CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Fernando Zecena of sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).[1] After conviction, appellant admitted a prior felony conviction for which he served a prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life in prison for the sexual penetration conviction, and imposed but stayed, pursuant to section 654, the six-year mid-term for the lewd act conviction. The court also struck the one-year enhancement for the prison prior found true.
On appeal, appellant raises two issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he penetrated the victim’s genital opening, which is an element of section 288.7, subdivision (b); and (2) that he is entitled to one extra day of presentence credit. With respect to the first issue, we disagree with appellant and affirm the trial court. With respect to th

Defendant and appellant J.A. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order finding his daughter Trinity A. (Daughter) to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (subdivision (b)),[1] which requires, in relevant part, that the child is at substantial risk of suffering “serious physical harm.” We construe Father’s argument on appeal to be that the section 300 petition filed in this case was insufficient to support the court’s finding of jurisdiction because, when the juvenile court amended the petition, the court deleted some instances of the words “serious” and “physical” from the petition.[2] Because Father failed to raise this issue below, we conclude he has forfeited the issue on appeal. In any event, we are not persuaded by his argument. Accordingly, Court Affirm.

Defendant and appellant Justin Charles Neumann appeals from the issuance of a post-conviction criminal protective order (issued when his probation was revoked), directing that he stay away from the victim of his underlying offense for 10 years. For the reasons discussed below, the protective order is reversed.

Plaintiff John Clifton Elstead, an attorney representing himself in this lawsuit he filed nearly fifteen years ago, appeals from a judgment entered after a bench trial rejecting his breach of contract claim against the servicer of his home mortgage, JPMorgan Chase Bank, successor to Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., and Chase Mortgage Services, Inc. (“Chase”).
This is the second time this case has been before us. We previously affirmed a grant of summary judgment in Chase’s favor on all causes of action but one, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Elstead’s breach of contract claim only. (Elstead v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (Nov. 30, 2009, Nos. A117521, A119606) [nonpub. opn.] (Elstead I).) The trial court rejected that remaining cause of action at trial principally because Elstead could not prove he performed his own contractual obligations: specifically, he failed to show that he had ever paid Chase nearly $50,000 he owed under a settlement the parties reached in

Ryan S., maternal grandfather (MGF), and Paula S., maternal grandmother (MGM) (collectively, MGPs) of Jacob S., and Jacob S. (the child) (collectively, appellants) appeal an order denying MGPs’ Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition to have the child placed in their custody. Appellants argue the juvenile court erred in refusing to remove the child from the foster parents with whom he had been placed and place him instead with MGPs under their interpretation of the “relative placement preference” of section 361.3. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Emma Court LP; Mark Migdal Revocable Trust; and Mark Migdal, both individually and as trustee of Mark Migdal 2000 Revocable Trust, appeal from the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs to defendants United American Bank (United American) and Lighthouse Bank (Lighthouse; collectively, defendants), and costs to defendant Geraldine Felix, following the dismissal of plaintiffs’ lawsuit, which arose from an agreement between United American and Migdal for construction loan funding for two of Migdal’s property development projects. On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it (1) awarded contractual attorney fees to United American and Lighthouse because such fees were barred by statute, and fees related to the tort and statutory claims that were not authorized by the loan agreements; (2) effectively awarded half of the attorney fees to Lighthouse, which was not a party to any of the loan agreements; (3) awarded United American and Lighthouse costs d

Joel Ward appeals from a judgment enjoining him from harassing Tarshia Rodgers. He contends that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Defendant, Aaron Edward Stapleton, appeals from a first degree murder conviction (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)) and the jurys handgun use finding. ( 12022.53, subd. (d).) Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his gang status and awarded too few days of presentence custody credits. We affirm with modifications.



We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v.Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v.Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909.) Twenty-one-year old Rodolfo Orozco lived at times with his parents and began moving around prior to his May 22, 2006 death. Mr. Orozco worked sporadically in the construction industry. Mr. Orozcos brother was Alejandro Orozco.[2] On three occasions Alejandro went to the Tujunga area to pay money for his rent. On those occasions, Mr. Orozco was with defendant. Mr. Orozco paid rent to Alejandro. Mr. Orozco had a drug problem.

Defendant went to his uncle’s home, where the uncle was in the backyard with some friends and family, including his four-year-old daughter. Defendant was swinging a cane around wildly, which made the uncle concerned for his daughter. The uncle asked defendant to please leave if he was going to be doing that. Defendant left and said, “I’ll be back.” Defendant’s request for appointment of substitute counsel is denied. The judgment is affirmed.

Macario Monterrosa appeals from his judgment of conviction for first degree murder (premeditated murder) of Rogelio Alvarado and attempted premeditated murder of Juan B. He contends the court should have instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense. We modify the judgment to correct sentencing errors but otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Deborah Salas appeals from the denial of her motion to withdraw her no contest plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her no contest plea. She maintains her motion should have been granted because she showed by clear and convincing evidence that her plea resulted from the deprivation of her anti-anxiety medication after she was unexpectedly taken into custody during a court appearance. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Tyrone Hunter (defendant) appeals from his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant contends that his conviction was not supported by substantial evidence, and he asks that we review the in camera hearing on his Pitchess discovery motion.[1] As we are unable to review the in camera hearing, and conclude that substantial evidence supports the conviction, The Court affirm the judgment.

jury convicted appellant Sebastian Zazueta of one count of murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)), and four counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), with firearm allegations found true as to each count (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).) The trial court sentenced him to state prison for 50 years to life, 25 years to life for count 1, plus an additional 25 years to life for the firearm allegation; consecutive terms for counts 2 and 3, and concurrent terms of life plus 25 years to life for counts 4 and 5. The Court reject appellant’s contentions, and affirm