CA Unpub Decisions

In an amended information filed September 27, 2016, the Tulare County District Attorney charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), committed during a kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The information further alleged defendant personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury and death to the victim. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
Defendant was jointly tried alongside codefendants Angelita Reyes and Arturo Hernandez Pompa (Arturo). The jury convicted defendant of murder and found the various allegations of the information to be true. The court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
Defendant makes several claims of prejudicial error. We remand for resentencing on a conceded issue, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jose Epifanio Garcia, Jr., appeals his convictions following a jury trial. Garcia was found guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1) of Rodolfo Garcia; assault with a firearm on Yesenia, Joel, and Maria (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 3, 5, 7, respectively); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 8); and participating in a street gang (former § 186.22, subd. (a); count 9). The jury found true enhancements for lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), being an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), committing the offense to benefit a criminal street gang (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), discharging a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d), and personally using a firearm in a gang offense causing injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)) as to count 1; benefiting a street gang (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), personally using a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)),

Appellant Trevor Jim Bishop appeals following his conviction by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and assault on a child under eight years old by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and resulting in death (id., § 273ab, subd. (a); count 2). He was acquitted of first degree murder. He was sentenced to a total unstayed term of 25 years to life in prison and ordered to pay restitution, as well as various fees, fines, and assessments.
In our initial ruling on appeal, we held: (1) the trial court correctly admitted prior bad acts evidence in this case, and the admission of any evidence exceeding that ruling was harmless; (2) there was no improper cross-examination of appellant; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in opening or closing arguments; (4) the trial court did not improperly admit hearsay evidence; (5) the trial court did not incorrectly admit improper expert opinion through the use of the term nonaccidental;

On August 2, 2021, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to M.S. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and selected adoption as the permanent plan. On appeal, C.H. (mother) and I.S. (father) contend the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies to the termination of their rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Because the record fails to demonstrate the kind of deep bond required to come within that exception, we conclude the court properly found that it does not apply. We therefore affirm.

Defendant Victor Mendoza used violence of some kind to force an aged and sickly friend to leave his home, walk several blocks, and go into an open field; the victim’s blood was later found strewn throughout his kitchen/living room. Once in the field, the victim was killed with 12 to 15 blows from a machete.
Defendant denied inflicting the fatal blows. He testified that a person he knew only as “Miklo” forced him to bring the victim to the field by threatening to kill defendant’s family. Supposedly Miklo told defendant that he merely wanted to question the victim about allegations that the victim was a child molester, but Miklo killed the victim immediately upon arrival instead.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, on a felony-murder theory (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subds. (a), (e)), with a kidnapping-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)).

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) concedes it did not comply with its inquiry duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2. And thus it agrees, the juvenile court erred in finding that reasonable inquiry had been made into the possible Indian ancestry of Y.D. and G.D. (the Children) and that ICWA did not apply, allowing the court to declare them dependents and removing them from their father, R.D. (Father). On the record before us, we agree with the Agency’s concession. The parties have submitted a joint stipulation for issuance of an immediate remittitur pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1). We will reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand the matter with directions for the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and section 224.2.

Jorge G. (Father) appeals an order in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency proceeding for J.G., granting sole legal and physical custody of J.G. to M.R. (Mother). Specifically, Father challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his request to be elevated to presumed parent status pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). Father also contends he was prejudiced because the court did not rule on his presumed status until after the six-month family maintenance review hearing, following J.G.’s placement with Mother at the disposition hearing. Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Father had not fully developed a parental relationship with J.G. and therefore did not qualify for presumed status. Father was not prejudiced by the timing of such finding because an earlier ruling denying Father presumed status would not have changed the outcome of the custody orders.

In 2019, a jury convicted defendant Kellen Boswell Winslow II of forcible rape, indecent exposure, and lewd conduct. Winslow subsequently pleaded guilty to rape of an unconscious person and assault with intent to rape. After receiving a sentence of 14 years in state prison, Winslow sought 233 days of custody credit for time he spent on electronic monitoring prior to sentencing under Penal Code section 2900.5, which entitles an individual to credit for all “days served in home detention pursuant to . . . Section 1203.018.” The trial court awarded Winslow four days of credit but determined he was ineligible for credit during the remaining 229 days that he was under electronic monitoring but not subject to home detention.
On appeal, Winslow asserts that he is entitled to presentence custody credit during the 229-day period when he was electronically monitored, characterizing the conditions of his bail release during this period as “home detention.”

This is an appeal from an order denying a request for class certification. Appellants Lidia Carbajal, Guadalupe Beltran, and Ana Maria Sanchez sued their former employer (Imperial Maintenance Services, Inc. or Imperial), Imperial’s owner, and several former Imperial employees, alleging violations of various labor laws. In a motion for class certification, Appellants sought class treatment for five of their claims. They sought to certify one class consisting of Imperial employees who were allegedly not paid for all hours worked, a second class of employees who were allegedly denied meal breaks, a third class of employees who allegedly received inaccurate or incomplete wage statements, a fourth class of employees who were allegedly not paid all wages due when they were terminated, and a fifth class of employees who, due to the other alleged violations, were allegedly subjected to unlawful or unfair business practices.

After being terminated from a position with Sacramento County (the County), Cynthia J. Vatalaro sued the County for unlawful retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 (section 1102.5)—a statute that protects whistleblowing employees. Under this statute, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for disclosing information that the employee has reasonable cause to believe reveals a violation of a local, state, or federal law. Vatalaro alleged that, in violation of this statute, the County retaliated against her after she reported that she was working below her service classification.
The County afterward filed a motion for summary judgment. It contended that Vatalaro could not show that she had a reasonable belief, or any belief at all, that the information she disclosed evidenced a violation of any law.

This is Isaac William Taylor’s second appeal about his robbery conviction. In his first, we affirmed this conviction but reversed a second conviction for kidnapping for robbery. (People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1105–1112 (Taylor).) After we remanded the case, the trial court resentenced Taylor to an upper term sentence plus enhancements for his robbery conviction. Taylor appeals his new sentence.
While his second appeal has been pending, the Legislature passed two ameliorative sentencing laws that are relevant to Taylor’s case. One law limits the application of upper sentencing terms unless a defendant has stipulated to circumstances in aggravation or a fact finder has found the circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt. This statute is Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) or simply SB 567. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Taylor’s sentencing did not comply with SB 567’s new requirements.

This is an appeal from final judgment after the trial court granted defendant Hamilton Nicholsen’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Plaintiff Monica Davis seeks reversal on the grounds that there was no enforceable settlement agreement between the parties and even if there were, the judgment impermissibly altered its terms. We affirm.

In 2014, through DNA evidence, Halbower was implicated in two long unsolved murders that occurred in San Mateo County in 1976. Thereafter, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Halbower with two counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).
In March 2015, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings after defense counsel expressed a doubt as to Halbower’s mental competency. In June 2016, a jury found Halbower competent to stand trial. Following a preliminary examination, Halbower was held to answer and charged by information with two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). In September 2018, a separate jury found Halbower guilty on both counts of murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to two concurrent terms of life in state prison.

A jury found defendant Adalberto Coronado guilty on numerous counts of sexual assault on children, child abuse, and corporal injury to a spouse. The trial court imposed a total term of 60 years to life in prison.
Coronado contends the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). He argues the evidence should have been excluded as insufficiently reliable under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly); that there was an insufficient showing that the subject of expert testimony was beyond the common understanding of jurors; that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352; and that its admission violated his due process rights.
For the reasons below, we conclude these claims are without merit. We will affirm the judgment.