CA Unpub Decisions

Parents S.V. (Mother) and T.L. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders concerning their three children J.L., T.L., Jr. (Jr.), and B.L. Both parents contend the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their respective duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We agree. We conditionally reverse the court’s orders and remand for compliance with ICWA.

Ruben Ramirez Tellez appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of assault with the intent to commit a sexual offense (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 3). The jury also found Tellez used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses in counts 1 and 3. (§§ 12022.3, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 16 years, which included upper terms on count 1 and its attending deadly weapon enhancement.
Tellez raises two sentencing issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by relying on improper aggravating factors to impose upper terms on the assault conviction in count 1 and its deadly weapon enhancement. While this appeal was pending, Senate Bill No. 567 (Reg. Sess. 2020-2021) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) became effective.

Alicia Marie Richards and Ryal W. Richards have been embroiled in a long drawn-out and highly acrimonious dissolution action for several years. Alicia has filed multiple unsuccessful appeals in connection with the couple’s divorce judgment and Ryal’s efforts to enforce it. In April 2018, while some of her appeals were pending, Alicia filed a fraud action against Ryal. In 2020, the trial court sustained Ryal’s demurrer without leave to amend. Alicia’s arguments on appeal attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the demurrer, as well as her contention she sufficiently pled eight causes of action, lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of Ryal.

Alicia Marie Richards and Ryal W. Richards have been embroiled in a long drawn-out and highly acrimonious dissolution action for several years. Alicia has filed multiple unsuccessful appeals in connection with the couple’s divorce judgment and Ryal’s efforts to enforce it. In April 2018, while some of her appeals were pending, Alicia filed a fraud action against Ryal. She later amended the complaint to add Ryal’s mother, Patricia Strang, as well as Ryal’s trial counsel in the dissolution action, Kevin Eugene Robinson. The trial court sustained Ryal’s demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. We affirmed the judgment dismissing Ryal in Richards v. Richards (May 2, 2022, G059675 [nonpub. opn.] (Richards V.).
This appeal challenges the trial court’s decision to grant Strang’s and Robinson’s special motions to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).

Mid-Wilshire Property, L.P. (Mid-Wilshire), and Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center, appeal from a judgment in favor of respondents Dr. Leevil, LLC (Dr. Leevil), and Lido Holding Company, LLC (Lido), entered after a proceeding bearing a passing resemblance to a trial took place in the superior court. This proceeding began in August 2017 and ended in November 2019. The two-year suspension was necessary because a core issue in the case – whether a late fee sought by Dr. Leevil was an unlawful penalty – was before a court in Ventura County. The record indicates that all parties and the court understood how crucial the resolution of this issue was, right up until the last day of trial in November 2019. Then it was ignored.
The case and this appeal concern the foreclosure sale of commercial property belonging to Mid-Wilshire, which had secured a loan eventually owned by Dr. Leevil.

Kennedy McDow (Kennedy), who has been a self-represented litigant throughout these proceedings, appeals from an order appointing himself and his sister, Betty Harris (Betty), as co-conservators of the person of their mother, Lily McDow (Lily). He contends the probate court erred when it denied him the right to have certain witnesses testify at the conservatorship hearing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Enrique Esquibel appeals from a resentencing hearing at which the trial court struck the prison priors, declined to strike the firearm enhancements, and adopted all other findings and orders from the original sentencing hearing. One of those findings was that counts 1 and 5 were not committed pursuant to one intent and objective, and thus consecutive sentences were appropriate. Esquibel now contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not reconsidering its prior findings as to counts 1 and 5 in light of People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935 (Roles). We agree with respondent that Roles is materially distinguishable, and the trial court properly declined to stay sentence on count 5.

Francisco Antonio Nava and three codefendants—Robert Ramos, Stephen Lopez, and Ruben Perez—engaged in a confrontation at a convenience market with E.D. and his girlfriend, C.A. They yelled rival gang slurs at E.D.; Lopez and Perez threw drinks into E.D. and C.A.’s car; and Lopez grabbed E.D.’s shirt and struck him in the back of the head, scratching his neck. Perez also tried to grab E.D. E.D. drove away. When E.D. stopped at an intersection, he saw a black car speeding toward him, heard two gunshots and glass breaking, and felt an impact on his car. He saw the black car on the left side of his car and a man pointing his hand out of the back passenger window.

Appellant Brandon Christopher Walker was charged, in count 1 of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and in count 2 of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) against victim E.C. He was also charged in count 3 of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242) against victim Jose B. As to count 2, the information alleged Walker personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). It further alleged Walker had served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) A jury convicted Walker of all counts and found the weapon use enhancement true.
The trial court struck the prison prior on the People’s motion, denied probation, and sentenced Walker to a total of four years in state prison.
On appeal, Walker contends that the trial court prejudicially erred when it excluded evidence of the E.C.’s immigration status, and when it failed to give an unanimity instruction on the criminal threats charge. We find no error and affirm.

James Patrick Hilliard appeals from an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under Penal Code sections 4852.01 and 4852.06. (Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner John Rios contacted respondent West Valley Water District (WVWD) demanding public records relating to improper use of the agency’s credit card that led to an employee’s termination. Robert Tafoya, general counsel for WVWD contacted petitioner’s counsel setting out various defenses to production to “protect the record” but informed petitioner’s counsel that the documents were available to be picked up. Instead of picking up the requested documents, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate against respondent WVWD, its director Clarence Mansell, and Tafoya, pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The petition alleged the respondents refused to produce the requested documents. After mailing the petition without a notice and acknowledgment of receipt to WVWD, respondent’s counsel instructed the agency to communicate to petitioner that he should contact WVWD’s attorney who would accept service on behalf of the agency.

Mother of the minor H.L. appeals from the juvenile court’s August 2021 order that letters of guardianship would issue, with H.L.’s foster parents appointed as her legal guardians and visitation for mother at the discretion of the guardians. Mother contends reversal is required because the juvenile court impermissibly delegated its authority in ordering that visitation was within the discretion of the guardians. We agree and reverse the portion of the order addressing visitation and remand the matter.

Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164, defendant Michael Lee Bonge contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not raise an ability to pay objection to the trial court’s imposition of fines and fees. We conclude defendant has failed to carry his burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment.

Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, defendant William Lee Brooks, Jr. appeals the imposition of assessments and fines without an ability to pay hearing. Recognizing his trial counsel did not object to these assessments and fines, defendant further contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The principles of due process do not require a determination of a defendant’s present ability to pay before the imposition of the fines and assessments at issue in Dueñas and in this proceeding. Thus, we reject his argument and, with that, we necessarily reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment.