CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Lonnie Ray Decker was pulled over while driving a car registered to someone else that contained large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana. A jury found him guilty of transporting and possessing methamphetamine for sale, but hung on similar charges involving the marijuana. He was sentenced to six years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) a police officer, who was the prosecution’s drug expert, violated his constitutional rights by improperly opining on his guilt when he was allowed to testify over defense counsel’s objection that there was no way defendant could not have seen the methamphetamine on the floorboard of the back passenger seat; (2) the same officer testified to inadmissible profile evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial;

Mike Harsini sued Belmont Village (Belmont) and Miki Lamm (collectively, defendants) for the wrongful death of his mother. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. We conclude that Mike Harsini has forfeited his contentions by failing to provide a coherent statement of facts, failing to provide an adequate record, failing to cite to the record, and failing to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Will Arthur Gregory (defendant) argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. There was no prejudicial error, so we affirm.

The juvenile court declared mother Ma.M.’s children dependents and removed them from her custody after finding she was involved in several domestic violence incidents with her former boyfriend. During the most recent incident, one of the children intervened and started hitting the boyfriend. On appeal, mother contends there is insufficient evidence supporting the court’s removal orders and there were reasonable means to protect the children short of removal. We affirm.

SwiftAir, LLC appeals from the trial court’s orders granting motions by Southwest Airlines Co. and Row 44, Inc. for attorneys’ fees and costs. SwiftAir argues the court erred in ruling Southwest and Row 44 were entitled to attorneys’ fees as prevailing parties under the relevant contracts. SwiftAir also argues that, because Southwest’s offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 was unreasonable, the trial court erred in awarding Southwest $209,886.89 in fees for experts not ordered by the court. We affirm.

After defendant Ariana Irisha Garth pleaded no contest to evading a peace officer, grand theft, and resisting arrest, the trial court sentenced her to two years in state prison. Her sole contention on appeal is that she is entitled to resentencing under the recently enacted ameliorative amendments to Penal Code section 1170. The People agree.
We accept the Attorney General’s concession, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand for resentencing in light of amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). In all other respects, we affirm.

Appellant Darlene N. (Mother) appeals from a dispositional order declaring her young daughter, M.C., a dependent minor and placing her in Mother’s home with family maintenance services. She contends that although her toddler had been hospitalized for two days after possibly ingesting drugs, there was insufficient evidence that the minor was at substantial risk of future harm. We conclude that the juvenile court properly assumed jurisdiction, because there was substantial evidence that the minor had suffered serious harm as a result of Mother’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) We therefore affirm.

J.C., a ward of the juvenile court, appeals from a disposition order continuing his wardship after he was found to have violated his probation. The sole focus of this appeal is a probation condition imposed by the juvenile court requiring J.C. to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices. J.C. argues the probation condition is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), as construed in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), and is unconstitutionally overbroad. Although an electronics search condition is appropriate here, we conclude the condition imposed by the court is too broad to survive scrutiny under Ricardo P. We therefore strike the condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider imposing a revised condition.

Following a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained “risk of harm” allegations (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1)), as to K.V. (Father) and mother. Father appeals, challenging a jurisdiction finding that his “daily” consumption of alcohol placed E.V. (minor) at “serious risk of physical harm or neglect,” which precipitated an alcohol assessment requirement and removal of the minor from his custody. Although the jurisdiction and disposition orders are supported by other, unchallenged findings, we exercise our discretion to consider Father’s challenge.

Defendant Gregory Washington, Jr. appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder. He contends the trial court failed to follow the required procedures to protect one incompetent to stand trial due to intellectual disability; that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the destruction of exculpatory evidence; and that the trial court improperly allowed an officer to testify about the contents of a surveillance video. We shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Michael Anthony Romero pleaded no contest in September 2020 to false imprisonment with violence and misdemeanor false imprisonment. In February 2021, he was placed on probation for a term of three years.
Defendant initially contended on appeal that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by placing him on probation for three years. He cited Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a), effective January 1, 2021, which makes the maximum allowable term of probation two years, with certain exceptions. The Attorney General conceded the point. We requested supplemental briefing, however, because it appeared from the record that defendant’s relationship to the victim made the crime a domestic violence offense, which, as “an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions,” is excluded from the two-year probation term limit. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).) We asked the parties to address the following questions:

In this dissolution of marriage action, appellant Walter Pistor (Walt) challenges orders after trial requiring that he reimburse respondent Kimberly Pistor (Kimberly) for certain expenditures of community funds made by him during the marriage—specifically for funds spent on his car-racing hobby and for loans made to friends and other entities. On appeal, Walt contends the reimbursement orders lack legal foundation and factual support. For the reasons explained below, we largely agree.
We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering reimbursement to the community for Walt’s expenditures during the marriage on his personal hobby. As for the order requiring reimbursement to the community for Walt’s loans of community funds, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering reimbursement for a portion of the loans.

Defendant Dinorah Lizzette Martinez-Urbina pled no contest to driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or higher causing injury and two counts of child endangerment. The trial court granted her probation which included electronic and cellular device and financial record search terms. On appeal, defendant contends that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge as unreasonable and overbroad the terms of probation requiring her to submit to a search of her electronic and cellular devices and financial records. The People disagree. We affirm.

In 2008, appellant Joseph Enrique Lopez (appellant) was convicted after a jury trial of count 1, first degree murder, with two special circumstances: the murder was intentional and committed while appellant was an active participant in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22)); and the murder was committed by appellant while the defendants were engaged in the commission of rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
In 2020, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, and asserted he was not the actual killer, he was convicted under the felony-murder rule, and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and he could not be now convicted of first or second degree murder because of the amendments to sections 188 and 189. The court denied the petition.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record.