November 2019, DCFS removed Aaron from mother’s home and placed him in the home of relatives. The court ordered family reunification services but terminated them a year later and set a permanency planning hearing. At that hearing (in Sept. 2021), it was undisputed that the relatives would likely adopt Aaron. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) Mother, however, asserted the “beneficial parental relationship exception” to termination of parental rights. (Ibid.) The juvenile court rejected the exception and terminated mother’s parental rights.

Defendant Tramel Sylvester Lockett appeals from an order denying his post-sentencing motion to modify restitution, Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1). He contends that intervening events since the restitution amount was originally set show that a reduction in the award is necessary to align it with the victim’s actual losses. We, and the People, agree. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Father R.H. and mother J.G. appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to daughters M.H. and T.H., arguing the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) made an inadequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.

Lazaro O., the father (Father) of I.O., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and a dispositional order. I.O.’s mother (Mother) does not appeal. Father argues that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings and orders that I.O. is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), due to Father’s actions. He further contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him to attend a domestic violence counseling program as part of his reunification plan.
We find Father’s challenges to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to him justiciable. We hold that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based on domestic violence and, alternatively, on Father’s failure to protect I.O. from Mother’s drug abuse.

In 2009, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found that the crimes were gang related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), and that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) (d)). Defendant was sentenced to an overall term of 50 years to life, including a term of 25 years to life for first degree murder, and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court imposed and stayed a sentence (of an undefined term) under section 654 for felon in possession of a firearm.

A jury convicted defendant Phillip Dean Griffin of attempted criminal threat and found true the allegation that he used a deadly and dangerous weapon. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of his crime and the sentencing enhancement. The Attorney General concedes both errors, but maintains that defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to instruct adequately on attempted criminal threat. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Jesse Spicer and Akkeli Frederick were jointly tried by one jury and found guilty of gang-related murder and attempted murder. While in jail, Spicer made incriminating statements to a confidential informant masquerading as a fellow inmate, including ones identifying Frederick as his accomplice. On appeal, both defendants contend that Spicer’s statements should have been excluded. They also contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the judgments, that certain identification evidence and evidence Spicer was on probation were improperly admitted, and the trial court should have imposed a discovery sanction on the prosecution. We reject these contentions but because Spicer and Frederick are entitled to the benefit of recently-enacted ameliorative laws, remand is necessary.

A jury found defendant Jamie Lauer guilty of, among other crimes, murder and attempted murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole. Those convictions were upheld on direct appeal and in a subsequent habeas proceeding.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his postjudgment petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. We reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant James Russell Cernogg appeals from a postjudgment order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. In his earlier appeal of the trial court’s order, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Our Supreme Court granted review, and has now transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775). We do so, and again reverse and remand.

Defendant and appellant Steven A. Vasquez appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437). We affirmed the trial court’s order summarily denying Vasquez’s petition without appointment of counsel on the basis that section 1170.95 did not provide relief for Vasquez because he was convicted of attempted murder.
The Supreme Court granted Vasquez’s petition for review, and on February 16, 2022, it transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).)
We ordered our prior opinion vacated on March 1, 2022, and now issue this opinion.

Before us is the all too familiar story of estranged parents who are at odds with each other regarding what they believe is in the best interest of their child. What began as a highly contentious family law dispute has turned into a vigorously contested juvenile dependency case. On appeal, K.A. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s orders asserting dependency jurisdiction over Carson A. and removing Carson from father’s custody. Father contends he was denied due process when the juvenile court amended the dependency petition sua sponte to conform to proof. We affirm.

Plaintiff Jon Simonton, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, appeals a judgment dismissing his action against Dropbox, Inc. (Dropbox) alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 United States Code section 77k (hereafter the 1933 Act). He contends the court erred by enforcing a provision in Dropbox’s bylaws that designates federal district courts as the exclusive forum for claims under the 1933 Act. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Subtronic Corporation (Subtronic) agreed to purchase an Electro Scan, Inc. (Electro Scan) pipeline leak detection system from its distributor Weco Industries, LLC (Weco). Three years after the purchase, Subtronic claimed it agreed to the purchase based on the mistaken belief that there was a one-time fee, rather than an annual charge, for the software support and processing it acquired in connection with the system, and brought this action to rescind the contract and for alleged unfair business practices.
During the bench trial, the court admitted extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, which it found was ambiguous. The court concluded that while the contract did not explicitly state the software support and processing fee was an annual charge, rather than a one-time fee, the evidence established that it was, indeed, an annual charge and that Subtronic was not mistaken about the nature of the charge.