CA Unpub Decisions

Robert C. appeals the juvenile court's order ─ made concurrently with terminating dependency jurisdiction ─ granting joint legal and physical custody of his son, K.C., to the boy's mother, R.S., with primary custody awarded to R.S. Robert contends the order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

On the same day in March 2011, the trial court sentenced Ira M. Dickey in four separate cases and awarded him differing amounts of presentence custody credit in each case. In February 2013 Dickey filed a petition for writ of error coram vobis seeking an order directing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to recalculate his release date based on the case in which he had earned the greatest number of presentence custody credits. The trial court denied the petition on both procedural and substantive grounds.
Dickey appeals. His appointed appellate counsel filed a brief requesting we independently review the record for error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.) Having done so and having identified no reasonably arguable appellate issues, we affirm the judgment.

The Orange County Juvenile Court entered true findings on a delinquency petition alleging that Moises R. committed forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2); count 1), sodomy of a person under 14 years old and more than 10 years younger than the perpetrator (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(1); count 2) and two counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4). After the case was transferred to San Diego County, the San Diego County Juvenile Court adjudged Moises a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and ordered him placed in a community care facility.
Moises appeals, contending the findings on counts 3 and 4 must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he had the requisite specific intent; the court miscalculated his maximum term of confinement (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)); and it failed to award him precommitment credit. The People properly concede these points.
In counts 3 and 4, Moises "laid [the victim] on [a] couch" and "pulled [the victim's] pants down." These acts were merely preparatory to the sodomy alleged in counts 1 and 2. (People v. Perkins (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 15, 19.) The court calculated the maximum term as 19 years (13 years on count 1 and two years each on counts 2, 3 and 4)[1] and failed to award Moises credit for time he spent in juvenile hall before the dispositional hearing (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067).

Frederick Rand (Rand) appeals an order increasing the spousal support he is obligated to pay to his former wife, Akiko Morimoto (Morimoto). Rand contends the court abused its discretion by modifying the spousal support award because Morimoto did not demonstrate a material change of circumstances. We affirm.

A jury convicted Seth Cravens of second degree murder (Pen. Code[1] § 187, subd. (a); making a criminal threat (§ 422); battery (§ 242); and four counts of assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). As to one of the assault counts, the jury found Cravens personally inflicted great bodily injury.
(§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) and 12022.7, subd. (a).) The jury found Cravens not guilty of two additional assault counts and an additional battery count. The court sentenced Cravens to 20 years to life in state prison.

Defendant, Avant Garde Senior Living, appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration. There were two grounds upon which the trial court relied in denying the petition to compel arbitration. The first was the danger of conflicting rulings with the results of proceedings pending against codefendants in the judicial forum. The second ground was the trial court’s express statement that arbitration is not an efficient means of dispute resolution. We conclude these grounds were not a proper basis for denying the petition to compel arbitration. Thus, we reverse the order denying the petition to compel arbitration. There were other grounds for denying the petition that the trial court never ruled upon. Upon remittitur issuance, the parties remain free to litigate those questions.

A modification decision.

Richard Mercado appeals from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of no contest to carrying a dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310)[1] for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Mercado asserts the trial court erred when it failed to hold a Marsden[2] hearing on his second request for new counsel due to ineffective representation by his trial counsel. The Attorney General concedes the error based on People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 (Sanchez). We conditionally reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to conduct a Marsden hearing.

Plaintiffs, Akinsanya Kambon, Tama-sha Kambon, The Gallery Kambon and Pan African Art, appeal from a demurrer dismissal. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action of defendant, T-Mobile USA, Inc. without leave to amend. Plaintiffs argue: it was error to sustain the demurrer because they stated valid causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and negligence; defendant’s statements were not mere opinions about the future because they concern technical matters within its expertise; and the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for leave to amend the complaint. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Minor A.A. appeals the dependency court’s order removing her from the care of her maternal cousin D.K. after D.K. was involved in an altercation with her daughter Sierra D., who also resided in the home with D.K. and D.K.’s three other children. A.A. contends the trial court failed to consider the factors in Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.3, subdivision (a),[1] concerning relative placement before it removed her from D.K.’s home. We agree, and reverse and remand for a hearing to consider these factors.

By information filed on June 19, 2001, David Soto Flores was charged with attempted murder in violation of Penal Code sections 187 and 664 (count 1), assault with a deadly weapon in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 245 (count 2), and battery with serious bodily injury in violation of subdivision (d) of Penal Code section 243 (count 3).[1] Pursuant to a plea bargain, the court found Flores guilty of attempted murder but dismissed counts 2 and 3, and the court then turned to Flores’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found that, at the time of the commission of the crime, Flores was not sane within the meaning of section 1026. The court accordingly found Flores not guilty by reason of insanity. The court further found that Flores had not recovered his sanity, and the court therefore ordered Flores committed to the California Department of Mental Health for placement in a state hospital, with his commitment not to exceed 13 years (the maximum period of imprisonment under the charge of conviction), minus custody credits of 197 days (172 days actual time, 25 days good time/work time).

The plaintiffs in this case include United Housing Preservation Corporation (United), AFC-Low Income Housing Partners (AFC-Low Income) and AFC-American Housing (AFC-American). The defendants are POZ Village Development Inc. (POZ) and The Bedford Group (Bedford). The parties were partners in the same partnership.
United sought to purchase the general partnership interests of defendants. Pursuant to an agreement, the purchase price was to be determined by an independent appraisal. When the appraisal was completed it included a debt of nearly two million dollars owed to POZ and Bradford. Plaintiffs sought to rescind the purchase of the partnership on the ground that United suffered from a mistaken belief that the appraised value of the two partnership interests to be purchased would not include the debt owed.
Following a court trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendants. The court concluded the evidence did not demonstrate United was mistaken about the interest to be acquired in the purchase. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in its determination. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

E.P. (Mother), the mother of two teenage sons (Joseph and Jose) and a toddler (Daughter), appeals from the orders entered after the juvenile court declared her children dependents of the court and made disposition findings. Mother contests the jurisdiction determinations as to all three of her children. We affirm.

Ivy Beverly appeals from a judgment that sentences her to four years in state prison on a probation violation. We remand for the limited purpose of correcting an unauthorized sentence. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.