CA Unpub Decisions

R.B. appeals a trial court order establishing a one-year conservatorship over his person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (“LPS Act”) (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5000 et seq.) and imposing special disabilities. While this appeal was pending, the one-year conservatorship challenged by R.B. expired. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Through the services of a placement agency, Dr. Gary L. Greenberg, an anesthesiologist, was temporarily assigned to work at Contra Costa Regional Medical Center (CCRMC). After three days on the job, his temporary assignment at CCRMC was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Greenberg sued CCRMC, the chief of its anesthesiology department, and the placement agency (Staff Care, Inc.) in connection with the termination. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Greenberg now appeals, and we affirm.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
Petitioners, parents of minor B.D., challenge the trial court’s order terminating reunification services at the six-month review hearing in B.D.’s dependency matter. Petitioners argue substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that returning B.D. to either petitioner’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to B.D., and that there was no substantial probability that B.D. would be returned to either petitioner after the rendition of additional services. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings on both risk of detriment and probability of return as to both petitioners. Accordingly, we deny both petitions and their requests for a stay of the upcoming hearing on termination of parental rights.

LeeAnne H. Daily and the Daily and Daily Law Firm appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike Helen Garcia’s complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Appellants contend the trial court erred in determining that the anti-SLAPP statue did not apply to Garcia’s claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court correctly determined the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to the claims; we affirm.

Mark Anthony Marquez appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and rape of an intoxicated person (§ 261, subd. (a)(3)). Marquez raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends his forcible rape conviction should be reversed because it resulted from vindictive prosecution, a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process. Because his trial counsel did not raise this issue below, thereby forfeiting his appellate claim, Marquez alternatively argues his counsel’s omission constitutes ineffective assistance. We conclude the prosecution’s reinstatement of the forcible rape charge, which it had dismissed earlier in the proceedings, did not raise a presumption of vindictive prosecution, and therefore, we reject Marquez’s claim in either configuration.

Mother appeals from a judgment in a dependency petition that terminated her parental rights as to her daughter and selected adoption as the daughter’s permanent plan. Mother raises a single issue on appeal: that the court erred in failing to make a finding that Social Services Agency (SSA) had adequately investigated the minor’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. SSA concedes that the court failed to make a finding and that the evidence would have been insufficient to support a finding.
Nevertheless seeking an affirmance, SSA moves this court to receive additional evidence not before the trial court that allegedly demonstrates, first, that substantial evidence supports a finding that ICWA did not apply, and second, that any error was harmless because mother could not achieve a different result on remand.

Juvenile dependency courts shoulder a sacred burden in our system of justice. Facing heavy workloads with correspondingly heavy factual records, they stand as stewards of the welfare of each child brought before them. This burden is not an easy one, yet our experience is that our dependency courts carry it with remarkable efficiency and diligence. Rarely do we feel the need to second-guess their decisions.
But we must always bear in mind one of the ultimate consequences of dependency proceedings: the termination of parental rights. There are few consequences as weighty. It is therefore incumbent upon us as a reviewing court to ensure that the procedures employed are commensurate with the outcome. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.

This case concerns three separate gang drive-by shootings that took place in San Jose in 2012 and 2013. Based on his involvement, a jury convicted Balam Eugenio Gonzalez of the first degree murders of Pedro Cortez and Armando Heredia (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) and the attempted premeditated murder of Brian Joya (§§ 187, 189, 664). The jury found true multiple firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1), (g)), gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), (5)), and special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (21), (22)). The trial court imposed sentences of life without the possibility of parole for the two murders, a consecutive life term for the attempted premeditated murder, plus 80 years to life for the firearm enhancements and a prior serious felony enhancement.
On appeal, Gonzalez contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after witness Ramon Lomeli testified Gonzalez was involved in an uncharged shooting;

Defendant and a friend confronted an armed security guard. Defendant drew a gun and fired at the security guard. The security guard returned fire, ultimately killing defendant’s friend. Defendant was convicted of attempted murder of the security guard, murder of his friend, and active participation in a criminal street gang. The jury made special findings that the attempted murder was for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that defendant personally discharged a firearm. As relevant here, the two theories of murder the prosecution presented were natural and probable consequences and provocative act murder. The court sentenced him to 52 years to life in prison. We affirmed that conviction in a prior appeal. (People v. Reyes (Dec. 8, 2009, G040778) [nonpub. opn.])
This is an appeal from the denial of a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing, which the court denied at the prima facie stage. There are two issues on appeal.

Tremaine Hunter appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. Hunter argues the court erred by denying his section 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. We agree and reverse the postjudgment order.

Defendant the Law Offices of J.D. Cuzzolina, Esq. appeals from the court’s order denying its special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court found plaintiff Stuart Kane LLP’s declaratory relief action did not arise from protected activity. The court also held the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous and ordered defendant pay $5,000 in costs and fees to plaintiff.
Defendant raises three arguments on appeal. First, defendant contends plaintiff’s declaratory relief action arises from protected activity because it is based on defendant’s professional representation of its client and an underlying settlement agreement. Second, defendant argues plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief. Finally, defendant claims the court erred by awarding costs and fees to plaintiff because the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.

This appeal arises from a judgment entered in favor of defendants North Orange County Community College District (the District), and its employees (the individual defendants). Plaintiff Kourt D. Williams alleged statutory and common law claims based on allegations of race and age discrimination arising from his employment application to the District. After the trial court granted Williams leave to file his lawsuit, he filed it one day after a statute of limitations deadline lapsed for his statutory claims.
The District successfully filed demurrers and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court concluded Williams’s statutory claims were time-barred and declined to equitably toll the deadline that had lapsed. The court also concluded Williams did not state facts sufficient to support his common law causes of action.
We review the trial court’s rulings on Williams’s common law claims de novo and conclude Williams has not shown error.

Petitioner Evelyn D. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing on May 25, 2022, as to her now two-year-old son, D.S. She contends the juvenile court violated section § 16002.5 when it determined that real party in interest, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department), provided her reasonable reunification services. She further contends the juvenile court erred by failing to continue reunification services to the next review hearing.
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders and deny the petition. On this record, the juvenile court’s finding the department provided mother reasonable reunification services and its order terminating them are supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant and defendant Joseph Elias Castrillo (appellant) was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. On appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and the enhancement, but remanded the matter for the court to consider whether to strike the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement, based on statutory amendments that occurred after his sentencing hearing. On remand, the court declined to dismiss the firearm enhancement.
In this appeal, appellant argues the matter must again be remanded because the court did not realize the full extent of its discretion as to the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement. We agree and will again remand.