CA Unpub Decisions

On June 24, 2020, an information charged defendant with attempted robbery under Penal Code sections 664 and 211, a felony (count 1); driving or taking the vehicle of another, to wit, a 1988 Lincoln Towncar, under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), a felony (count 2); receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a), a felony (count 3); and misdemeanor theft (count 4). The information also alleged that that defendant was ineligible for probation under California Rules of Court, rule 4.413. The information further alleged that defendant had two serious priors under Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (c), and (e)(2)(A), and 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).
On June 16, 2020, defendant requested to represent himself, and the court granted defendant’s request. On June 30, 2020, defendant made an oral motion to dismiss his case; the court denied his motion.

When A.G., Jr. (A. or child) was three months old, he was found to have a broken wrist. When he was five months old, he was found to have broken ribs. As a result, he was declared a dependent and removed from his parents’ custody. At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court found a substantial risk of detriment if he were returned to the parents.
The father, A.G., Sr. (father), appeals. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a substantial risk of detriment. We will hold that the evidence, taken in combination, that (1) a parent recklessly used excessive force on the child twice, each time causing broken bones, (2) the father had previously used excessive force on another child, causing a broken bone, (3) the father had not completed therapy, and (4) the parents falsely denied that they had recklessly used excessive force on A. was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding.

The juvenile court denied defendant and appellant, H.M. (father’s), Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, father contends the court erred in denying his section 388 petition and in declining to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of his parental rights. We affirm.

In 2019, Appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. After the appointment of counsel, the petition was summarily denied. Appellant appealed the denial of her petition, and this court affirmed the order in an unpublished opinion, People v. Torricellas, D077815 (June 25, 2021). Appellant’s petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on September 15, 2021 (S270274).
In October 2021, Appellant filed a second petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In November 2021, the trial court denied the second petition on the grounds the petition was repetitive, and the earlier denial had been upheld on appeal.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of the second petition.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.

This is the second appeal filed by appellants K.P. (mother) and A.T. (father) after termination of their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) In the previous appeal, this court accepted the parties’ joint application and stipulation for a reversal and conditionally reversed and remanded for limited proceedings to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). In this appeal from the juvenile court’s orders reinstating the orders terminating their parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption, mother and father again contend the juvenile court and the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the requirements of ICWA. Because mother and father failed to object in the juvenile court on specific grounds asserted in this appeal, their claims are forfeited. We will affirm the orders terminating parental rights.

Defendant Jesus Ceja Montano appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Based, in part, on new legislation that applies retroactively to defendant’s case, the People concur that defendant is entitled to reversal and remand for further proceedings on one of his convictions. As we shall explain, we conclude that he is entitled to reversal and remand on two of his convictions.

Shailesh Shah appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate. Shah petitioned for writ relief to overturn a decision by the Dental Board of California (Board) denying him reinstatement of his license to practice dentistry. The Board revoked his license after he sexually battered two female patients in his dental chair while he was on probation for an earlier sexual battery of a female patient. Shah sought reinstatement of his license in 2013 and again in 2017. The Board denied reinstatement both times, and this proceeding arises out of the second denial of Shah’s petition for reinstatement.
In this appeal, Shah contends (1) the Board “committed an impermissible due process violation by exceeding the statutory framework for rehabilitation and reinstatement criteria,” (2) the Board violated due process by holding Shah to “an unreasonable and improper evidentiary standard,” (3) in denying reinstatement, the Board mischaracterized the evidence in the record,

Defendant Nathan Philbrook appeals from the denial of his petition to recall his manslaughter sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 originally enacted in Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). On appeal, he first makes belated collateral attacks on the original judgment, contending his 23-year sentence, the result of a plea bargain, was void in three respects: a prior strike was neither pled nor admitted; the sentence was not run consecutively with his existing sentence, as required by the Three Strikes law; and a 12-month term, instead of a 16-month term, was erroneously imposed on one count.
Defendant also directly challenges the denial of his petition to recall his sentence. In his opening brief, he raised various grounds, including that section 1170.95 must be construed to apply to manslaughter convictions.

Mother and father appeal from the order terminating their parental rights to son under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Joining in each other’s briefs, the parents contend the juvenile court erred when it declined to find the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights applied. They also argue the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with section 224.2, subdivision (b)—the California statute implementing the initial inquiry rules of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the parent-child beneficial relationship exception inapplicable. We nonetheless conditionally reverse and remand for the juvenile court to order DCFS to comply with section 224.2, subdivision (b).

Timothy Scott Seymour was charged in a consolidated information filed April 7, 2021 with one count each of oral copulation with, or penetration of, a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and committing a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and two counts of possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)). It was further alleged as to the first two counts that Seymour had previously been convicted of a sex offense within the meaning of the one strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61), and as to all four counts that he had previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).

Jonathan S., father of two-year-old Heaven S., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He argues that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services did not comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law and that the juvenile court erred in ruling ICWA did not apply. We agree and conditionally affirm.

The superior court granted the petition filed by Property Management Associations, Inc. (PMA), Thomas Spear and Joshua Fein (collectively PMA parties) to confirm an arbitration award dismissing the investment fraud claims of Thomas Ahern, individually and as surviving spouse and successor in interest to Priscilla Ahern, as barred by governing statutes of limitations; denied Ahern’s petition to vacate or correct the award; and entered judgment in favor of the PMA parties on October 16, 2020. The arbitration was conducted pursuant to the arbitration provision in a cotenancy agreement between BH & Sons, LLC, on the one hand, and tenant in common investors who had purchased interests in improved real property in San Diego (the Aerovault property), on the other hand.

A jury convicted defendant Jonathan Chi of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found true the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. On appeal, defendant contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, the trial court erred in delivering a jury instruction and engaging in misconduct, and a juror was not competent to serve. He also requests a remand for resentencing. We affirm.

Respondent Connie Hernandez leased a commercial unit from appellant, non-practicing attorney Phoenix (AKA Peter) Thottam. At the time of the lease, the unit was without power due to a recent fire, but according to respondent, appellant had promised, both orally and in writing, to restore power to the unit. The lease itself, which was drafted by appellant, stated that the unit was being provided on an as-is basis, but also stated that appellant was working to restore power and further required respondent to cooperate with appellant as he was doing so. The lease additionally included conflicting provisions regarding the parties’ entitlement to attorney fees in case of a dispute, some precluding attorney fees and another entitling appellant to fees.