CA Unpub Decisions

In 1996, appellant Antonio Salgado shot a man at a Compton gas station at the behest of his coworker, appellant Antonio Garcia. The man survived the attempt on his life, and Garcia and Salgado avoided liability for the crime after another person was misidentified as, and convicted of being the shooter.
As part of a renewed investigation 20 years later, the wrongfully convicted man’s brother, Miguel Contreras, surreptitiously recorded conversations with Garcia, Salgado, and a third coconspirator. Those primarily Spanish recordings and their English translations formed part of the evidence admitted at Garcia and Salgado’s 2019 joint jury trial for attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and, as to Salgado only, felon in possession and firearm enhancements. The jury found appellants guilty as charged. The court sentenced Garcia to a total term of 25 years to life and Salgado to a total term of 60 years to life.

Plaintiff Yazmin Ortiz appeals from an order granting, in part, a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. We reverse, in part, as to the 12th cause of action to the extent it concerns activity not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. We otherwise affirm.

On April 14, 2022, this Court filed several documents from Miguel Diaz, collectively, as a petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenges the failure of the Solano County Superior Court to file his notice of appeal from an order finding him to be a vexatious litigant.
After initial review, we notified the parties we might choose to act by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance and sought opposition, if any, to the petition. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177–180.) Real party in interest responded, taking no position on the matter.
The petition for writ of mandate establishes that Miguel Diaz timely presented his notice of appeal from the final order and other related orders granting the motion of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to declare him a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b).) The Clerk of the Solano County Superior Court rejected the notice of appeal.

Ramon Dominguez appeals from convictions of robbery in an inhabited dwelling, resisting an executive officer, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury entered upon his plea of no contest. He contends his plea was involuntary because his attorney falsely advised he was facing a life sentence, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw the plea and failing to appoint substitute counsel. He also maintains two assessments and a restitution fine imposed at sentencing must be stayed pending an ability to pay hearing. Finally, he contends a remand is required due to statutory amendments affecting trial courts’ sentencing discretion that became effective during the pendency of this appeal. We find his arguments without merit and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ernie Hernandez appeals from his conviction of evading an officer with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, raising a claim of instructional error. We agree with Hernandez that the instruction given to the jury misstated one of the ways “willful or wanton disregard” may be proved, but we find the error harmless.
After the parties completed their appellate briefing, Penal Code section 1170 was amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. No. 567), and we requested supplemental briefing on whether the new law affects this appeal. The parties agree Hernandez is entitled to resentencing under S.B. No. 567.
We remand for resentencing under S.B. No. 567 and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant Aileka Pennewell appeals a judgment revoking her probation and imposing a four-year prison sentence. Initially, her court-appointed counsel filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and defendant submitted a letter brief arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the probation violation findings, (2) the prison term should be reversed because her felony conviction upon which it was based should have been reduced to a misdemeanor prior to the filing of the probation revocation petition, and (3) the court made unspecified errors in calculating her credits. After reviewing the briefing and the record, we concluded that no issue warranted further briefing, but that potential errors in the calculation of custody credits required a limited remand.

Ernest T. (Appellant), guardian to minors M.S. (born in 2005), E.S. (born in 2007), and J.S. (born in 2008) (Minors), challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that Minors are persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Appellant also contends the court erred in removing Minors from his home. We affirm.

In 2019, Carl Lee Houle, Jr., pled no contest to unlawfully possessing
a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310), and he admitted having a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, 1170.12) and serving two prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to the negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced Houle to six years in prison, which included two mandatory one-year prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, Houle urged this court to strike the prior prison term enhancements in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill 136), which amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2020. Senate Bill 136 eliminated section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements except for sexually violent offenses as defined in the Welfare and Institutions Code. (See People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 340–341.)

Police arrested David Gray for rape in 1996. He is currently incarcerated for an unrelated crime. Based on the 1996 arrest, prison authorities designated Gray’s custody status with an “R” suffix used to identify sex offenders in the prison population, thereby imposing restrictions on Gray not usually placed on prisoners.
After the trial court granted Gray’s petition to seal and destroy the 1996 arrest records per Penal Code section 851.8, Gray filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel individual employees of Folsom State Prison (Folsom) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) (collectively, respondents) to seal and destroy the arrest records and remove the “R” suffix from his custody designation. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer to Gray’s writ petition with leave to amend, but dismissed the case as moot a few months later when it found that respondents had voluntarily performed the acts sought in the writ petition.

This action arises from the proposal of real party in interest KB Bakewell Seaside Venture II (KB Bakewell) to develop a large project known as Campus Town on the former Fort Ord military base. Respondent City of Seaside (City) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) pursuant to CEQA for the Campus Town specific plan and approved the project. After holding a public hearing, the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) determined that the Campus Town project was consistent with the Fort Ord Reuse Plan.

The focus of this appeal is a three-page stipulation concerning the disposition of the parties’ community property residence. Respondent Imani Butler and appellant Leslie Butler signed the stipulation in May 2012, while their dissolution action was pending, and the stipulation was signed by a judge and entered as a court order. Under the stipulation, Imani quitclaimed the residence to Leslie with the proviso that she was to deed it back to the community 12 months later if she had not succeeded in removing Imani’s name from the loan on the residence by modification or refinancing. The stipulation also provided for the sale of the residence. Leslie obtained a modification of the loan, but the modification did not remove Imani’s name from the loan. Leslie did not deed the residence back to the community at the end of the 12-month period. In 2016, Imani obtained a court order requiring Leslie to deed the residence back to the community and requiring that the residence be sold.

The minor, I.E., appeals from a dispositional order placing him on probation with various terms and conditions, following findings by the juvenile court that he committed four counts of lewd conduct on two children under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). Regarding one of the counts, the juvenile court found that the minor and the victim, who was his girlfriend at the time, were both 13 years old at the time of the conduct, and that the minor knew the wrongfulness of his conduct (see § 26, subd. One).
On appeal, the minor contends: (a) the juvenile court violated his right to due process by failing to consider the issue of consent in determining whether he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct regarding the count involving his girlfriend; (b) there is not substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct;

Appellant Calhoun appeals an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend his claim of professional negligence against respondent Roca, a licensed structural engineer who prepared plans and calculations for Calhoun’s residence. The trial court concluded Calhoun’s claim was time-barred, finding that Calhoun had failed to timely file the certificate of merit required by Code of Civil Procedure section 411.35. The trial court also decided this defect could not be cured by amendment to the complaint.
On appeal, Calhoun contends the trial court erred as a matter of law and raises a number of arguments challenging its conclusion that his claim is time-barred. Calhoun argues that his original complaint substantively complied with section 411.35, the accrual date for his claim was July 2017 (not May 2017, as found by the trial court), and the equitable doctrines of estoppel and fraudulent concealment apply to defeat Roca’s statute-of-limitations defense.

A jury convicted appellant Leondez Vasquez Sanchez of 10 counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) ) and one count of attempted commission of such an act on a child under age 14 (§§ 664, 288, subd. (a)). Sanchez had committed the crimes against three children, and the jury found true 10 multiple-victim allegations (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)). The trial court imposed a sentence of 60 years to life in prison plus three years.
On appeal, Sanchez contends his trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to object to comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) evidence. Sanchez further contends the prosecutor’s allegedly improper comments highlighted ambiguities in a related jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 1193) and likely resulted in a misapplication of that instruction.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.