CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Santos Maldonado was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) [count 1])[1] and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) [count 2]). The information further alleged he served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and, in connection with count 1, inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.7). The jury found defendant not guilty on count 1 and guilty on count 2. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the prior prison term allegations. Thereafter, defendant received an aggregate sentence of six years: an upper term of four years on count 2 plus two years for two of the prior prison terms. The court struck punishment for the remaining prior prison terms.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his mother’s attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying. He also asserts his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance because (1) she

Defendant and appellant J.R. (Father) is the father of N.R. (a female born November 2011) and B.R. (a male born June 2013) as well as five other children (collectively, the children). Defendant and appellant Ja.R. (Sister; a female born October 1998) is the oldest of the children.[1] Father and Sister contend that the juvenile dependency court erred in (1) denying Sister’s Welfare and Institutions Code[2] section 388 petition; and (2) failing to find the sibling relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), applicable to the termination of parental rights. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

Defendant and appellant R.F. is the maternal grandmother (MGM) of six-year-old L.K. and one-year-old L.J.K. MGM appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her a full evidentiary hearing related to her Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition requesting placement of the children in her care and custody.[2] On appeal, MGM argues that (1) the juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the juvenile court erred in failing to conduct a relative placement preference hearing pursuant to section 361.3 when it denied her section 388 petition. We reject MGM’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

The only issue in this appeal is whether a “super-strike” conviction sustained after a theft-related felony conviction is nevertheless a “prior conviction” such that it bars the reduction of the theft-related felony to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
Consistent with the three published opinions on this issue, we will hold that it is.

Defendant and appellant Linda Belin appeals from the trial court’s judgment affirming her continued involuntary treatment at Patton State Hospital (Patton) as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2970.[1] Defendant makes the following claims on appeal:
1. The People did not provide sufficient evidence to prove she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others due to a severe mental disorder as required in the MDO law.
2. The phrase “substantial danger of physical harm” in sections 2962 and 2970 is unconstitutionally vague.
3. The trial court erroneously allowed the expert witness to describe otherwise inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay evidence in violation of her due process right to a fair trial.
4. The California Supreme Court’s recent case of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 655 (Sanchez) which clarified the admission of expert testimony in gang cases pursuant to Evide

In this mandamus proceeding, an association (plaintiff Friends of
Spring Street) challenged a determination by defendant Nevada City (the city) that real parties in interest Mollie Poe and Declan Hickey had the right to resume operation of a bed and breakfast facility in a residential district of the city despite the fact that, years earlier, voters had passed an initiative measure repealing the provisions in the city’s municipal code allowing such facilities. Plaintiff also challenged a 2015 city ordinance relating to the discontinuance of nonconforming uses subject to conditional use permits. The trial court upheld the city’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast and upheld the 2015 ordinance.
On plaintiff’s appeal, we conclude that while the trial court did not err in upholding the 2015 ordinance, the court did err in upholding the city’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast. Accordingly, we will reverse.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Oscar Vargas of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. (Pen. Code, § 21310[1].) The trial court found that defendant suffered one prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that section 21310, the statute that criminalizes carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, and section 16470, the statute that defines “dirk” and “dagger,” together are facially overbroad and thus unconstitutional. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Angela Kay Vandiver appeals from an order denying her petition to reduce her burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) conviction to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18.[1] Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

Warren Shaw was charged with numerous counts and enhancing allegations, including the charge in count 1 that he committed corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and that he had been convicted of a prior violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) within the meaning of section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1). The complaint specially alleged Shaw had three prison priors within the meaning of sections 667.5, subdivision (b) and 668, and one strike prior within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) though (i), 1170.12, and 668.
Shaw entered into a plea bargain pursuant to which he pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior strike conviction and one of the prison priors, in exchange for a stipulated five-year term in state prison and dismissal of the remaining charges and allegations. However, when he subsequently appeared for sentencing, Shaw made an oral Marsden motion[2] and also requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn. The

Defendant and appellant William B. Morschauser, an attorney, appeals from a judgment and postjudgment order granting a motion to tax costs following a jury trial on plaintiffs and respondents Ruth Mauzey and Larry Mauzey's[1] complaint for professional negligence in connection with Morschauser's untimely filing of a petition to probate the will of Ruth's son. The jury returned a special verdict in Ruth's favor finding Morschauser was negligent, his negligence was a substantial factor in causing Ruth harm, and Ruth's damages were $183,000. In these consolidated appeals, Morschauser contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because there is insufficient evidence that he owed Ruth a duty of care, and neither the jury instructions nor special verdict enabled the jury to decide whether he acted as Ruth's attorney; (2) Ruth failed to establish causation or damages to a reasonable certainty; and (3) the

Appellant Philemon Purganan appeals an order denying his request to vacate an October 2005 family court order that he pay respondent Yvonne Fernandes $1,000 a month in spousal support. Purganan contends the court erred by denying his request because the October 2005 order modified a 2001 Hawaii court's spousal support order in violation of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the UIFSA; Fam. Code,[1] § 5700.101 et seq.), the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the order, and as a result the October 2005 order is void ab initio. We agree that under the UIFSA, the Hawaii court had exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the matter of spousal support and that the UIFSA precluded the San Diego Superior Court's modification of the Hawaii order. Because the court erred by denying Purganan's motion to vacate the October 2005 order, we reverse with directions set forth below.

This appeal arises from a judgment entered in an interpleader action filed by attorney C. Bradley Hallen to determine how $600,000 in proceeds recovered as a result of the settlement of a wrongful death action should be distributed among the four surviving siblings of the victim, Minarokh (Mina) Hamzavi.
After listening to testimony and reviewing the evidence presented, the trial court determined that the two younger siblings had developed much closer personal relationships with Mina, and therefore suffered greater injury as a result of her death, than the two older siblings, who were essentially estranged from her. The court awarded the estranged siblings nominal damages of $10,000 each, and divided the remainder of the settlement funds between the two other siblings.
On appeal, the two older siblings (appellants) seek to reverse the trial court's judgment, arguing that there is not sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. However,

Plaintiffs Duncan Faulkner and his mother, Catherine Ibarra, filed a complaint alleging the defendants conspired to deny Faulkner his legal rights to compensation for injuries he incurred during an assault by inadequately investigating the incident and making false statements to the police and the small claims court. The court granted Defendants' special motions to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 425.16, concluding the statute protected the activities underlying the asserted claims and appellants could not establish a probability of success on the merits, and entered judgment in favor of defendants.
On appeal, Faulkner and Ibarra contend the court erred in granting the special motions to strike because the conduct underlying the complaint was illegal as a matter of law and therefore not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute, and, even if the conduct was entitled to protection, they made a sufficient showing on the merits of

In late January 2013, a 76-count felony indictment was filed against David Thomas Wise (Wise) and his wife and codefendant, Christina Wise.[1] The indictment charged Wise with the commission of the following 68 felonies against more than 20 victims: one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft (count 1: Pen. Code,[2] § 182, subd. (a)(1)); 18 counts of presenting false information in an insurance claim (counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20-22, 24-25, 27, 29, 31 & 69: § 550, subd. (b)(1)); 25 counts of grand theft of personal property (counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49 & 51-53: § 487, subd. (a)); eight counts of issuing checks with nonsufficient funds (counts 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46 & 50: § 476a, subd. (a)); one count of using false statements in the sale of a security (count 48: Corp. Code, § 25401); three counts of failure to file a tax return (counts 54, 56 & 58: Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2117.5); three counts of