CA Unpub Decisions

Mother J.B. (mother) of minor J.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends conditional reversal is required because the Tehama County Department of Social Services (Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.); she adds that the court erred in terminating parental rights without a proper ICWA finding.
We agree the matter must be remanded for ICWA compliance; we conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights subject to ICWA compliance on remand.

In July 2018, a jury found defendant Stephen Nicholas Woodward, Jr., guilty of corporal injury to a spouse, false imprisonment, attempted second degree robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found true: (1) that -- as to all four counts -- defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (e); and (2) that during the commission of corporal injury to his spouse, defendant personally used a baseball bat as a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
In August 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years in state prison, consisting of: (1) the upper term of four years for the corporal injury offense; (2) the middle term of four years for the great bodily injury enhancement to the corporal injury offense; and (3) one year for the deadly weapon enhancement to the corporal injury offense.

Defendant Buddie Raymond Minnick was convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years of age, sexual penetration by a foreign object against a child under 14 years of age, and oral copulation of a child under 14 years of age. The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial error by improperly vouching for the credibility of a witness; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor’s improper vouching. We affirm.

Defendant Tyler Richard Johnston appeals from the postjudgment denial of his application to designate as a misdemeanor his 37-year-old felony conviction for taking a vehicle without the consent of the owner. The People argue that defendant failed to submit evidence with his initial filing proving that his conviction is eligible for designation as a misdemeanor. Finding defendant sufficiently alleged eligibility for relief, we will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs in this coordinated proceeding appeal from postdismissal orders denying their motions for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute. In 2017, plaintiffs filed petitions against defendant Department of Water Resources (DWR) challenging the California WaterFix (WaterFix), a proposal to improve the State’s water supply infrastructure by constructing two 35-mile-long tunnels that would convey fresh water from the Sacramento River to pumping stations in the southern Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (Delta). The lawsuits sought to compel DWR to rescind the WaterFix approvals, decertify the environmental impact report (EIR), and suspend activities related to the project until DWR complied with applicable laws. Most of the plaintiffs also filed answers opposing a separate action filed by DWR to validate the project’s bond financing.

Mother appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her son under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court erred when it determined the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law as to mother’s possible Indian heritage. Mother, DCFS, and son have stipulated to a conditional reversal and remand to the juvenile court to permit proper compliance with ICWA and related California law. We accept the parties’ stipulation.
The conditions that must be satisfied before an appellate court may accept a stipulated reversal are set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 379-382 [appellate court found § 128 (a)(8) factors present in dependency appeal].)

Blanca G. and Armando G., the parents of Eddy G. and Valentina G., challenge visitation orders the juvenile court issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4, subdivision (a), when the court terminated jurisdiction. Armando argues the court abused its discretion in requiring monitored visitation with his children; Blanca argues the court abused its discretion in prohibiting her from serving as the monitor for Armando’s visits. We affirm.

Melissa L. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to Alyssa P. and Laura L. Melissa argues the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because the Department did not ask Alyssa’s and Laura’s known relatives about possible Indian ancestry. She also argues the court did not comply with its duty to ensure the Department conducted an adequate inquiry.
We agree with both contentions. Because the Department breached its duty of inquiry under ICWA and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), and because the court breached its duty to ensure the Department conducted an adequate inquiry, substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding ICWA did not apply.

Guadalupe M. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders appointing legal guardians for one of her sons, Emiliano R., and terminating Guadalupe’s parental rights to two of her other sons, Cristobal R. and Luis M. Guadalupe argues the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because the Department did not ask known relatives about possible Indian ancestry. Therefore, she argues, the juvenile court erred in ruling that ICWA did not apply.
We conclude that, because the Department breached its duty of inquiry under ICWA and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding ICWA did not apply.

Martin Jauregui (Jauregui) filed a wage and hour class action and Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) lawsuit against LPF RE Manager (LPF) based on an off-the-clock security check allegedly imposed by LPF on all workers at LPF’s premises. Sandra Gasca (Gasca), who later filed a wage and hour class action and PAGA lawsuit against LPF and labor contractor Valley Harvest (Valley Harvest) based on the same security check required at the LPF worksite, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene in Jauregui’s action. We affirm the order.

In a concurrently filed opinion resolving consolidated appeals (B306162 and B306180), we affirm on the merits two judgments against defendant and appellant LMA & SAI 1433 Wilshire LLC (LMA) that arise out of a dispute over the lease between LMA and its commercial tenant, plaintiff and respondent Izzy’s Deli (Izzy’s). In issuing the judgments in favor of Izzy’s, the trial court found Izzy’s to be the prevailing party. The lease between the parties includes a clause that states the prevailing party in an action to enforce or declare rights under the lease is entitled to attorney fees. Izzy’s subsequently filed a motion seeking attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted the motion, awarding Izzy’s $328,276 in attorney fees and $5,658.87 in costs.
LMA filed this appeal, which it expressly characterized as a “protective appeal” from the post-judgment award of attorney fees and costs.

In a concurrently filed opinion resolving consolidated appeals (B306162 and B306180), we affirm on the merits two judgments against defendant and appellant LMA & SAI 1433 Wilshire LLC (LMA) that arise out of a dispute over the lease between LMA and its commercial tenant, plaintiff and respondent Izzy’s Deli (Izzy’s). In issuing the judgments in favor of Izzy’s, the trial court found Izzy’s to be the prevailing party. The lease between the parties includes a clause that states the prevailing party in an action to enforce or declare rights under the lease is entitled to attorney fees. Izzy’s subsequently filed a motion seeking attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted the motion, awarding Izzy’s $328,276 in attorney fees and $5,658.87 in costs.
LMA filed this appeal, which it expressly characterized as a “protective appeal” from the post-judgment award of attorney fees and costs.

Ronald King appeals from the superior court’s order denying his petition under Penal Code section 1170.95. We conclude substantial evidence supported the superior court’s finding, after an evidentiary hearing and beyond a reasonable doubt, King was a major participant in a robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, the superior court did not err in ruling King was not eligible for relief under section 1170.95, and we affirm.

Michele Pelter filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and other causes of action related to the death of her sister after lap band surgery. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Pelter appeals. We affirm.