CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
R.M. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders, contending that the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with their duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related state statutes and court rules. We conditionally affirm the court’s orders but remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA’s requirements.
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Miles James Williams appeals a judgment following conviction of misdemeanor vandalism. (Pen. Code, § 594.)
At a jury trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that on November 26, 2020, Williams entered a Santa Barbara drugstore. The store manager knew Williams and ordered him to leave. As he walked from the store, Williams triggered an electronic theft device alarm. Williams forcibly removed the device and destroyed it. The store manager summoned police officers who then arrested Williams. Williams testified at trial that at the time of the incident he was not taking his psychotropic medication. The trial court sentenced Williams to serve 364 days confinement in county jail and awarded him presentence custody credit of 381 days. The court found that Williams did not have the present financial ability to pay any fines, fees, or assessments, and therefore did not impose them. We appointed counsel to represent Williams in this appeal. |
The Santa Barbara County Probation Department (Department) appeals postjudgment orders of the superior court following the court’s issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus. That writ set aside a Civil Service Commission of Santa Barbara County (Commission) decision that upheld the termination of Robert Hample’s employment at the Department. The Commission filed a return with a new decision that did not reinstate Hample to his position with the Department. Hample filed objections to the return.
We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court had authority to determine whether the Commission’s new decision and its return to the writ complied with the mandamus judgment it entered; 2) the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the Commission to consider whether Hample could be reinstated following his retirement and receipt of retirement benefits; |
David Paul Guerrero, who was convicted of second degree murder, appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.1 He contends the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof at the hearing on his petition under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the order denying his petition. The parties ask this court to correct the judgment to reflect the accurate amounts of certain assessments imposed on Guerrero’s conviction. We order the trial court to correct the judgment, as specified below.
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In 2004, a jury convicted petitioner Clarence Ervin Reese of first degree felony murder, attempted carjacking, and burglary, and found felony-murder special circumstance allegations true. Thereafter, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our California Supreme Court clarified under what circumstances a Penal Code section 190.2 special circumstance may be found true when the defendant is not the actual killer. Reese petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus, and we issued an order to show cause. We now conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove Reese acted with reckless indifference to human life, and the special circumstance findings must be reversed.
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Appellant Alfredo Parada appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends the trial court erred in finding that he failed to establish a prima facie case and therefore was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We conclude that the trial court was entitled to rely on the record of conviction in denying the petition at the prima facie stage. Moreover, any error was harmless, because the jury instructions from the trial make clear that appellant’s convictions for murder and attempted murder were not based on theories of felony murder or natural and probable consequences. Consequently, he is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. We therefore affirm.
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Defendant and appellant Mark Theodore Freeman appeals from the superior court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. We affirm because the record of conviction establishes Freeman is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
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Defendant appeals his convictions for multiple sexual assaults against a single victim, a minor over the age of 14 years. The court sentenced defendant to four consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He argues his sentence was unauthorized because he was not provided with due process notice that he could be sentenced to LWOP. Defendant also asserts that the court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of his sexual attack on another woman. We affirm.
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Rodney S. appeals from an October 5, 2021 dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court and imposing various conditions of probation. He contends the probation condition prohibiting him from being present in a building that he knows contains firearms or weapons is invalid and must be modified. In a prior opinion challenging the same condition in a different wardship petition, this court held the condition was overbroad and required modification. (People v. R.S. (Apr. 5, 2019, A154336) [nonpub. opn.].) Contrary to Rodney’s contention, the law of the case doctrine is not applicable here. Although this is Rodney’s fourth appeal under the same juvenile court number, the prior appeals pertained to separate wardship petitions, each with different underlying offenses and dispositional orders.
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L.D. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders denying her requests for reunification services and additional visits with her two-year-old son, M.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388; undesignated references are to this code.) She argues the court abused its discretion by summarily denying the petitions without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
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Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant, Jason Carmichael Hickerson, Jr., pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. He raises a single issue on appeal—that his motion to suppress should have been granted because, at the time the police officers searched the car he was driving, they had no reason to believe he had lied about his identity and therefore had no basis to search for evidence of such. We conclude that, regardless of whether the search was lawful, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies because, while still at the scene, defendant admitted he initially provided a false name, at which point the officers could have, and would have, searched the car for evidence of that misdemeanor offense. We therefore affirm.
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This case arose out of what the trial court termed “a scuffle” between defendant and a neighboring resident who thought defendant was going to break into his vehicle. The court, sitting as the trier of fact, found the neighbor reasonably restrained defendant by grabbing his sweatshirt while calling the police. The court further found defendant’s efforts to escape from the neighbor were unreasonable, particularly when defendant drew and used a knife to slice the neighbor’s arm. The court therefore rejected defendant’s claim of self-defense, finding defendant “profoundly lack[ed] credibility” and convicted him of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) accompanied by infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
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Plaintiff James Burroughs was the Director of Health and Safety employed by defendant Truebeck Construction, Inc. (Truebeck), a San Mateo County-based construction company. Burroughs alleges that after he reported to company management his discovery that an employee had falsified a safety training record, he was subjected to increasingly hostile treatment in the workplace that ultimately forced him to quit his job when the situation became intolerable. Burroughs initiated this suit against his former employer for various statutory and common law claims of retaliation and wrongful constructive discharge, and ultimately the trial court granted summary judgment against him. He now appeals, arguing that various triable issues of fact warrant a trial on all of his causes of action. We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.
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