CA Unpub Decisions

Minors Christopher W. and C.W. appeal from juvenile court orders dismissing dependency petitions filed on their behalf under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j). The petitions alleged their father, Christopher W. (Father), caused Christopher serious physical harm by engaging in excessive discipline, consisting of repeated belt strikes that resulted in bruising to multiple body parts. The petitions further alleged the boys’ mother, S.S. (Mother), failed to protect Christopher, the family had a history of physical abuse, and C.W. was also at substantial risk of abuse. The minors contend the court erred by not taking jurisdiction. We agree, and conclude the undisputed evidence compelled the juvenile court to find they were subject to jurisdiction. We reverse and remand with directions.

A jury found defendant Kenneth Jerai Easley guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a)) for shooting and killing Ayo Hullett in October 2019. It also found true three firearm enhancements: personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); personal discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). At sentencing, the court considered its discretion to dismiss or strike the enhancements under section 1385, and it declined, sentencing Easley to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for the most serious firearm enhancement, for a total indeterminate sentence of 40 years to life.
Easley’s attorney asked the court to impose minimum fines and fees.

A jury convicted Ahern Hahshon Woods on 28 counts arising from theft and drug-related activity between February 2017 and May 2019. The trial court sentenced Woods to a term of 15 years in prison.
Woods challenges only the convictions on the four counts that relate to the theft of two pickup trucks on different dates in 2019. For both vehicle thefts, Woods was convicted of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (counts 3 and 5). Woods contends that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that he took the trucks, as required for the convictions in counts 3 and 5. According to Woods, the evidence supports no more than a finding that he was later found to be in possession of the trucks. In addition, for both of the vehicle thefts, the jury also convicted Woods of receiving a stolen vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d (counts 4 and 6).

A second amended information filed in October 2020 charged defendant Martin Flores with the following crimes against granddaughters Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2: aggravated sexual assault by rape of a child under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than the defendant (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), (6), 269, subd. (a)(1)–counts 1 & 6); forcible rape of a child under 14 years of age (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (c)(1)–counts 2 & 7); aggravated sexual assault by oral copulation of a child under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than the defendant (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)–counts 3 & 8); forcible oral copulation of a child under 14 years of age (former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(B)–counts 4 & 9); and forcible lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)–counts 5, 10 & 11).

Miguel J. Lucas pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). He was granted two years of formal probation and ordered to serve a term of 365 days in local custody with credit for time served. Among other conditions of Lucas’s probation, the court required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices.”
Lucas asserts the electronic search condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) because it has no relationship to the crime of which Lucas was convicted and is not reasonably related to future criminality. We conclude Lucas has forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Lucas further asks us to vacate any unpaid portion of the $154 criminal justice administration fee imposed under the recently repealed Government Code section 29550.1.

In 2012, a jury convicted Rafael Meraz of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The jury found that Meraz was a principal and a principal in the murder, personally used a firearm, and proximately caused great bodily injury, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). Meraz was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years-to-life in prison.
Meraz appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion, People v. Aguon et al. (Nov. 29, 2016) D064367.
In 2020, Meraz filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel, received briefing, and reviewed the record of conviction, including the court file and the prior opinion of this court. The court held a hearing and denied the petition by written order. The court found Meraz had not made a prima facie case for relief and determined he was not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95.

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
In 2012, a jury found defendant Francisco Delgado guilty of three counts of first degree murder and found true the special circumstances of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, and multiple murders. Defendant appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. (Statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code.) His attorney filed a brief stating the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant did not file a supplemental brief.

Defendant Salvador Ramon Martinez appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant argues the trial court erred when it found him ineligible for relief because he was convicted on a theory of provocative act murder. We disagree and affirm the order.

A jury found defendant Lope Elwin Tolosa guilty of vehicle theft, driving under the influence, driving while privileges were suspended or revoked for a prior conviction for driving under the influence, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He now claims his conviction for vehicle theft should be reversed, because statements he made to police officers were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, and erroneously admitted at trial. He further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.3d 497 (Romero), and in its imposition of fines and fees. In supplemental briefing, he argues that the imposition of the upper term on count one was improper in light of Penal Code section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) (Senate Bill No. 567).

The jury found defendant and appellant David Osby guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 [count 1]) and resisting an officer (§ 69 [count 2]). The jury found true the allegations that Osby used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that he suffered three prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Osby to a total of 25 years to life in prison, plus a determinate term of 17 years.
On appeal, we reversed the convictions (the panel majority held the trial court abused its discretion by retaining a juror whose incompetence to serve appeared as a demonstrable reality in the record, and the concurring justice opined reversal was necessary because of error in the trial court’s ruling permitting Osby to represent himself). (People v. Osby (Apr. 22, 2021, B299496) [nonpub. opn.].)

Y.S. (mother) appeals from the order terminating parental rights to her child, L.S. (minor), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law. We conditionally reverse, and remand for ICWA compliance.

Karl Beierschmitt (Karl), a California resident, was allegedly exposed to asbestos products while working in dental offices, including in California, from 1955 to 1975. Many years later, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. Karl and his wife, Margaret Beierschmitt (collectively, plaintiffs), sued Grobet File Company of America, LLC (Grobet), successor in interest to William Dixon Company (Dixon), as a manufacturer of asbestos products in California. In this appeal from the trial court’s order granting Grobet’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, we consider whether plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated their claims arise out of or relate to Grobet’s forum-directed activities, which is necessary to establish specific (case-linked) jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Min Sun Cho (Cho) appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Carl’s Jr. Restaurant (CKE). We conclude Cho fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and thus we will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jose Barragan (defendant) appeals from the summary denial of his petition for vacatur and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel and entertain briefing, and in ruling that the petition was barred as a successive petition or a motion for reconsideration of defendant’s prior petition. Defendant also contends that in his petition he made a prima facie showing that he falls within the provisions of section 1170.95 and that the jury’s true finding in his murder trial pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) did not bar relief as a matter of law.
We agree that the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition without appointing counsel and entertaining briefing, and that the petition should not have been barred as a successive petition or motion for reconsideration. However, we find the errors to be harmless.