CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found appellant Hau Trung Nguyen guilty of the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Nguyen’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that to convict him of that crime it must find the vehicle’s value exceeded $950. The Attorney General concedes that instructional error, identifies another, and contends both were harmless. For the reasons explained below, we agree and affirm the judgment.

In this marital dissolution proceeding, Rainer Dahms brought a motion to declare his spouse, appellant Parisa Javanbakhsh, a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391 . The court granted the motion after extensive briefing and a hearing. A formal order was filed on May 24, 2018.
On appeal, Javanbakhsh contends that the trial court erred. Her appellate brief does not comply with the California rules of appellate practice and contains no specific argument in support of her claim of error. As we discuss, although we could elect to consider Javanbakhsh to have defaulted because of these procedural deficiencies, we have considered the merits of the challenge to the order. Finding no error, we will affirm.

Francisco Leonardo Hernandez appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of oral copulation and sodomy by an intoxicating substance, and oral copulation and sodomy with an unconscious person. He argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence and insufficient evidence supports the latter two convictions. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster, a self-represented inmate, appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer with leave to amend. Such an order is not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1) As a general rule, appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a nonappealable order and, furthermore, have a duty to dismiss such an appeal on their own motion. (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307.) As explained below, this general rule should be applied to the circumstances of this case.
We therefore dismiss the appeal on our own motion.

Petitioners, A.M. and J.M., who were the prospective adoptive parents for minor T.W., bring this petition for an extraordinary writ under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.28, challenging the juvenile court’s finding that removing T.W. from their custody served T.W.’s best interest. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) We find no error in the juvenile court’s ruling and deny the petition.

In this appeal, defendant Dontrea Ann Castro challenges the sentence she received for one count and a fee imposed that has since been repealed by the Legislature. We remand this matter for resentencing, and order that any unpaid portion of the fee imposed for the preparation of a presentence probation report be vacated.

Defendant Mark Lee Contreras pled no contest to physically assaulting his wife and was placed on probation. On appeal, defendant contends the probation supervision and report fees imposed by the trial court must be vacated pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1869). We order the judgment modified, but affirm in all other respects.

Defendant Isaias Andrade Torres appeals from an order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to vacate a 2012 plea of no contest. After receiving testimony and considering declarations and transcripts, the superior court stated that “the burden has not been met and I’m going to deny the motion.”
Applying the independent standard of review set forth in People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), and giving deference to credibility findings where the superior court personally observed the witness, we conclude Isaias (1) established by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not meaningfully understand the mandatory immigration consequences (permanent deportation) of his no contest plea and (2) demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea if he had understood those consequences.
We therefore reverse the order denying the section 1473.7 motion.

Natalie Brito Reyes was a passenger in a vehicle detained by law enforcement. The detaining officers ordered Reyes out of the car. She complied and left her purse in the vehicle. The driver was next ordered out. He hesitated, clutched the purse, placed it on the rear floorboard, and then exited.
As it turned out, the purse contained methamphetamine. Reyes initially denied knowing about the drugs but then admitted they were hers. The driver admitted they were his. Reyes was arrested and charged with selling methamphetamine; the driver was not.
At trial, the driver testified he placed the methamphetamine in the purse after the vehicle was stopped by law enforcement. Officers variously testified the drugs were Reyes’s, she intended to sell them, and the driver was not involved in the crime. The jury found Reyes guilty.

Defendant Matthew Joseph Barrera entered into a stipulated plea agreement that included four prior prison term enhancements. In our prior opinion, we ordered the enhancements stricken based on the modifications to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), brought about by Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) and the matter remanded to the trial court to permit the People and trial court an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. Our Supreme Court granted review then remanded the matter to us with direction to “vacate [our] decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 483” (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483).
The parties have submitted supplemental briefing. Defendant contends that we should strike the prior prison term enhancements and remand for resentencing.

Appellant Jesus Alvarez Mejia was charged and convicted of count 1, first degree murder, and count 2, attempted first degree murder, with firearm enhancements. Appellant was sentenced to indeterminate life terms on the convictions and enhancements.
In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and alleged his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and he was not the actual killer. The superior court denied the petition.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has filed his own supplemental brief. We affirm.

In an earlier appeal in this case, we affirmed the trial court’s grant of defendants’ special motion to strike, also known as an anti-SLAPP motion. During the appeal, defendants moved for attorney’s fees and costs for prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion, and the trial court awarded much of the amount requested.
In this appeal, which concerns that fee award, we find that the trial court’s legal analysis as to why the fee motion was timely was erroneous. However, we are unable to resolve a factual issue that will determine whether the motion was timely. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Mother, Jasmine Huerta, appeals orders on three requests to modify a visitation order imposed along with exit orders from the juvenile court respecting two children with different fathers. The visitation orders included in the exit orders to family court provided for four hours of visitation one time per week with two children, one of whom was placed with her father, and the other who was placed with the paternal grandmother. On the most recent application to modify visitation, the court determined that mother had failed to comply with orders that she complete at least four months of in-patient drug rehabilitation, among other issues. The court therefore reduced visitation to one and one-half hours per week, and disallowed telephone contact on Sundays as had been previously permitted. Mother appeals.
On appeal, mother argues that the court abused its discretion by (1) denying her request to increase the frequency or duration of her visits,

Defendant and appellant Felipe Edgar Segundo impregnated his 13-year-old niece and was sentenced to a term of 35 years to life. On appeal, he raised four issues, three of which related to the propriety of the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (via the pregnancy), and the fourth of which stemmed from the lack of an outer time limit on Segundo’s no contact order with his victim. We affirmed the judgment but reversed the no contact order, directing the trial court to determine again whether to impose such an order.
Segundo petitioned for Supreme Court review. The Court granted review and transferred the case back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and to reconsider the case in light of Assembly Bill No. 124 (Stats. 2021, ch. 695). We ordered supplemental briefing from the parties.
We agree with Segundo that resentencing is proper under Assembly Bill No. 124. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing under the new law.