CA Unpub Decisions

On November 3, 1981, defendant and appellant Richard Joseph Crane was convicted after a court trial of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207), assault (Pen. Code, § 245), and second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187). He was sentenced to a term of 24 years to life in state prison.
On February 9, 2021, defendant filed a motion to augment the record to include mitigating evidence relating to youthful offender factors pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. Several weeks later, on February 23, 2021, he filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
The trial court denied defendant’s motions on March 17, 2021, reasoning (1) defendant already had a full mitigation hearing in accordance with People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261; and (2) no timely motion to recall his sentence was filed. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

The Marina City Club is a mixed-use real estate development containing both condominiums and apartments. A five-member Condominium Owners Association (COA) Board of Directors (Board) manages the finances of the COA and helps maintain the development. Essex Marina City Club, L.P. (Essex) owns and runs the apartments. The shared areas of the development are overseen by a Management Council consisting of two members of the COA Board, two representatives from Essex, and one mutually-agreed-upon independent member.
Plaintiff and appellant Elena Mondragon, a COA Board member, sued defendants and respondents Neil Kelliher, Peter Bergmann, Louise Pesce, Lahdan Rahmati, and Donna Bryce, all of whom, at one time or another, served as COA Board representatives to the Management Council. Mondragon claims respondents breached their fiduciary duty by “their abject failure to comply with numerous documents that govern both the operation and maintenance of the Marina City Club …

Mark Anthony Venturine appeals the judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to five counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), and one count each of inflicting corporal injury on a current or former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b)). Appellant also admitted a prior strike and serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (a), (c)). The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in state prison.
Appellant, who has been diagnosed with mental disorders including obsessive compulsive disorder and alcohol use disorder, contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request for mental health diversion under section 1001.36.

Defendant Oscar Delatorre pled no contest to second degree robbery and a firearm enhancement. (Pen. Code, § 211, 12022.5, subd. (a). ) The parties agreed Delatorre would be sentenced to a total of 10 years, and also agreed he would be released temporarily, surrender in November 2019, and be sentenced in January 2020. Delatorre failed to surrender as agreed. After he was apprehended more than a year later, the court sentenced him to 15 years.
Delatorre asserts on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him for a term higher than the bargained-for term. He asks that we remand the case and order the trial court to sentence him to 10 years. Notably, Delatorre does not seek to withdraw his plea. Delatorre is not entitled to the remedy he seeks. We therefore affirm.

Appellants S.R (Mother) and E.G.B. (Father) are the parents of J.R. (born September 2015), J.G. (born June 2019), and G.G. (born April 2020) (collectively, the children). The court declared the children to be dependents of the court and removed them from the parents’ custody. Mother and Father appealed from the court’s dispositional orders. They contend that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with its duty to inquire whether the children are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We agree, and will direct the court to ensure DCFS’s compliance with the duty of inquiry.

In 1980, Stephanie Sommers (Sommers) was raped and murdered in her home. With the forensic capability at the time, law enforcement was unable to identify the killer, and the case was unsolved for many years.
In 2004, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was able to produce a partial DNA profile of Sommers’s killer from a swab taken from her body. In 2014, that profile was compared to, and matched, a reference sample of defendant and appellant Harold Parkinson’s DNA.
On January 21, 2016, defendant was charged by indictment with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance allegations that he was engaged in the commission of rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and that he had previously been convicted of second degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)). It was further alleged that defendant personally used two deadly and dangerous weapons, to wit a knife and a weight, in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).

Years ago, a trial jury convicted defendant and appellant Gabriel Guerrero (defendant) of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder; the jury was instructed it could convict defendant on the conspiracy charge if it found he conspired to commit an assault, but a murder was a natural and probable consequence of that planned assault. More recently, the trial court denied defendant’s Penal Code section 1170.95 petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction—without first issuing an order to show cause. The Attorney General concedes reversal and remand is required because the record does not show defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. That will be our disposition after a short discussion of the facts, the pertinent procedural history, and the law.
On April 26, 2005, six men, including murder victim Ryan Dasalla (Dasalla), beat up one of defendant’s brothers. In retaliation, defendant participated in the shooting of Dasalla the following day.

This litigation arises out of a dispute between certain entities and individuals concerning the use of a large electronic sign in the City of Long Beach to advertise car dealerships in the area. When plaintiffs and appellants H.T.L. Properties, LLC (HTL Properties) and HTL Automotive, Inc. (HTL Automotive), were denied use of the sign, they filed a lawsuit against defendants and respondents James Speck (Speck), Circle Automotive Group, Inc. (Circle Auto), and Electra Media, Inc. (EMI), claiming that defendants wrongfully denied them use of the sign. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment and were awarded attorney fees and costs. HTL Properties and HTL Automotive appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, and on May 4, 2021, we dismissed HTL Automotive’s appeal because it was not in good standing with the Franchise Tax Board and affirmed the judgment against HTL Properties. (H.T.L. Properties, LLC v. Speck (May 4, 2021), B299160 [nonpub. opn.], p. 21.)

Keyron Lamont Binns, convicted in 1997 of attempted willful, deliberate and premediated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and other serious felonies, appealed the superior court’s order summarily denying his petition for resentencing, contending the court erred in ruling section 1170.95 did not apply to attempted murder. We affirmed the order based on prior decisions from this and other courts of appeal that had rejected identical arguments.
After granting Binns’s petition for review, the Supreme Court transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider Binns’s appeal in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775) and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). In supplemental briefing Binns again argues the case should be remanded for the superior court to appoint counsel, issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.

A jury found defendant Bryan Lee McCarter guilty of attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215, subd. (a)), and the trial court sentenced him to 30 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court (1) erroneously admitted a witness’s opinion testimony, (2) abused its discretion by refusing to strike one of defendant’s prior felony strike convictions, and (3) violated the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Defendant Edward Culver Hughes appeals from the final judgment of conviction of second degree murder based upon alleged instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also challenges the trial court’s imposition of a restraining order at judgment and sentencing which precludes defendant from contact with his minor son for 10 years. We find that (1) defendant’s claims of error have been forfeited by his failure to object in the trial court; (2) defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated; and (3) defendant’s claims of error either lack merit or constitute harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Nickie Allen Donald appeals from a resentencing he contends resulted in an unauthorized greater sentence. We disagree that the greater sentence was unauthorized.
However, we agree with Donald that remand is nonetheless necessary because the court failed to conduct a full resentencing hearing and was erroneously informed regarding whether certain terms of imprisonment could run concurrently or consecutively. We therefore shall vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing.

Reginald Jackson appeals from a judgment following the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to respondent Don Bui, M.D. Jackson argues the trial court erred in determining his medical malpractice claim was time-barred. For the reasons stated below, we conclude Bui was entitled to summary judgment and accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Jezrell Leavel Crawford contends on appeal that his $296 report fee must be vacated because Assembly Bill No. 1869’s (2019−2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1869) amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1b must be retroactively applied to his case. The People argue the amendments are not retroactive, but that the balance of defendant’s report fee must nonetheless be vacated under former section 1203.1b.
We also ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the impact of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which modified section 1170, subdivision (b), to require imposition of the middle term of imprisonment unless circumstances in aggravation justify imposition of a greater sentence. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) It further modified section 1170, subdivision (b), to require that the circumstances in aggravation be found true beyond a reasonable doubt or be stipulated to by the defendant. (Ibid.)