CA Unpub Decisions

“A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a), italics added.) A person may prosecute a writ when: “New evidence exists . . . of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” (§ 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A), italics added.)
In 1999, William Blaine Williams was sentenced to 25 years to life under the former “Three Strikes” law, based on nonviolent drug convictions. Williams filed petitions for resentencing in 2013 (Proposition 36) and 2014 (Proposition 47).
In 2016, the trial court presided over a consolidated evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, the district attorney presented evidence Williams had stabbed his fellow inmate Edward Rose on July 20, 2010.

In this appeal, Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asks that we reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under Family Code section 2030. The actual dispute underlying his request for attorney fees is not currently at issue. However, it is integral to the court’s attorney fees ruling and is briefly described below.
This is a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue is between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met on March 1, 2006, to discuss Daniel’s claims. They reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum (the Handwritten Agreement). Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million.

Daniel C. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to Kyle K. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply and that it considered improper factors in making its determination. We affirm.

This matter involves a minor who comes before this court for the third time in four years. In 2018, we affirmed the juvenile court after it found true that appellant had committed (1) residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459); (2) robbery (§ 211); (3) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and (4) battery with infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). (In re A.J. (Dec. 14, 2018, F075246) [nonpub. opn.].)
While that first appeal was pending, appellant incurred various violations of probation. In November 2018, appellant was again deemed a ward of the juvenile court and his physical custody was removed from his parent or guardian. A maximum term of confinement of nine years four months was set.
In 2020, we concluded in an unpublished opinion that the maximum term of confinement had been erroneously calculated because some of the sentences imposed should have been stayed under section 654.

Appointed counsel for defendant Steven Parda asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

On August 20, 2019, Fernando Quintero was charged with one felony count of arson to a structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)) and one misdemeanor count of arson with intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d)).
On August 30, 2019, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings for a competency evaluation (Pen. Code, § 1368), and on September 20, 2019, found Quintero not competent to stand trial.
On October 18, 2019, Quintero was committed to the Department of Mental Health, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1370/1370.01, for a maximum of two years.
On November 5, 2020, the trial court dismissed the misdemeanor count and adopted the findings of the Behavioral Health and Recovery Services and found Quintero not likely to become competent in the foreseeable future. The court ordered the Kern County Public Conservator to evaluate Quintero for a possible conservatorship proceeding.

This case involves the question of whether Proposition 57 requires an in-person parole hearing for prisoners convicted of nonviolent offenses and sentenced to determinate terms.
In 2018, respondent John Ernst pleaded guilty to felony criminal threats and admitted prior serious felony enhancements; he was sentenced to 14 years in prison. In both 2018 and 2019, Ernst was eligible for the parole consideration as a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent felony and sentenced to a determinate sentence, pursuant to the provisions of Proposition 57.
Proposition 57 was approved by California voters in 2016, and added section 32 to Article I of California’s Constitution that states: “Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)

In 2008, a jury convicted petitioner Juan Alonso Curiel with one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 2), and five counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664; counts 3-7). On count 1, the jury found true the special circumstances that petitioner discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and that petitioner was an active participant in a criminal street gang and committed the murder with an intent to kill (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). For the murder offense, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. For the premeditated attempted murder offenses, the court imposed five concurrent terms of 25 years to life. (People v. Curiel (Aug. 11, 2009, F055935) [nonpub. opn.] (Curiel).)

On November 3, 2016, defendant Allen Ray Horsley engaged in a verbal altercation with Dustin Montgomery before shooting him in the head and killing him. A jury convicted defendant of murder and assault with a firearm and found true allegations that defendant intentionally used and discharged a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 50 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to self-defense relating to the murder charge and not the assault charge; (2) the trial court erred in responding to the jury’s question regarding the definition and effect of provocation in their consideration of the murder charge; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument that compared premeditation and deliberation to a baseball player’s decision to swing at a ball and a driver’s decision not to stop at a yellow traffic light;

Appellant and defendant Larry William Irvin was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of attempted murder, domestic violence, assault, violation of a restraining order, and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on allegations of three prison priors and a prior domestic violence conviction within the last seven years. The trial court found the prior prison allegations to not be true and found the prior domestic violence conviction to be true. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in fines and fees at the statutory minimum.
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that he had sustained a prior domestic violence conviction under section Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1).

On October 13, 2021, an amended felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Cristian Runkle, and codefendants Merlin Perales Ortiz and Isaiah Rodriguez, with murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1).
On October 20, 2021, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Defendant executed a plea waiver form, was advised of and waived his constitutional rights, and stipulated to a factual basis for his plea.
On November 3, 2021, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Defendant stated that his appeal was based on “the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.” Defendant also filed a request for a certificate of probable cause; the court denied the request.

In June 2019, appellant Robert Michael Vanleeuwen (Vanleeuwen) filed a petition to establish a parental relationship with M.R., who is the biological daughter of respondent E.B.R. (Mother). In August 2019, the family court granted Vanleeuwen a three-year restraining order against Mother. In August 2020, the family court dismissed the petition and set aside the restraining order. Vanleeuwen contends the family court violated his constitutional rights by (1) not permitting him to speak during the August 2020 hearing; and (2) setting aside the restraining order without notice. Further, Vanleeuwen asserts his biological relationship with M.R. was “not sufficiently disproved.” We reverse with directions.

Defendant and appellant Jeffrey Jovon Stojsich killed a “snitch” and was convicted of murder. He appeals, contending that because the victim was someone whose snitching helped put Stojsich’s brother in prison, the killing was personally motivated, and thus he lacked the specific intent necessary for a gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b). Stojsich also requests that we review the materials the trial court considered in camera pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), wherein Stojsich sought discoverable personnel records of a peace officer who testified as a street gang expert at trial. The trial court did not disclose any records as a result of the Pitchess motion.

This case arises out of a longstanding dispute between Makaden, Inc. (Makaden) and D.R. Horton Los Angeles Holding Company, Inc. (Horton) regarding a profit participation agreement in a residential land development deal. The parties have now tried the case twice before different juries. The second jury returned a verdict in favor of Makaden for $1,279,513 and the trial court awarded Horton pre-judgement interest in the resulting judgment.
Horton filed several posttrial motions, including a motion for a new trial, in which it asserted the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence, an alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and a motion to vacate the portion of the judgment awarding prejudgment interest. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial, finding the jury relied on a calculation of damages presented by Makaden’s expert that was erroneous for several independent reasons, but denied the motion for JNOV.