CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Fareed Sepehry-Fard seeks review of a workplace violence restraining order issued against him in favor of several employees of respondent Severson & Werson, a Professional Corporation (Severson). After briefing in this appeal was complete, Severson elected to vacate the restraining order and dismiss the underlying action. As the appeal is now moot, and this court cannot render any effectual relief on appeal, we will grant Severson’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff Juvenal Coronel (plaintiff) filed this lawsuit against his former employer, defendant Pinnacle Agriculture Distribution, Inc. He alleged representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) and class claims based on various wage and hour violations. A few months after he filed his lawsuit, defendant settled a similar class action and PAGA lawsuit filed by nonparty Damian Reyes (the Reyes action). This settlement was approved and judgment was entered in the Reyes action. Defendant then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in this action, arguing plaintiff’s claims were barred by the settlement in the Reyes action. The trial court agreed, granted the motion, and entered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff now appeals.

In 2002, defendant Jose Oscar Chavez was the driver of a vehicle during a drive-by shooting. A jury convicted Chavez of murder and found true related firearm and gang allegations. The trial court imposed a sentence of 40 years to life.
In 2019, Chavez filed a petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95.) After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, telling Chavez: “I do believe the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that you are liable for second degree murder based upon your own actions and implied malice.”
Chavez filed an appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief identifying no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Chavez filed a supplemental brief asking this court to dismiss and replace his appointed counsel.
We reviewed the record and found no arguable issues. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order. We also deny Chavez’s request to dismiss and replace his counsel.

In this appeal, M.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conclusion he is a developmentally disabled person who is a danger to himself and/or others, resulting in his commitment to the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals at the Kern Regional Center (KRC). M.W. also challenges the term of his commitment as violating his right to equal protection under the constitution. KRC disputes these contentions. Following our review of the record and our consideration of the legal standards governing these forms of commitments, we affirm the findings supporting M.W.’s commitment to KRC, and further conclude there was no violation of M.W.’s constitutional rights. We affirm.

Defendant Tory Marquise Simmons contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion to dismiss a prior felony “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
We also ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the impact of Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1869), which eliminated many fines, fees, and assessments that courts have imposed under a variety of statutes, including former section 1203.1b, previously allowing collection of probation report fees. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 47.) The People concede that defendant is entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 1869. We accept the People’s concessions.
We vacate the portion of the judgment requiring payment of fees pursuant to former section 1203.1b. In all other respects, we affirm.

In 1991, a jury convicted petitioner Darrell Logan of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition on the ground petitioner was a principal in the offense and acted with at least implied malice.
On appeal, the People concede the trial court engaged in premature factfinding and instead should have issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing. We accept the People’s concession and will reverse and remand. In light of this disposition, petitioner’s additional argument, that he had a constitutional right to be transported for personal appearances prior to the issuance of an order to show cause, is moot.

In 2010, appellant Kyle Hoffman and codefendant Luis Palafox (Hoffman and Palafox; collectively defendants), were convicted after a joint trial of two counts of first degree murder with three special circumstances, and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP).
In 2019, Hoffman filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, and alleged he was entitled to relief because he was not the actual killer, and his murder conviction was based on the felony-murder rule and/or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The superior court denied the petition.
On appeal, Hoffman’s appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

In 2014, a jury found petitioner Neftali Bonilla guilty of the second degree murder of J.G. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and found gang and firearm enhancements to be true (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate term of 40 years to life.
In 2020, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition on the ground petitioner is ineligible for relief. The court did not provide a further statement of reasons.
Petitioner contends the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent him on the petition and in failing to provide a statement of the evidence relied upon in its ruling, and further argues these errors were prejudicial. We agree the court erred in disposing of the petition without appointing counsel. Additionally, section 1170.95 now requires a court to provide a statement setting forth its reasons for denying the petition.

In 2017, a jury convicted appellant and defendant Alonso Corona of first degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of Victor Anaya (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1). The jury also convicted defendant of attempted premeditated murder involving another victim, David Anaya, stemming from the same incident (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). The jury found true that defendant committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that, during these offenses, at least one principal intentionally and personally discharged and personally used a firearm that proximately caused great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The jury, however, did not find true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon David during the attempted murder.

L.B. (mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights. (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b) & (g), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) She argues the court erred in concluding the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) conducted a sufficient inquiry into the minors’ Indian ancestry as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We agree and therefore conditionally reverse and remand with directions that the department complete its initial inquiry.

A jury concluded that defendant Moises Enrique Gonzalez was the shooter. It found him guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). He was sentenced to life in prison, with the possibility of parole, plus 20 years, along with the usual fines, fees, and ancillary orders.
Defendant contends:
(1) There was insufficient evidence that the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated.
(2) The trial court erred by admitting photos found on Instagram, because they were not adequately authenticated.
(3) The trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify about what the videos showed. As defense counsel did not object to this testimony, defendant also contends that the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
(4) The prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument.

In 2013, this court affirmed defendant and appellant Ricco Tucker’s conviction of first degree felony murder for his participation in an armed robbery of a gold dealer that resulted in the dealer’s murder, and we affirmed his state prison sentence of 10 years, plus 25 years to life. In 2019, defendant petitioned the superior court to vacate his murder conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, a resentencing statute enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). The superior court initially denied the petition but later vacated its order and determined that defendant had made a prima facie showing of eligibility. At the evidentiary hearing held on February 19, 2021, defendant conceded he was a major participant, and the superior court found that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant’s petition was denied.

Following a bench trial, defendants Jesse Jimenez and Nicolas Mora were convicted of actively participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a) (§ 186.22(a)), and Mora was convicted of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; unlabeled statutory citations are to this code). Defendants admitted that they had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and Jimenez admitted that he had served a prior prison term within five years (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Jimenez was sentenced to 12 years in state prison, and Mora was sentenced to 18 years and four months in state prison.
On appeal, Jimenez and Mora challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for actively participating in a criminal street gang.

This case arises out of a longstanding dispute between Makaden, Inc. (Makaden) and D.R. Horton Los Angeles Holding Company, Inc. (Horton) regarding a profit participation agreement in a residential land development deal. The parties have now tried the case twice before different juries. The second jury returned a verdict in favor of Makaden for $1,279,513 and the trial court awarded Horton pre-judgement interest in the resulting judgment.
Horton filed several posttrial motions, including a motion for a new trial, in which it asserted the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence, an alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and a motion to vacate the portion of the judgment awarding prejudgment interest. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial, finding the jury relied on a calculation of damages presented by Makaden’s expert that was erroneous for several independent reasons, but denied the motion for JNOV.