CA Unpub Decisions

In an amended juvenile wardship petition, the Marin County District Attorney alleged Nicholas M. committed misdemeanor oral copulation with another person under age 18. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, §§ 287, subd. (b)(1), 17, subd. (b)(4).) After Nicholas admitted the allegation, the Marin Juvenile Court sustained the petition; found him to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602; and transferred the case to Contra Costa County, his county of residence, for disposition. The Contra Costa Juvenile Court then declared him a ward and placed him on probation, including a condition that he pay a $200 restitution fine. Though he did not object to the fine below, he now appeals, arguing it is an unauthorized sentence because the amount exceeds the statutory maximum. The People agree, and so do we.

Kyle Shields appeals from an order finding him incompetent to stand trial and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) under Penal Code section 1370. Shields’s appointed counsel filed a brief that raises no issue for appeal and asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We conclude that Wende review is not required here and that the issues Shields raises in a pro se supplemental brief lack merit. We therefore affirm.

Defendant Derrick Damon Harper and Joseph Bradshaw were charged and tried in a joint trial before separate juries for felony murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and accompanying gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b), (d), (e)(1)). Additionally, it was alleged defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions for kidnapping (§§ 207, subd. (a), 667, subds. (a)(1), (d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c), 667.5, subd. (a)). Midway through trial, the court granted defendant’s request to represent himself and appointed standby counsel.
The jury convicted defendant of first degree felony murder, and found true the firearm and gang enhancements. The trial court determined that defendant’s prior convictions qualified as strikes, that he committed two prior serious felonies, and that he had served two prior prison terms.

After a plastic surgeon filed a petition to compel arbitration of a patient’s malpractice claims, the patient’s attorney made statements regarding the plastic surgeon’s negligence to an online website. The plastic surgeon sued the attorney for defamation, and the attorney filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied the special motion to strike, and the attorney appealed.
We affirm. While the fair report privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d)) provides a complete defense to media reports of judicial proceedings, the attorney’s statements are not protected.

Mandak Kohn Griffin appeals from a lengthy sentence following his conviction for multiple sex crimes against minors, possession of child pornography, and using a minor to assist in distributing or producing child pornography. Griffin contends his conviction for violating Penal Code section 311.4, subdivision (a) 1, must be reversed for lack of evidence he used a minor to distribute pornography. As explained below, we conclude the prosecution charged Griffin with using a minor to produce child pornography, the production theory was argued to the fact finder, and the trial evidence supported that theory. Griffin also appeals from the imposition of various fines and fees, but as explained below, we conclude he forfeited his claim of error because he failed to object below. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This is a complicated case with a voluminous record. To borrow a phrase used by one counsel during oral argument, it is “a beast.”
It began when PacifiCare Life and Health Insurance Company (PacifiCare) petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking to reverse a penalty of nearly $175 million assessed against it by the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California (the Commissioner). The penalty was not a single assessment; rather it was the sum of penalties assessed for 19 distinct categories of wrongdoing, each involving anywhere from 2 to 462,805 violations. The total number of alleged violations exceeds 900,000. The Decision was 220 pages long; the trial court’s statement of decision, which is a primary focus of this appeal and is incorporated by reference into its judgment granting the writ of mandate, is 43 pages long. The administrative record exceeds 50,000 pages.

Petitioner Ricardo C. (father), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450−8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders denying him reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for May 9, 2022, as to his now two-year-old son, R. M.-C., Jr. (minor). Father seeks a writ directing the juvenile court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and provide him reunification services. He contends the juvenile court erred in not notifying his family that his children were taken into protective custody and asserts that he wants to reunify. We deny the petition.

Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster filed this action under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983) against three superior court judges and a former deputy district attorney. Foster sought (1) declaratory relief stating each defendant’s acts and omissions violated his constitutional rights and (2) injunctive relief vacating orders on his postconviction DNA motions brought under Penal Code section 1405 and granting him a hearing. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers based on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction and defendants’ immunity.
The initial and dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over a section 1983 action that challenges orders entered by the superior court in plaintiff’s criminal case. As explained below, the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
We therefore affirm the judgments of dismissal.

Defendant Juan Garcia Belmonte was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping in 2010. The jury also found true a felony-murder special circumstance allegation the murder was committed while engaged in a kidnapping pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(B), and a vicarious arming enhancement pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant petitioned for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) in 2019. The court denied the petition without appointing defendant counsel, concluding defendant had not established a prima facie showing for relief because, with the intent to kill, he aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree. On appeal, defendant challenges the court’s denial of his petition before appointing him counsel.

In this appeal defendant, Anthony Martinez Diaz, challenges the constitutional fairness of his trial because a standard instruction on how to view conflicting evidence was not provided. Defendant also challenges the validity of an enhancement charged and found true by the jury for use of a deadly weapon. Defendant believes the enhancement must be stricken because the use of a deadly weapon is an element of the crime he was found guilty of committing, assault with a deadly weapon. While we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of one jury instruction after reviewing the complete record of how the jury was instructed in this case, we agree the enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon must be stricken.

A jury convicted defendant Isidoro Mata of multiple counts, including first degree murder and three counts of attempted murder, in connection with a series of drive-by shootings in which defendant was the driver. Following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, asserting he was entitled to resentencing under the new laws. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) After appointing defendant counsel and receiving briefing by the parties, the court denied the petition, stating the murder conviction was based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and aiding and abetting a firearm discharge from a motor vehicle, rather than a now invalidated theory of murder. The court reasoned the jury found true the “special allegation” that defendant “acted with an intent to kill that was deliberate and premeditated.”

Defendant and appellant, Juan Antonio Guerrero, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the superior court denied. After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant.
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of facts and a statement of the case. Defendant was offered the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. Defendant contends that the amendments to section 1170.95 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.), provide that all persons convicted of murder under any theory in which malice is imputed to the defendant solely based on their participation in a crime, including direct aiding and abetting, are eligible for relief. We affirm.

The People appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendant and appellant Victor Manuel Aguirremariano’s Penal Code section 1473.7 motions to vacate his guilty pleas and convictions in case Nos. MWV802368 and FWV1400545. The People argue the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motions because he had not met the requirements entitling him to relief and he was correctly informed of his immigration consequences. The People also claim defendant failed to show any prejudicial error, with contemporaneous objective evidence, resulting in a legal invalidity of his 2008 or 2014 drug convictions as required under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). The People also argue that the trial court’s interpretation of section 1473.7, subdivision (e)(2) to presume the invalidity of defendant’s 2008 and 2014 pleas and convictions, without any showing of error or prejudice, is contrary with the presumption of correctness of superior court orders.

K.N., mother of the minor (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her petition to modify prior orders and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.) We will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.