CA Unpub Decisions

J.B. (mother) and H.B. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption for minors M.B., T.B., and Ja.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because the Department did not adequately inquire into information that the minors may have Cherokee heritage. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224.2.) Father joins in mother’s arguments.
We will conditionally reverse and remand the matter for limited proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.

Following three probation violations, the trial court revoked defendant Vincent Angelo Jiron’s probation and sentenced him to the midterm of three years. Defendant appeals the sentence imposed contending the trial court abused its discretion. Specifically, he claims the trial court misunderstood the law when it determined there was insufficient time left for defendant to complete rehabilitative programming, given the shortened probationary term mandated by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2). We disagree and affirm.

Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), defendant Ian Christopher Broughton appeals the imposition of fines and assessments without an ability to pay hearing. We conclude defendant forfeited his Dueñas claim by failing to raise an ability to pay objection at any of his several sentencing hearings and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Paul Walden appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. His appointed counsel asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief but did not file one. We conclude he is not entitled to Wende review and dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

Following a bench trial, defendant Kai Yang was found guilty of bringing a controlled substance into jail, possessing a controlled substance in jail, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor intoxication in public. On appeal, he contends his convictions for bringing a controlled substance into a jail and possessing a controlled substance in jail are irreconcilable with his conviction for being intoxicated in public and insufficient evidence supports his convictions for knowingly bringing a controlled substance into a jail and possessing a controlled substance in jail. We affirm, but remand as explained below.

Defendant Carlton Gordon Secrest pleaded no contest to charges related to felony indecent exposure, and the trial court sentenced him to the upper term in prison. On appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not request mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. (Statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code.)
In supplemental briefing, defendant argues we must reverse and remand the matter so as to give him the benefit of the ameliorative changes to section 1170 enacted under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which came into effect on January 1, 2022, while his appeal was pending. The People concede, and we agree. We will reverse defendant’s sentence, remand for resentencing, and otherwise affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Ricky Sims of attempted murder and criminal threats, and found true several enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 46 years in prison, with 10 of those years being from two serious felony conviction enhancements, and an indeterminate term of 14 years to life. In the second of two prior appeals, this court remanded for the trial court to consider its discretion to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement allegations and to amend and correct the abstract of judgment. On remand, the trial court declined to dismiss those enhancements, but did not amend and correct the abstract.
In this third appeal, defendant now contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider his age in declining to dismiss those enhancements, and (2) the abstract of judgment should be amended. The People agree the abstract should be amended.

Section 6 of article XIII B of the California Constitution requires the State of California, subject to certain exceptions, to “provide a subvention of funds to reimburse” local governments “[w]henever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service.” In this case, the City of San Diego (the City) seeks reimbursement under this provision for the costs of complying with a new permit condition that the State Water Resources Control Board (the Water Board) imposed on operators of water systems that serve K-12 schools. Under the new permit condition, these operators must provide free lead testing at each K-12 school they serve on the school’s request.
In this appeal, we must determine whether the Water Board’s new condition requires “a new program or higher level of service” within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6. The Commission on State Mandates (the Commission), which is charged with hearing claims under section 6, concluded i

After a robbery involving a firearm and an investigatory stop of a vehicle driven by minor A.L., officers searched the vehicle and found a loaded handgun under the driver seat. Minor moved to suppress the seized evidence, but the juvenile court denied the motion. The parties agreed to a negotiated disposition in which minor admitted he had carried a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle. Minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation.
Minor now contends the initial stop was unlawful as the officer did not have a reasonable basis to stop him; the subsequent search of the car went beyond the scope of the detention; and his consent to search was not voluntary, as it was given without benefit of Miranda warnings and the detention had become an unlawful de facto arrest.

A jury convicted defendant Miguel Angel Pineda Cruz of two counts of criminal threats, and one count each of assault with a firearm, domestic violence, possession of a firearm by a felon, and methamphetamine possession. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 245, subd. (b), 273.5, subd. (a), 29800, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm in the assault and in one criminal threat incident. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior uncharged acts of domestic violence against the victim, Maria E., under Evidence Code section 1109; (2) the court improperly admitted unauthenticated text messages in violation of the hearsay rule; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the firearm possession count; and (4) the cumulative effect of these claimed errors violated due process.
We will affirm the judgment.

This case returns to us on transfer from the California Supreme Court.
Defendant James Anthony Kleinau pleaded no contest to reckless evading of a peace officer and admitted four prior prison terms as part of a negotiated plea agreement that included a stipulated sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of seven years in prison, including the upper term of three years in prison on the evading charge and one year for each of the four prior prison terms. On appeal, defendant contends that Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to his case and requires that the four prior prison term enhancements be stricken. The Attorney General agrees. However, the parties disagree as to the effect of the new law’s application on the plea agreement.
In March 2021, we filed an unpublished opinion remanding the matter with directions to strike the enhancements and provide both parties an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement.

Defendant Matthew Douglas White appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant argues the trial court incorrectly concluded he was ineligible for relief because section 1170.95 applies to second degree murder under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson). In supplemental briefing, defendant argues the recent amendments to section 1170.95 further support his argument. We will affirm

In 1997, defendant Larry Tyrone Harper pleaded guilty to second degree murder. In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied defendant’s petition after holding an evidentiary hearing relying on the transcript from defendant’s preliminary hearing. During the pendency of this appeal, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) (Senate Bill 775) was enacted, which modified section 1170.95. The parties now agree the matter must be remanded for a new hearing consistent with the revised section 1170.95.
In light of Senate Bill 775, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

J.J. (Mother) appeals from an order finding her ex-husband, R.M., is a presumed father of E.S., pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and also finding he is a third parent pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (c).
On appeal, Mother asserts: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected her request to include R.M.’s trial court “outbursts” and the court’s admonitions in the settled statement; (2) the presumed paternity finding was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) this case is not an appropriate action to grant third parent status because it would lead to “warring parents fighting for custody”; (4) granting third parent status would impermissibly circumvent the purpose of stepparent adoption statutes; (5) there is no existing relationship between R.M. and E.S. to support a third parent finding; and (6) section 7612, subdivision (c), is unconstitutional as applied.