CA Unpub Decisions

Ralph Lee Robinson entered into a plea agreement in which he pled no contest to cultivating marijuana. Appellate counsel was unable to identify any arguable issues in the case. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Sandra Kay Adams stands convicted of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of arson of an inhabited structure. Adams was sentenced to a term of five years in prison on the arson count, and the midterm of three years each, stayed pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 654, on the attempted voluntary manslaughter counts. Adams appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Petitioner Janet G. seeks extraordinary relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l);[1] Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s order, made at the 18-month permanency review hearing (§ 366.22), setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for her son T.H. We deny the petition.

Defendant and appellant C.D. (Minor) appeals a juvenile court order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] petition alleging he committed a robbery. Following a disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered Minor placed home on probation. The minute order memorializing the juvenile court’s decision states Minor is subject to a maximum confinement term of five years. Minor argues the five-year maximum term is erroneous because it was not part of the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and because, in any event, he was not ordered removed from his parents’ custody. The Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that the maximum confinement term should be stricken.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Timothy Dale (defendant) with one count of attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, § 213(b).)[1] At trial, victim Desiree Scott (Scott) testified that on January 20, 2016, defendant approached her outside her home, ordered her to give him her bracelets, and, when she refused, advanced on her with a knife. Scott ran into her home and called 911. The police apprehended defendant shortly thereafter, carrying the knife he had pointed at Scott. Scott positively identified him as her assailant.

Defendant, Adrian Medina Lopez, pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Penal Code[1] section 192, subdivision (a). He also admitted gang and firearm allegations were true. (§§ 186.22, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (c).) At his sentencing hearing, defendant made a motion to withdraw his plea. The motion was denied and a sentence of 41 years in state prison was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. Thereafter, a sentencing error was discovered and defendant was resentenced to 31 years in prison. He again moved to withdraw his plea but that motion was denied.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues but requesting we independently review the record on appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441. (See Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 227-284.) On September 7, 2016, we advised defendant that he had 30 days within which to f

Following a jury trial, defendant, Rudolph Farrow, was convicted of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle and counterfeiting the state seal. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 472.) He was sentenced to county jail for three years eight months. We reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 (Brady)) but correct defendant’s custody credit.

After they collided on a bicycle path, inline skater Roger Navas-Balladares sued bicyclist Christopher Montella for negligence. The jury concluded that Montella was not negligent, and the court denied Navas-Balladares’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial. We affirm.

Bank of New York Mellon successfully moved for summary judgment in an action brought by Vicki Hufnagel. We affirm.

Defendant Timothy Richard Woods appeals from a judgment of conviction of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459-460, subd. (a)).[1] Following a jury trial, defendant admitted each of the information’s allegations concerning his prior convictions—specifically, that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12) and that he had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). After granting defendant’s Romero motion (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504) as to one of the two strike convictions, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 23-year term.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court violated Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 and his federal due process rights by admitting evidence of a 2010 burglary to prove his intent to commit theft with respect to the charged first degree b

Appellant Zaman Kabir has now made three trips to our court. His first appeal was dismissed because he did not have a final judgment.[1] The second appeal – from a default and a default judgment in favor of respondent Behnaz Shahbazi – resulted in our upholding the default and returning the default judgment to the trial court to modify the amount. Kabir now appeals from this modified default judgment.
Kabir evidently believes that returning the judgment for modification nullified the default and put all the issues in the litigation back on the table. In this he is mistaken. We did not reverse the default itself, and we did not reverse the default judgment in its entirety. The second appeal established the law of the case for any subsequent activity in the trial court, and the only debatable issue likely to arise from the modified judgment was the amount of the new judgment itself. Kabir has not shown us any defect in this newly calculated amount. We

Theodore Davis (Davis) petitions for a writ of review from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). (Lab. Code,[1] § 5950; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.495.) In light of the WCAB’s admission that it failed to consider a relevant Labor Code provision, we grant the petition, vacate the WCAB’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioners S.J. (mother) and David S. (father) in propria persona challenge the juvenile court’s exercise of its dependency jurisdiction over their two infant sons, now 22-month-old Santiago and nine-month-old Gabriel, and its dispositional orders denying them reunification services based on its finding that Gabriel suffered severe physical abuse while in their exclusive custody. They contend there was insufficient evidence that they knew or had reason to know that Gabriel was being physically harmed. They seek extraordinary writ relief[1] from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, including the court’s order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[2] (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We deny the petition.

Douglas Wayne Clopton entered into a plea agreement, which resulted in conviction on two misdemeanor charges. Appellate counsel could not identify any arguable issues. We affirm the judgment.