CA Unpub Decisions

Michael Jeffrey Lawrence appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of several offenses, including possession of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)), undesignated statutory references are to this code). Lawrence’s appointed counsel filed a brief asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Having found none, we affirm.
In April 2021, the prosecution charged Lawrence with three offenses arising out of incidents in October 2020 and March 2021: possession of
a controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (§ 11370.1, subd. (a), count 1); possession of a controlled substance for sale (§ 11378, count 2); and misdemeanor driving while privilege suspended or revoked. (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a), count 3.)
At trial, the prosecution offered the following evidence:

Following a bench trial, the court found defendant Julian Swig met the criteria for a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and entered an order on August 18, 2021, extending his commitment to September 12, 2022. (Pen. Code, § 2970 ). Swig seeks reversal on the sole basis that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time of trial he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We affirm.

C.T. (Father) appeals from juvenile court orders finding jurisdiction over his three minor children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (“section 300(b)(1)”) and disposition orders requiring he engage in family maintenance services. Because the juvenile court vacated the dependencies and dismissed his children’s dependency petitions during the pendency of this appeal, we dismiss Father’s appeal as moot.

Plaintiff Doris Yates brought this action against her employer, defendant California State University of the East Bay, for alleged violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. ) related to third party harassment by a student. The operative complaint alleges that defendant failed to take all reasonably necessary steps to prevent and address the student’s harassment and that defendant unlawfully retaliated against plaintiff for asserting her rights under FEHA. We conclude the trial court properly sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend, and we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Defendants Sonic Automotive, Inc., FAA Concord H, Inc., and FirstAmerica Automotive, Inc. (collectively, defendants) appeal from a trial court order denying their petition to compel arbitration of a lawsuit filed by plaintiff Anthony Williams. We affirm.

Calvin Bennett McDonald III contends that his conviction for three counts of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69) must be reversed because the trial court erroneously omitted an instruction on an element of the offense and provided an incorrect response to a jury question. Because we conclude his contentions lack merit, we affirm.

Plaintiff TransMart, Inc. (TransMart) entered into an option contract with defendant San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) giving it the opportunity to lease space in BART’s train stations for the purpose of developing retail space. When the deal fell apart and BART rejected TransMart’s effort to exercise the option, TransMart brought this civil action for breach of contract. A monthlong jury trial was held after which the jury returned a special verdict in favor of BART. We affirm.

Jaime P. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order removing three of her children from her custody pursuant to a petition filed by the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (department) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. She contends the court erred in ordering the children removed. In particular, she argues there was insufficient evidence the children would face substantial harm if left in her custody, and the court should have ordered alternative measures short of removal.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order.

After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found G.C. committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute sending harmful matter to a minor, sexual battery, and false imprisonment. G.C. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court.
G.C. raises four claims on appeal. First, he contends insufficient evidence rebutted the presumption he lacked capacity. Second, he contends the image he sent did not constitute “harmful matter” under Penal Code section 288.2. Third, he contends section 288.2 was not intended to target minors who engage in age-appropriate sexual contact. Fourth, he argues section 288.2 as applied to him violated his equal protection rights.
For the reasons below, we conclude these claims are without merit. We will affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Michael Vincent Atwell pleaded no contest to felony taking or unauthorized use of a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), carrying a loaded firearm when having a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c) ), and misdemeanor resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He also admitted allegations that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) (hereafter “prior prison term enhancement”) and had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12). Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Atwell to five years in state prison, which included one year for the prior prison term enhancement.
In his initial appeal to this court, Atwell contended this court should strike the prior prison term enhancement in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136).

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Shane Lamont Thomas, Jr. pleaded no contest to felony assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) ) and felony evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). He also admitted allegations that he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) (hereafter “prior prison term enhancements”) and had suffered a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). In accord with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Thomas to seven years four months in prison, which included two consecutive one-year prior prison term enhancements.
In his initial appeal to this court, Thomas contended this court should strike the two prior prison term enhancements in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136).

In 1999, defendant Juan Manuel Gonzalez was convicted by jury trial of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187). The jury found true gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) for both counts, personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) for the murder count, and personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) for the attempted murder count. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 67 years to life. The court also imposed a restitution fund fine of $10,000. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Gonzalez (Apr. 5, 2001, H020233) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, proceeding in pro per, defendant filed a postjudgment motion for “sentence modification” due to his “inability to pay.”

In 1999, defendant Juan Manuel Gonzalez was convicted by jury trial of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187). The jury found true gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd (b)(1)) for both counts, personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) for the murder count, and personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) for the attempted murder count. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 67 years to life. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Gonzalez (Apr. 5, 2011, H020233) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, defendant petitioned the trial court to vacate his murder and attempted murder convictions under newly enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437).

M.A. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order made at the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing denying him visitation. Father contends the court erred by denying him visitation because insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court improperly delegated its decision-making authority. Father’s contention lacks merit, and we affirm the orders.