CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Santos Acevedo Pasillas pleaded guilty to murder based on his involvement in the robbery of a convenience store during which the shop owner was shot dead by defendant’s coparticipant. Defendant was paroled in 2018 and he petitioned for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) in 2019. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, concluding defendant acted as a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. On appeal, defendant argues insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

Cesar Joshua Pinon was convicted of attempted premeditated murder, attempted robbery, and resisting an executive officer, all arising out of an incident in which he shot a man after unsuccessfully trying to rob him. The jury also found true gang enhancement and firearm use enhancement allegations. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 43 years to life in prison.
Pinon was tried with his co-defendant, Jimmy Zaragoza, who was also convicted of various offenses arising out of the same incident. Zaragoza’s appeal is addressed in a separate opinion, our case number F080295. Many of the issues raised in the defendants’ respective appeals overlap.
Pinon raises numerous issues. We conclude that, due to recent legislative enactments that took effect while his appeal was pending, Pinon is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Jimmy Zaragoza was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted robbery, resisting a peace officer, and possession of burglary tools. All of the offenses arose from an incident in which he and his co-defendant, Cesar Joshua Pinon, unsuccessfully tried to rob a man whom Pinon then shot. Zaragoza was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter on an aiding and abetting theory. The jury found true gang enhancement and firearm enhancement allegations. Zaragoza was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 years to life in prison.
Zaragoza raises numerous issues on appeal. He also joins in several of the issues Pinon raises. We conclude that, due to recent legislative enactments that took effect while his appeal was pending, Zaragoza is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

In this appeal from the dispositional order in a dependency case, defendant and appellant, Kendra V. (Mother), contends respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to comply with the duty of initial inquiry imposed by state statutory provisions implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). We agree and remand for CFS to investigate and report on the potential Indian ancestry of Mother’s children.

In 2021, B.M. admitted to first degree murder and, as part of her disposition, the judge imposed the mandatory minimum restitution fine of $100. On appeal, B.M. argues the judge violated her due process right to a determination on her ability to pay as articulated in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). The People argue B.M. forfeited her challenge by failing to object to the fine. We agree B.M. has forfeited her challenge, and therefore affirm.

Defendant and appellant Richard Harold Landis appeals the Riverside County Superior Court’s summary denial of his Penal Code section 1170.126 petition seeking resentencing on a conviction for which he was sentenced under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)). In supplemental briefing, he requests we remand his case for recall of his sentence and resentencing pursuant to section 1171.1 because his prison term includes a prison prior enhancement that became legally invalid while his appeal was pending. He also raises a number of issues attacking the judgment, including wrongful conviction and improper classification of one of his offenses.
We affirm the denial of the section 1170.126 petition, decline the invitation to remand the matter for compliance with section 1171.1 procedures, and find the other issues he raises are not reviewable on this appeal.

For two years, defendant and his partner ran a Ponzi scheme that stole approximately $30 million from would-be investors.
A jury convicted defendant of 304 counts involving 27 victims. The counts covered a wide range of violations such as grant theft by false pretenses, securities fraud, acting as a broker-dealer, as well as 93 enhancements relating to the taking of property. In January 2014, the court sentenced him to a total of 81 years and 8 months in prison. Defendant was also required to pay restitution in the amount of $6,041,800.18 as well as court operations and facilities assessment fees. Defendant appealed.
On appeal, we agreed with defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence of the sale or offer to sell a commodity to support seven counts of commodity fraud and reversed the convictions on those counts. (People v. Montecastro (Oct 7, 2015, E060533) [nonpub. opn.] pp. 2, 39 (“Montecastro I.).)

In June 1990, defendant and appellant Anton Kubica, along with his wife CJ Michaels, killed Marie Darling and buried her in a shallow grave in the desert near Palm Springs. Kubica and CJ then forged a document that transferred funds from Darling’s Swiss bank accounts into an offshore account in Anguilla opened by defendant just prior to Darling’s murder. In 1993, CJ and defendant were identified as suspects in Darling’s murder. They were both prosecuted for committing fraud against other victims in Palm Springs and spent time in jail. The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (RCDA) did not pursue murder charges.
In 2014, the cold case unit of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department began an investigation into the case. An arrest warrant was issued for defendant; CJ was deceased. While investigating the case, new evidence came to light that defendant had admitted to a business partner that he had buried a body in the desert in California.

As part of a plea bargain, Tevine Taj Simpson agreed to plead no contest to one count of using personal identifying information without authorization (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)), in exchange for receiving a 16-month lower-term sentence, to be served locally and with no postrelease supervision. But in December 2019, after Simpson repeatedly failed to appear in court, the trial court exercised the Cruz waiver incorporated in the plea bargain and sentenced Simpson to a three-year upper-term sentence (still to be served locally and without postrelease supervision).
On appeal, Simpson challenges only the trial court’s imposition of the upper-term sentence. As we will explain, however, Simpson’s appeal is moot because he fully served his sentence as of May 2021, is not subject to postrelease supervision, and has not identified any ground on which we should exercise our discretion to entertain a moot appeal. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.

The San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 707 alleging Eduardo B. committed torture (Pen. Code, § 206; count 1); attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189; count 2); corporal injury on a domestic partner (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 3); and assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4). Eduardo admitted count 2, and the remaining counts were dismissed. After a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court committed Eduardo to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for nine years or nine years to life.
Eduardo appeals, claiming the confinement term was unauthorized and the court erred in committing Eduardo to DJJ.

Appellant Evan Pilcher appeals from an order of the trial court granting respondent Sheryl Pilcher’s request to renew a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). Evan raises a number of specific challenges to the trial court’s order; all of his arguments stem from his principal contention that the trial court erred in granting Sheryl’s request to renew the restraining order because in renewing the restraining order, the court also improperly renewed an order limiting Evan’s visitation with the parties’ children.
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of its order renewing the restraining order does not include a ruling regarding Pilcher’s custody and/or visitation rights.

MC Painting appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of a Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) action brought by a former employee, Lauro Sanchez. In denying the petition, the trial court followed Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian), which held that a worker’s right to pursue a representative PAGA action cannot be waived and that this state law rule is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
On appeal, MC Painting contends Iskanian is no longer controlling because it has been “overruled” by the United States Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612 (Epic Systems).

Plaintiff Victoria Doe was sexually assaulted on at least five occasions by a bus driver employed by defendant Oceanside Unified School District (the District) while traveling on a special education bus route operated by the District. The bus driver would touch plaintiff’s genital area over her clothing for a brief moment and then return to his seat. On each occasion, the touching occurred while another District employee, a bus attendant, was assisting another student in getting secured in her seat. After plaintiff told her mother about the abuse and her mother reported it to the District, the District placed the driver on leave and reviewed video recordings taken from inside the bus. The District provided police with five recordings that showed the bus driver leaning into plaintiff’s personal space and terminated the driver’s employment. The bus driver admitted criminal liability for his conduct.

A jury convicted Daniel Rodriguez Quintero of first degree murder with the special circumstances of torture and kidnapping for ransom. Early in the case, Quintero asked to represent himself. The trial court granted his Faretta motion and appointed the Office of Assigned Counsel (OAC) “to provide a legal runner and reasonable ancillary services.” Quintero later raised concerns about the efficiency of OAC and, on two separate occasions, requested the appointment of “co-counsel” other than OAC or the public defender. The trial court denied both requests and, approximately three weeks later, Quintero relinquished his pro per status. He was represented by a public defender at trial.
On appeal, Quintero contends the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to appoint “advisory counsel” and, instead, summarily denied his request as a matter of practice.