CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Tommy Bibbs guilty of: evading an officer while operating a motor vehicle with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property (count 1; Veh. Code, § 2800.2); failing to stop at the scene of an accident with property damage (count 4; Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)); driving while under the influence (DUI) of alcohol and/or drugs (count 5; Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); and driving while under the influence of amphetamine (count 6; Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant guilty of the lesser charge in count 3 of vandalism of property valued under $400, a misdemeanor.
Defendant argues that his 180-day sentence for failing to stop at the scene of an accident should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, that $160 in fines and fees must be stricken because the court did not detail them in its oral pronouncement of sentence, and that he was entitled to an additional day of custody credit and 88 additional days of conduct credit.[1]

Having reviewed the petition for writ of mandate and the varying views of the two judicial officers who have handled aspects of the criminal proceeding against petitioner/defendant Otis Hall (Defendant) in connection with whether section 1210.1 of the Penal Code[1] should be applied to the current charges against Defendant, we conclude the most expeditious manner of resolving the conflict is to:
(1) vacate the order entered on May 8, 2013, and all subsequent orders and proceedings, including any orders entered on May 13, 2013, June 20, 2013, and any other orders entered after Defendant’s guilty plea made on April 29, 2013;
(2) on our own motion, and “in the interests of justice” direct that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than either of the judges whose orders are the subject of this proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (c)); [2] and
(3) remand for transfer to a new judicial officer who shall, without consideration of the prior proceedings in this matter, exercise his or her independent judgment as to whether Defendant qualifies for the sentencing option provided in section 1210.1.

The Los Angeles Police Protective League (League) appeals an order of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the League’s complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. The League’s complaint seeks relief from the City of Los Angeles and Chief of Police Charles Beck’s (collectively, respondents) practice of establishing minimum penalties to be imposed on officers found guilty of repeating misconduct. The League contends that its complaint adequately stated causes of action for injunctive and declaratory relief, and that the dispute is ripe for adjudication. We agree and reverse.

A modification decision.

Patti Howell (wife) appeals a postjudgment order pertaining to the spousal support and child support obligations of Douglas Howell (husband).
We perceive no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s order in its entirety.

Defendant and appellant Lexington National Insurance Corporation (Lexington) appeals from the summary judgment of bail forfeiture entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent the County of Los Angeles. Lexington contends the trial court erred in denying the surety’s motion for a second extension of the 185-day period in which Lexington could set aside the bail forfeiture. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Marine Simon (Simon) appeals a judgment following a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Health Net of California, Inc. (Health Net of California) and Health Net, Inc. (Health Net).
The essential issue presented is whether Simon complied with the California Fair Employment & Housing Act’s (FEHA) exhaustion requirement before filing suit. (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq., § 12960.)[1]
With respect to Health Net, we conclude the instant action is barred because Simon failed to file an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment & Housing (DFEH) prior to filing suit. Simon’s DFEH complaint, which solely named Health Net of California, cannot be construed to extend to Health Net.
As for Health Net of California, this action is barred because, as the trial court found, Health Net of California was not Simon’s employer at the time of the acts alleged in the complaint.
Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Aruna Sharma (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America), ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust), and U.S. Bank, National Association as Trustee for the Benefit of Harborview 2005-12 Trust Fund (U.S. Bank) (collectively defendants) following the trial court’s dismissal of the action due to plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint after defendants’ demurrer was sustained. Plaintiff contends that her failure to oppose the demurrer should be excused because she was ill. We conclude that plaintiff has shown no error, and affirm the judgment.
On June 27, 2005, plaintiff obtained a $386,150 loan from First Magnus Financial Corporation and executed a deed of trust against real property located in Pomona, California (Property). The deed of trust named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the holder of the beneficial interest in the deed of trust. On March 10, 2010, ReconTrust, as MERS’s agent, recorded a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust stating that plaintiff’s arrears exceeded $17,000. A substitution of trustee and assignment of deed of trust was recorded on March 23, 2010, stating that MERS was appointing ReconTrust as the substitute trustee and assigning its interest in the deed of trust to U.S. Bank. On July 26, 2011, ReconTrust recorded a notice of trustee’s sale.

A jury convicted defendant Djoliba Narcisse of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)[1] and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) after he stabbed a female acquaintance outside a bar. The jury also found various enhancements to be true, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison. On appeal, and for the first time, Narcisse contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that self-defense is unavailable to someone who provokes a fight with the intent to create an excuse to use force. He contends that the instruction was unsupported by the evidence and may have misled the jury. We affirm.

The juvenile court found C.P. (minor) to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (wardship for violation of law) in that he committed battery on a cohabitant. It placed minor on probation with conditions. On appeal, minor contends that two conditions are unconstitutionally vague. The People concede that the two conditions should be modified, and we agree that the concession is appropriate. We therefore modify the conditions and affirm the order for probation.

Defendant Juan Pineda appeals from an order modifying the conditions of his probation to include gang orders. Defendant contends: (1) he was denied procedural due process when the trial court denied his request to hold a hearing; (2) two of the probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge as unreasonable one of the probation conditions. We conclude that two of the probation conditions must be modified. As modified, the order is affirmed.

In 2007, Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia) provided a loan of approximately $109 million to a limited liability company, Downtown Sunnyvale Mixed Use, LLC (DSMU),[1] which intended to use the funds to develop a combined retail, residential and commercial property in downtown Sunnyvale, California. Two years later, there was a default and the partially-completed project was abandoned. Wachovia filed an action for judicial foreclosure and secured the appointment of a receiver. At one point, Wachovia obtained court approval to have the receiver market and sell the property independent of the foreclosure proceedings. Minority investors in DSMU objected to this turn of events and informed Wachovia that its conduct violated the one form of action and security first rules set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 726.[2] The minority investors filed a cross-complaint against Wachovia alleging violations of section 726 along with various torts including fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation and interference with contract. Wachovia brought a special motion to strike the cross-complaint pursuant to the provisions of California’s anti-SLAPP[3] statute (§ 425.16). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the cross-complaint.
We shall affirm.

We appointed counsel to represent minor Abel G., born in 1999, on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on minor’s behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Minor was given 30 days to file written argument in his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from minor.
The district attorney filed a petition on May 8, 2012 alleging minor committed vandalism and possessed graffiti tools. Another petition was filed on June 6, 2012 alleging minor possessed a folding knife at school. After minor failed to appear for a May 21, 2012 hearing and a June 18, 2012 hearing, the court issued a bench warrant.
On October 19, 2012, minor admitted the offenses alleged in both petitions. He initialed and signed the guilty plea form. Additionally, minor orally admitted to the juvenile court he committed the crimes alleged in both petitions.

The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1) (the Realignment Act), which, together with subsequent related legislation, significantly changed the sentencing and supervision of convicted felons. The Legislature’s stated purpose for the Realignment Act “‘is to reduce recidivism and improve public safety, while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spending.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48-50.)
The Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (Pen. Code, § 3450