CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner and appellant Venus Nicolino (Nicolino) sought a civil harassment restraining order against her erstwhile personal assistant and personal manager, respondent Samantha Rey (Rey). Nicolino accused Rey of, among other things, being obsessed with Nicolino and accessing Nicolino’s electronic accounts after her employment ended. In response, Rey filed a declaration describing her employment with Nicolino, including assertions related to Nicolino’s mental health and marriage. The trial court denied Nicolino’s request for a restraining order—a ruling Nicolino never appealed. But Nicolino subsequently filed a motion to seal, essentially in toto, the declaration Rey filed in opposition to the restraining order request and Rey filed a motion for attorney fees for prevailing against Nicolino. The trial court denied the motion to seal and granted the motion for attorney fees, and we consider the correctness of both of these rulings.

Appellant David Max challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to post a bond under Corporations Code section 800 and the ultimate dismissal of his lawsuit after the court sustained, without leave to amend, a demurrer to Max’s complaint against 8e6 Corp. (8e6), 8e6 agents George Shih, Frank Wood, Mahendra Vora, and Rodney Miller (the individual respondents), and several entities owned or controlled by the individual respondents.
Max’s complaint alleges three causes of action: a derivative breach of fiduciary duty cause of action regarding the individual respondents’ improper use of corporate funds to pay their legal fees in both this and a previous lawsuit; an individual cause of action to recover the attorney fees Max incurred in a previous lawsuit seeking inspection of 8e6 corporate records; and a “mixed” cause of action containing both an individual fraud claim and a derivative breach of fiduciary duty claim.

This case arises from a dispute over whether state law required respondent City of Los Angeles (the City) to issue building permits to petitioners and appellants PLH, LLC and related entities (petitioner) without petitioner first obtaining conditional use permits. The state law in question is the California Solar Rights Act of 1978 (Stats. 1978, ch. 1154, the “Solar Rights Act”) and relevant subsequent amendments. Interpreting the law in effect at the time of the trial court’s decision in November 2019, the trial court found that the Solar Rights Act did not apply to petitioner’s projects; the trial court denied the writ relief sought by petitioner in three consolidated cases, dismissed the remaining claims, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Petitioner appealed.
While petitioner’s appeal was pending, the relevant statutory language was amended, effective January 1, 2022, to expressly exclude projects like the ones proposed by petitioner.

Plaintiffs Kamran Ghadimi, M.D., and Advanced Pain Treatment Medical Center sued ten individual defendants in nine separate cases, alleging that after defendants’ insurance failed to pay for medical treatments defendants received, defendants themselves owed the outstanding fees. The cases were deemed related, and one case was tried separately . The remaining eight cases are at issue in this appeal.
Plaintiffs alleged defendants owed fees for treatments performed between 2010 and 2016. Proceeding to trial solely on plaintiffs’ quantum meruit theory, the parties stipulated to have a jury determine the reasonable value for each of the medical procedures plaintiffs performed. The court and parties were then to use those values to calculate what each defendant owed the plaintiffs based on the treatments each defendant received.

C.M. (Mother), mother of O.M., petitions for extraordinary relief from the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider the termination of parental rights. We conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that returning O.M. to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. We further conclude the juvenile court did not err in refusing to continue reunification services until the 18-month review hearing. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

J.C. (Mother) and M.C. (Father) petition this court for extraordinary relief of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (.26 hearing) for minors D.H., Jai.H., and Jay.H. They contend there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order finding changed circumstances to support a new .26 hearing. We disagree and deny both the petitions and the petitioners’ stay request.

D.G., a minor, appeals from a final judgment of the juvenile court. His counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. There are none, so we affirm.

Defendant M.R. was tried as an adult and convicted of the murder and robbery of Ivan Miranda, crimes that took place when M.R. was 15 years old. He was sentenced to a prison term of 35 years to life and ordered to pay approximately $100,000 in restitution. After changes in the law that narrowed the felony murder rule and prohibited the transfer of juveniles under 16 years old to adult court, M.R.’s murder conviction was vacated and his case transferred back to juvenile court, where he was again ordered to pay some $100,000 in restitution. M.R. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay restitution and that vacating his murder conviction eliminated the factual basis for the restitution award. We affirm.

Appellant Li Qin, appearing in propria persona, appeals a judgment denying her petition to administer decedent Tsan Ching Chen’s estate. She contends the court erred in determining that she is not Chen’s “surviving spouse” under Probate Code section 78. We shall affirm the judgment.

We are familiar with the background of this family law case through our review of five prior appeals. (Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (Jan. 28, 2019, A152099, A152239 [nonpub. opn.]); Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (June 17, 2019, A154077, A154773 [nonpub. opn.]); Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (Nov. 20, 2019, A154868 [nonpub. opn.]).) In the present appeal, Nick Giannaris (Father), in propria persona, challenges a March 2021 order denying him increased visitation with the child he shares with respondent Maria Hristopoulos (Mother). He also seeks orders for a change of venue from San Mateo County to San Francisco County and to appoint a “Special Master” to advocate for the child.
We decline the requests for special orders and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before us following the California Supreme Court’s order to show cause before this court why petitioner is not entitled to relief on his writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that petitioner’s youth at the time of the offense should be one of the factors considered during the hearing under Penal Code section 1170.95 to determine if he was eligible for resentencing.
The People filed a return, and petitioner filed a traverse and lodged exhibits. Pursuant to our request, the parties submitted supplemental briefing regarding the propriety of consideration of exhibits submitted with the traverse.
We grant the petition and remand for a new hearing under section 1170.95 where the trial court shall consider petitioner’s youth at the time of the offense as one of the factors in determining whether petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life.

C.H. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to one of her children, J.M. (minor). Mother asserts the court erred by finding the minor adoptable and contends the order should be reversed for a more appropriate permanent plan. We disagree and affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant Richard McCormick of multiple counts of sexual penetration, oral copulation, and lewd acts committed upon his two minor grandchildren and of continuous sexual abuse of his now-adult daughter throughout her childhood. On appeal, defendant maintains the trial court erred in excluding evidence of specific, illustrative instances of his character for honesty, caring, and kindness. We affirm.

Appellant Mortimer Howard filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, alleging that the City of Alameda (City) exceeded its authority and abused its discretion when it issued an encroachment permit to his neighbor, Jerry A. Schneider. The permit allowed Schneider to maintain a wooden fence that is constructed on public space adjacent to the paved sidewalk. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the City had the authority to issue the permit and had not abused its discretion in doing so. Alternatively, the court found that Howard had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree that issuing the permit was within the City’s discretion and affirm.