CA Unpub Decisions

Michelle K. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to S.K. (born December 2015) and J.H. (born August 2018) (collectively, the children) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. David H. is the father of J.H. S.K.’s father was never located. On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm.

David H. (father) and Michelle K. (mother) are the parents of J.H. (born August 2018). Father and mother’s parental rights to J.H. were terminated pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. On appeal, he contends that if the order terminating mother’s parental rights is reversed on any substantive basis, then the order terminating his parental rights must also be reversed even if there is no independent error pertaining to him. We affirm.

Appellant and defendant Tyler Hauptman was convicted of first degree residential burglary and sentenced to state prison. In his first appeal, we remanded the matter for the trial court to consider whether it should exercise its discretion and strike the prior serious felony enhancement based on amendments to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), stay a concurrent term, and for the opportunity to raise any issues about the imposition of fines and fees, and otherwise affirmed.
On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to stay the enhancement, defendant did not raise any issues about the fines and fees, and the court stayed the concurrent term previously imposed. The court declined to recalculate defendant’s actual time in custody and deferred the calculation to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). In this appeal, the parties agree the matter must again be remanded for the trial court to calculate his actual time credits.

In 1996, a jury convicted petitioner Alicia Rosina Meza of the first degree murder of Isidro Soto Cardinas (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1). On count 1, the jury found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of robbery. (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i)). For this offense, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. (People v. Meza (Oct. 30, 1997, F025822) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza).)
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing on her murder conviction pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition without providing a statement of reasons.
In this appeal from the trial court’s order, her counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts of the case, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).)

This matter is back before us after a prior appeal that resulted in a remand for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620), which retroactively amended Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h). Defendant Victor Javier Estrada now raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the resentencing. We conclude his claim is not appropriate for resolution on direct appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Cavin Lee Eddowes sexually assaulted a woman and then obstructed and threatened to kill the deputy sheriff transporting him after his arrest. A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to commit rape by force, false imprisonment with violence, attempted criminal threat, and misdemeanor obstruction or resisting a peace officer. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of six years in prison.
Defendant contended on appeal that (1) we should reverse his conviction for attempted criminal threat because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the intended threat must have been sufficient to cause sustained fear in a reasonable person, (2) we should strike a $30 criminal conviction assessment the trial court did not orally pronounce at sentencing from the abstract of judgment, and (3) we should order the trial court to amend the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect the components of the $930 penalty assessment.

Appellant and defendant Larry William Irvin was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of attempted murder, domestic violence, assault, violation of a restraining order, and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on allegations of three prison priors and a prior domestic violence conviction within the last seven years. The trial court found the prior prison allegations to not be true and found the prior domestic violence conviction to be true. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in fines and fees at the statutory minimum.
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that he had sustained a prior domestic violence conviction under section Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1).

On October 16, 2019, Gail White (plaintiff) filed a civil complaint against Diane Ponce (defendant) that alleged defendant breached an agreement to jointly invest in real property. A default was entered against defendant after she failed to file a responsive pleading. The trial court denied a motion to set aside the default on February 24, 2020, and a default judgment was entered against defendant on December 4.
On February 19, 2021, defendant filed a postjudgment motion seeking to set aside the default and the default judgment, purportedly pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473. However, the trial court observed that there were “no substantive factual differences” between the motion and defendant’s prior motion to set aside, construed the motion as a motion for reconsideration, and denied the motion under the principles governing motions for reconsideration.

In 2017, plaintiff and appellant KG Investment, LLC (plaintiff) discovered that one of its residential properties (the property) was used by a tenant to illicitly grow marijuana, causing damage to the property. As a result, plaintiff filed suit against the tenant, as well as several real estate professionals and business entities. Plaintiff alleged: (1) its real estate agent and broker, defendant and respondent Andy Chen (defendant Chen), failed to properly screen the tenant’s application to lease the property; (2) defendant Chen and his property management company, defendant and respondent Sunny Hills Property Management Group (SHPMG), failed to conduct an inspection of the property during the tenancy; and (3) defendant and respondent Chino Capital, Inc. d.b.a. Coldwell Banker Top Team was vicariously liable for the conduct of defendant Chen. Based upon these allegations, plaintiff alleged causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) “concealment,”

In this appeal, we determine that the language of a stipulated judgment required that a spouse’s obligation to pay spousal support for an agreed upon term continued even though the supported spouse remarried during the term.
After over 13 years of marriage, Petitioner-Appellant Kristoffer Dick and Respondent Marlenna Dick stipulated to a judgment of dissolution. In that stipulated judgment, Kristoffer agreed to pay Marlenna $1,000 per month in spousal support for seven years. (This opinion will use first names for the parties due to their identical last names.)
Marlenna remarried two-and-a-half months after entry of the stipulated judgment. Pursuant to Family Code section 4337 (“section 4337”), spousal support terminates upon the remarriage of the supported party, but the parties may agree otherwise:

In 2016, Don E. Parish (plaintiff) purchased a used vehicle from a licensed vehicle dealer (dealer). He subsequently discovered defects in the vehicle and that the vehicle had an unreported prior accident history. Plaintiff eventually filed a civil action against the dealer alleging causes of action for (1) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.; CLRA), (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.). Plaintiff also alleged a cause of action against the dealer’s surety, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (surety defendant) for liability on a surety bond pursuant to Vehicle Code section 11711, subdivision (a).
The dealer moved to compel arbitration, the trial court granted the dealer’s motion, and the litigation was stayed with respect to the cause of action between plaintiff and surety defendant.

Defendant and appellant Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (Ross) appeals the judgment entered by the trial court in which it ordered Ross to pay back rent, interest and attorney fees to plaintiff and respondent Waring Plaza Properties, LP. (Waring Plaza). In 1992, Ross rented a space in the Fred Waring Plaza (Plaza), a Palm Desert shopping center, with DSL Service Company (DSL). Ross signed a lease with DSL, which had several option periods to extend the lease (Lease). Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, DSL represented that the shopping center was to have an anchor tenant, which, in 1992, was a Mervyns store. Charles Amash purchased the Plaza in 1993. Charles transferred ownership to Waring Plaza.
In 2008, Mervyns closed and Ross, claiming a right under the terms of the Lease, reduced the amount of rent it was paying to Waring Plaza to an amount equal to two percent of its gross monthly sales, which Ross identified as “Substitute Rent.”

Defendant Drake Girard Petronzi, Jr. was charged with one count of felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) for causing or permitting injury to his severely malnourished three-month-old daughter. Prior to trial, a doubt was declared concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing and found he was competent. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. It also returned a true finding on a special circumstance allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five years (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)).
After the verdict was rendered, but before sentencing, a doubt was again declared as to the defendant’s competence. The court held a second competency hearing and the defendant was again found competent.

In 1983, David Love pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. As the factual basis for his plea, Love acknowledged he and two accomplices entered a residence with the intent to steal; they struggled with the occupant; and the occupant died as a proximate result of injuries inflicted during the struggle. The trial court sentenced Love to 15 years to life.
In 2019, Love filed a petition for resentencing under newly enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which narrowed the circumstances under which an individual can be convicted under the felony-murder rule (Pen. Code, §§ 188, 189) and provides a mechanism for resentencing of individuals whose convictions would not meet the new standard (§ 1170.95).