CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Jonathan Hampton guilty of involuntary manslaughter and found true an associated firearm enhancement. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years in prison. The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $300 and defendant received 5,043 days of custody credits against his sentence. Defendant was given credit for time served.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the intent element of involuntary manslaughter, thereby violating his rights to due process and a jury trial guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Specifically, he argues the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on criminal negligence. He further argues the trial court’s failure to apply excess custody credits to the restitution fine violated the ex post facto clause of article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution.

In 1996, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Roddric Jackson of one count of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) The jury also found that Jackson was armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that he used a gun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of the offense. The trial court found that Jackson had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)−(i)), two serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)), and two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and imposed an aggregate sentence of 47 years to life in prison, along with a restitution fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a parole revocation fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)).
In September 2021, Jackson filed a “Motion to Dismiss Restitution Order by the Court Pursuant to Assembly Bill [No.] 1869.” The superior court denied the motion on the ground that Jackson “has provided no compelling and extraordinary reasons to justify a waiver of the [f]ines and fees that were imposed in this case.” Jackson a

A jury convicted Sergio Garcia of first degree murder and found true the allegation that he had personally used “deadly and dangerous weapon(s), to wit, a knife and a large rock” when he and a codefendant killed Robert Velasquez on the night of July 29, 1990. In July 2021, Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, alleging that he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder for Velasquez’s death and requesting appointed counsel.
As the trial court explained, the record of conviction establishes that Garcia was tried not as an accomplice, but as Velasquez’s actual killer. Although the trial court erred by not appointing counsel upon Garcia’s filing of a facially sufficient section 1170.95 petition, the record of conviction establishes that Garcia is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The trial court’s error was harmless, and we will affirm.

In 1996, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Lamont Sheppard of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and one count of discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3). As to the attempted murder counts, the jury found true the allegations that the offenses were committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)), and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found not true the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm or that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for two consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole, plus three years four months. (People v. Sheppard (Jan. 14, 1999), B108626 [nonpub. opn.], at pp. 1–2.)
Defendant appealed, and on January 14, 1999, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Sheppard, supra, B108626, at p. 19.)

Kevin H. (father) appeals from a juvenile court’s custody order giving him monitored visits once a week with his son, Kevin Jr. (Kevin), contending that the juvenile court should have ordered monitored visits three times a week. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the order.

In January 2021, the juvenile court found jurisdiction over Harmony B. (then eight years old), Demi C. (then two years old), and Athena B. (then four months old) based on a petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleging counts under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) (Section 300(b)(1) and Section 300(j)). Specifically, the court found the children were at substantial risk of harm from appellant-mother Brittany B.’s drug abuse, her history of domestic violence with Demi and Athena’s father Dominic C., and her mental health issues. At disposition, the court removed all three children from Mother, then terminated jurisdiction over Harmony, granting sole physical custody to her non-offending father N.G.

A jury convicted Tomas Ramos Ochoa and Guillermo Teran of two counts of murder in connection with an attempted robbery. On appeal, Ochoa argues there is insufficient evidence supporting his convictions, and the trial court made several instructional errors. Teran argues the trial court erred in admitting experimental evidence, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand Teran’s case to correct an error in his abstract of judgment. We affirm the judgments in all other respects.

A.Y. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) to make initial child custody determinations regarding her three children, C.Y., R.Y., and M.Y. Mother argues the juvenile court erred in (1) concluding that Iowa, not California, had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings, and (2) finding that Iowa was the more appropriate forum under section 3427 without first considering all of the statutory factors relevant to that determination and allowing the parties to present evidence. We affirm.

Minor Carlos C. appeals an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a contested jurisdiction hearing at which the juvenile court sustained allegations that he evaded peace officers by reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and unlawful taking or driving a stolen vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Carlos contends he was eligible for the statutory deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790 et seq.) but that he was not given the statutorily required notice of eligibility and the juvenile court failed to consider his suitability for DEJ. The People agree that he was eligible for DEJ, and the record does not reflect that he received notice of his eligibility. We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s findings and disposition order and remand for further proceedings.

Xavier Walden appeals from a judgment reinstating his probation after he admitted a probation violation. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

Bryan Torrez appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of misdemeanor assault and battery (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 242). He contends (1) the court erred in precluding expert witness testimony to support his unconsciousness defense; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking a character witness about a purported arrest of the defendant for attempting to break into cars, because the arrest was actually for resisting a police officer; and (3) the sentencing minutes should be corrected so that he does not have to pay the fees and assessments imposed at sentencing or a $25 fee under section 1463.07. We will order a correction of the sentencing minutes and affirm the judgment.

Defendants Adi Simayof (Simayof) and Sarit Simayof-Cohen (Cohen) appeal the trial court’s order entering judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 against each defendant, and various companies associated with defendants, based on written settlement agreements which Simayof and Cohen separately entered into with plaintiff Lisa Kroger Eitani. Defendants argue that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to support entry of judgment against Simayof; that Cohen’s duty to pay money to Eitani pursuant to the settlement agreement never arose; that the settlement agreement between Eitani and Cohen was never intended to involve entry of judgment against Cohen; and, if entry of judgment against Cohen was proper, the trial court was required to reduce the amount of the judgment to reflect payments Simayof made to Eitani.

Jonathan Oomrigar appeals from a final judgment following the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. In this employment dispute, Oomrigar asserts the evidence established he could only be terminated for cause. He also claims the court abused its discretion by denying him leave to amend his complaint. We find no error and affirm.

Defendant Lamar McClinton is civilly committed as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) McClinton filed a petition for conditional release. In a declaration, a psychologist opined McClinton was not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if conditionally released. The trial court denied the petition, finding the psychologist’s declaration did not contain enough information for the court to conclude the petition was “not frivolous.”
McClinton contends the trial court erred by denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Attorney General concedes the error. We agree.
Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order denying McClinton’s petition for conditional release. On remand, we direct the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.