CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Kimberly Pickett (Pickett) appeals from the order dismissing her negligence action against defendant and respondent Olympia Medical Center (Olympia) after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, Olympia’s demurrer to Pickett’s second amended complaint (SAC). Olympia provided services and facilities for a surgery in which Pickett was allegedly injured.
The SAC states a claim for negligence against Olympia. We therefore reverse the order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action against Olympia.

In the purchase of her home, plaintiff Esperanza D. Bagwell obtained a mortgage loan from Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), secured by a first trust deed on the property. After the demise of WaMu, defendant JP Morgan Bank, N.A. (Chase) assumed the beneficial interest in the loan. Plaintiff defaulted, and Chase initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure, which resulted in a trustee’s sale in which Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche) purchased the property for $1,023,625.18 (the amount of the unpaid debt and other charges) and received a trustee’s deed.

The Court hold that the record of the hearing on the fee motion demonstrates that the trial court followed the lodestar adjustment method in determining the fee award and that the court did not abuse its discretion in selecting hourly rates for plaintiff’s attorneys. We further hold that plaintiff waived his appellate contentions concerning the trial court’s 25 percent reduction in the number of hours expended by his attorneys and the trial court’s failure to rule on his requests for paralegal fees and costs. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting, in part, the fee motion.

Plaintiff Swarnapali Timmann (Plaintiff) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Defendants John Napoli (Napoli), Kelly Berkline (Berkline), JFN Project Consultants, Inc., a California corporation (JFN Consultants), and JFN Project Consultants, Ltd., a United Kingdom corporation (JFN Limited) (collectively, Defendants). Judgment was entered for Defendants after Plaintiff’s case was dismissed for failure to post a nonresident plaintiff bond pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1030. We reverse the judgment, but affirm the discovery orders discussed later in this opinion.

Petitioner David M. (Father), the father of 19-month-old David M., Jr. (David, Jr.), challenges the Alameda County juvenile court’s February 1, 2016 order terminating family reunification services and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (366.26 hearing), for May 26, 2016.[1] He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that there was no substantial probability that David, Jr., would be returned to Father’s care if services were extended to the 18-month review date. For the reasons given below, we deny the petition.

James Clarence Neal (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion under Proposition 47[1] to have a felony conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor conviction. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

Manuel H., the presumed father of Gabriel H., (appellant) appeals from the dispositional order of the Mendocino Juvenile Court declaring Gabriel a dependent child, with custody placement entrusted to respondent Mendocino County Department of Social Services (Department). Appellant contends two findings made by the juvenile court are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree, and the Court affirm.

In these consolidated appeals, Mother challenges the order denying her section 388 petition and the order terminating her parental rights as to Sister and Younger Brother. Mother contends (1) the court erred by denying her section 388 petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, (2) there was not clear and convincing evidence Younger Brother was adoptable, and (3) the court should have applied the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Appellant J.J. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after he entered a no contest plea to a misdemeanor count of possessing brass knuckles in violation of Penal Code section 21810. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the evidence against him was discovered during an unlawful search by his school principal upon his return to campus. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) We affirm.

After jury trial, defendant Sean Anthony Donohue was convicted of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), and sentenced to a four-year probationary term. He seeks reversal of his conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence and instructional error. We affirm

In a dissolution action and related civil action, the former wife appeals orders permitting her ex-husband’s new wife to appear in the actions as counsel pro hac vice. We shall dismiss the appeals. Orders granting pro hac vice applications and denying motions to strike pro hac vice admission are not appealable.

Plaintiff Neelam Bala Rai filed an adversary proceeding against defendant Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (Real Time) in her bankruptcy case, claiming injury from an allegedly frivolous adversary proceeding filed earlier by Real Time. The bankruptcy court dismissed Rai’s proceeding, ruling that her state law claims for malicious prosecution and unfair business practices were preempted by federal law. Rai thereafter filed the present action, alleging the same claims found preempted by the bankruptcy court and joining four other claims based on the failure of Real Time to remove a lien from her real property in 2005. The Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jessica Nieto appeals after she pleaded guilty in count 1 to felony elder abuse (Pen. Code,[1] § 368, subd. (b)) and to the allegation that, in the commission of this offense, she personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon (i.e., a knife) (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Affirmed.