CA Unpub Decisions

Robert G. Cook appeals from the judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, in which he sought an order requiring the California Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) to vacate and set aside its order suspending Cook’s driver’s license after Cook refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level. Cook contends that the hearing officer’s decision confirming the license suspension must be set aside because the hearing officer improperly relied on hearsay evidence to support a finding that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to suspect that Cook had unlawfully driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).
We conclude that the hearing officer relied on admissible evidence in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to suspect that Cook had driven under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Oscar Urteaga, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s issuance of a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting respondent Melanie Darling, as well as her husband and children, from him.
Although Urteaga’s opening brief is not a model of clarity, we discern that Urteaga is displeased with the court’s issuance of the DVRO against him, and its denial of his request for a DVRO against Darling. Urteaga contends that the trial court erred in (1) granting the domestic violence restraining order “without making requisite findings” as required under the Domestic Violence Protection Act; (2) considering “a related pending criminal matter involving the parties,” which, Urteaga maintains, “unfairly influenced and resulted in the expression of a bias and lack of impartiality” on the part of the court;

Defendant Christopher Phothirath appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). He contends his conviction for attempted murder as an aider and abettor on a natural and probable consequences theory was eligible for relief under section 1170.95, and the trial court erred in denying his petition as he made a prima facie showing of eligibility. He also contends, and the People properly concede, that the sentence imposed is unauthorized under People v. Gonzalez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 (Gonzalez). In an unpublished opinion, we agreed the sentence was unauthorized and remanded for resentencing; we affirmed the order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition, consistent with then prevailing case law that defendants convicted of attempted murder were not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. (People v. Phothirath (Oct. 20, 2021, C092316) [nonpub. opn.].)

Defendant Manuel Valdivias Soto is a noncitizen who moved to the United States as a teenager in the late 1980’s to be with family and have children of his own. He appeals from the trial court’s denial of his 2020 motion to vacate his 2010 drug trafficking conviction, which subjects him to mandatory removal under federal immigration law. Claiming he would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences, defendant contends his conviction is invalid due to prejudicial error. Agreeing, we reverse.

Defendant Adam Villa and codefendants Joshua Parrish and Frank Camacho were convicted of attempted murder, attempted robbery, and related firearm crimes. On appeal, defendant initially argued that his conviction for attempted murder must be reversed under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, defendant also argued the trial court erred in imposing certain fines, fees, and assessments without holding a hearing to determine his ability to pay them.
In an unpublished opinion, we modified the judgment to effectuate Penal Code section 654 by imposing and staying a full term for the attempted robbery conviction and associated firearm enhancement, and affirmed the judgment as modified. (People v. Villa (July 14, 2020, C089392) [nonpub. opn.].)

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jaime Valdez of one count of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of robbery. The trial court sentenced him to 63 years to life in state prison. On appeal, he raises three arguments: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense’s request to sever trial of the two charges; (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion; and (3) the minute order of sentencing and abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect his presentence conduct credit. We agree with Valdez’s third contention and order the record corrected. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), Ana C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over her daughters, K.G. (then, seven years old) and Kailani S. (then, two years old). Mother contends we must reverse the order because (1) the court erred in finding the parental-benefit exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply to her relationship with her daughters, as the court applied an incorrect legal standard, and (2) the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the duty to inquire under section 224.2 whether K.G. or Kailani is or may be an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA)). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand the matter for a new section 366.26 hearing and further proceedings regarding ICWA.

Plaintiff brought an action against his former employer under the Private Attorneys Generals Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2699) for violation of section 226, subdivision (a)(9). Plaintiff was employed by a private contractor on a United States military base. The trial court concluded that plaintiff’s action was barred by the federal enclave rule. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.) The court granted defendant judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

After being terminated from her employment as a diabetes care specialist with Novo Nordisk, Inc. (NNI), Nicole Marie Hermanson brought this action against NNI and her former supervisor Sarah McLeish (collectively respondents) alleging 10 causes of action related to respondents’ termination decision and their conduct prior to termination. The gist of her claims was that after she questioned a work assignment by McLeish, which Hermanson believed was contrary to NNI’s policies, McLeish retaliated against her, caused her to become disabled, and refused to accommodate her disability. The basis for her gender discrimination and harassment claims is less clear, apart from a general claim that McLeish, a woman, felt threatened by other competent women and preferred to work with men. Respondents moved for and were granted summary judgment on Hermanson’s complaint.
Hermanson now appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.

Alleged father J.M. (Father) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section to 366.26, to adopt a permanent plan for A.M. (Minor). Father contends that the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to exercise reasonable diligence in its efforts to locate and provide notice to Father of the dependency proceedings, and that the juvenile court violated Father’s due process rights when it denied Father’s oral motion to continue the six-month review hearing so that Father could explore elevating his paternity status from alleged father to presumed father. Finding no error, we deny Father’s request for an extraordinary writ.

Richard Cohen appeals after the trial court amended the judgment to add him as a judgment debtor on alter ego grounds in this commercial real estate dispute. The amendment makes Cohen liable for a $9.2 million attorney fees award entered against the plaintiff “Rincon” entities—Rincon EV Realty LLC, Rincon ET Realty LLC, and Rincon Residential Towers LLC. Cohen argues that, because the plaintiffs are Delaware limited liability companies (LLC’s), the court should have applied Delaware law, rather than California law, to determine whether he is their alter ego. He also contends that bad faith must be proven to establish alter ego liability, and that there was no showing of bad faith here. Finally, Cohen claims there is no substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings on the unity of interest and inequitable result elements of the alter ego standard. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a final judgment following a jury trial that convicted defendant James Lee Wright of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) in which he raises no issue for appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record. Defendant has not exercised his right to file a supplemental brief. Having independently reviewed the record, we affirm.

In this probate action, appellant Sheila Velasco Yamamoto appeals from an order denying her motion for leave to file a third amended petition for a determination of entitlement to estate distribution under Probate Code section 11600. Respondent Euel T. Parden., Jr. (Parden, Jr.) is the trustee of the Parden Family Trust (the trust), established in 1993 by Parden, Jr.’s parents, Euel T. Parden, Sr. (Parden, Sr.) and Mary Batinich (Batinich). Yamamoto, who married Parden, Sr. after Batinich passed away in 2016, claims entitlement to a portion of the trust as an “omitted spouse” pursuant to sections 21610 through 21612. Parden, Jr. asserts that this court should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Yamamoto has appealed from a nonappealable order. Parden, Jr. also contends that the appeal, like the underlying petition and motion for leave to amend, is without merit.

A jury convicted defendant Rudolph Joseph Hernandez of one count of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1) , two counts of first degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a); counts 2 and 3), two counts of false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); counts 4 and 7) , one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 5), and one count of carjacking
(§ 215, subd. (a); count 6). The jury also found true allegations that non-accomplices were present during the commission of count 1 and that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of counts 1 through 7. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21), 12022.5,
subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b).) The jury further found true allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of counts 2, 4, 5, and 6. (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a).)
The court sentenced defendant to 28 years in state prison as follows: