CA Unpub Decisions

A surety on a $50,000 bail bond appeals from an order denying its motion to set aside a summary judgment entered on the bond. Surety contends that after the appearance period expired on October 21, 2019, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to order reinstatement of the bail bond, surety’s consent to the reinstatement did not confer the necessary jurisdiction, and the reinstatement order is void. Surety also contends that the September 3, 2020 summary judgment ultimately entered on the bail bond is voidable and the bail bond must be exonerated pursuant to Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (c) because the summary judgment was not filed within 90 days after the appearance period expired on October 21, 2019.
The trial court concluded the surety was estopped from challenging the reinstatement order because the surety (1) had prior notice that a reinstatement order would be entered, (2) gave its written consent to the reinstatement,

A surety appeals from a summary judgment entered on a bail bond and an order refusing to grant relief from its forfeiture, contending an emergency rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the COVID-19 pandemic tolled the appearance period for exonerating forfeited bail bonds and, therefore, the summary judgment was entered prematurely and is voidable. That rule tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Appendix I, Emergency rule 9 (Emergency Rule 9).) We conclude the appearance period is not a statute of limitations or repose and no tolling occurred.
We therefore affirm the summary judgment.

Appellant Russell Brian Sweeden was convicted, following a court trial, of one count of lewd or lascivious acts with a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); count 2). The court further found appellant had engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). Appellant was denied probation and sentenced to the middle term of six years.
On appeal, appellant makes several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance based on his failures to: (1) move for mistrial or otherwise seek remedy for the information referencing an act not shown by evidence at the preliminary hearing; (2) obtain an expert to test and testify about the DNA evidence the prosecution presented; (3) cross-examine the prosecution’s DNA expert witness on the transfer of “trace-DNA”; (4) object to the prosecution’s manner of questioning the minor victim;

A surety appeals from a summary judgment entered on a bail bond, contending the summary judgment was entered prematurely and, therefore, is voidable. The surety argues the summary judgment was entered early because the appearance period for exonerating forfeited bail bonds was tolled by an emergency rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. That rule tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Appendix I, Emergency rule 9 (Emergency Rule 9).) We conclude the appearance period is not a statute of limitations or repose and no tolling occurred.
We therefore affirm the summary judgment.

Stacey Adam Sango was convicted by jury of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. Originally, he challenged that conviction claiming the trial court erroneously excluded evidence relevant to determining the force with which he committed the assault. He also took issue with certain fines and fees imposed as part of his sentence. We affirmed.
After the original opinion was filed, Sango moved to recall the remittitur and petitioned for rehearing contending newly enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1-1.3) (SB 567), which requires most sentence-aggravating factors to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, applies retroactively to his case. He claims, under the new law, the trial court could not have relied on certain aggravating factors in pronouncing judgment because they were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of facts, a statement of the case, and requesting this court conduct an independent review of the record. We have independently reviewed the record for any potential error and find no arguable issues. We, therefore, affirm.

Defendant and appellant J.G. (father) appeals from the order of the Riverside County juvenile court terminating his parental rights as to H.G. (the child) pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. We will dismiss his appeal as moot.

Defendant and appellant, John Anthony Morales, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the court denied. After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant.
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of facts, a statement of the case, and identifying two potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the superior court erred in denying defendant’s petition; and (2) whether the denial constituted prejudicial error. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Keandre Dion Windfield appeals the decision of the San Bernardino County Superior Court not to strike personal firearm use enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.53 of the Penal Code.

Appellant L.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition regarding her daughter, A.M. (the child). We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Approximately 20 years after defendant and appellant Timothy Charles Duncan pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) requested that the trial court consider resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170, subdivision (d). The trial court declined to do so.
On January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540) went into effect, which changed the procedure for recall and resentencing upon a recommendation from the CDCR. Both parties agree that we should reverse and remand the matter to allow the trial court to review the CDCR’s recommendation in light of the new law. We agree and reverse.

C.C. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order removing his two-year-old son, M.C., from his and R.R.’s (Mother) custody. Father’s only contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b). We conclude that because the Agency failed to comply with its initial inquiry obligations, substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply. However, we affirm on the basis that such error was harmless.

Defendant Nicholas Antwone Bowden led deputies on a late night, high-speed chase down an interstate highway and surface streets with four young children in the backseat and an unsecured firearm under the front passenger seat. A jury convicted him of four counts of felony child endangerment, willful evasion of a peace officer, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an upper term on the principal child endangerment count, and it ran the sentences on all five subordinate counts consecutively.
Bowden argues the court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on the four child endangerment convictions. He contends concurrent terms were required because those convictions all stemmed from the identical course of conduct during the high-speed chase.

Appointed counsel for defendant Michael Joe Figueira has asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.