CA Unpub Decisions

Edgardro Ottoniel Mena appeals his conviction by jury of four counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 (counts 1-3 & 9; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))[1], three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of rape (counts 4-6; § 269, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of forcible oral copulation (counts 7- 8; § 269, subd. (a)(4)) with special findings that appellant committed the offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subd. (c)). The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to 105 years to life state prison. We affirm.

Miguel Lopez appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 459/461, subd. (b)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that appellant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions that qualified as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and had served seven prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to seven years in state prison and was awarded 284 days of presentence custody credit. He contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credit. We shall order the judgment modified to reflect an additional 100 days of presentence custody credit. Otherwise, we affirm.

Appellant Raymond Cardenas challenges his conviction on two counts of attempted murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle, arguing the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying a motion to strike a victim’s in-court identification and denying a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Leonid Shor, appeals from an order setting aside the default judgment against Little New York Restaurant, Incorporated. Defendant, Burlington Insurance Company, intervened after the default judgment was entered against the restaurant. Defendant then successfully moved to set aside the default judgment. Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion by permitting intervention after entry of the default judgment. Plaintiff also argues the trial court erred by setting aside the default judgment against the restaurant. We affirm the order.

A modification decision.

Appellant, the former wife of respondent, appeals on five separate grounds from a post-judgment order entered by the trial court regarding child support payments she sought from respondent via an order to show cause. We find only one flaw in the trial court’s order regarding the child support payments payable by respondent to appellant, and hence affirm the order in all respects save that one. Regarding that ground, we remand the matter to the trial court for recalculation of the proper child support payments.

After a jury trial, defendant Lennie Ramon Spicer was convicted of misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)),[1] and was found not guilty on two felony counts of threatening an executive officer (§ 69). Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that an element of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) is that the delay or resistance was done while the officer was acting lawfully. Defendant maintains the officer was unlawfully attempting to arrest him when defendant walked away because the evidence, according to defendant, does not support probable cause to arrest. (See § 836.) He thus claims that his due process rights were violated because insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We conclude that the record supports a finding of probable cause to arrest and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Accredited Surety and Casualty Company (Accredited) appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond and from summary judgment entered on the bond, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306.[1] Accredited argues: (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond because it failed to give timely notice of forfeiture; (2) that the bail bond was invalidated when the trial court issued a bench warrant in an amount less than the amount of bail; and (3) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment on the same day it denied Accredited’s motion to vacate the forfeiture. None of Accredited’s arguments have merit and we affirm.

Plaintiff James Nagel sued defendants Napa Nursing Center, Inc. (Napa Nursing Center), Horizon West HealthCare, Inc., and Horizon West HealthCare of California, Inc. seeking recovery of damages for wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and violation of patients’ rights in connection with Napa Nursing Center’s treatment of his deceased mother, Betty Nagel. Defendants appeal from the court’s order denying their petition to stay the action and compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims against them. (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] § 1294.) Defendants contend that Nagel signed an arbitration agreement to forgo a civil trial on malpractice claims, and that the arbitration clauses in question substantially complied with the requirements of section 1295, subdivisions (a) and (b). We affirm the order denying defendants’ petition to compel arbitration because, in our independent view, Nagel did not sign an agreement to arbitrate.

Appellant challenges a court order placing him under a Murphy conservatorship[1] on the basis of a jury’s findings that he is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Appellant does not contest the finding that he has a disabling mental disorder, but argues the jury’s verdict on his dangerousness must be reversed due to procedural errors at trial.
Specifically, appellant argues the trial court: (1) abused its discretion by permitting a deputy sheriff to accompany appellant to the witness stand; (2) erroneously admitted into evidence portions of appellant’s hospital file that did not qualify as a business record and were prejudicial to appellant; and (3) violated appellant’s constitutional rights by ruling that appellant could be compelled to testify at trial, and could be questioned about the incident that gave rise to the criminal charges on which appellant was found incompetent to stand trial. We conclude that the jury’s verdict on dangerousness was not the product of any prejudicial error, and therefore affirm the conservatorship order.

Defendant Damian Bustos Galindo appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded no contest to vehicle theft with a prior conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5) and delaying, resisting, and obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant also admitted allegations that he suffered a strike prior within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 as well as a prison prior within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). After denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior strike allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for four years.

We appointed counsel to represent Byron Christopher Chinchilla on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, to assist the court with its independent review, counsel provided the court with information as to issues that might arguably support an appeal. Counsel raised the following two questions: (1) Was Chinchilla’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated when trial counsel waived his own personal presence for the resentencing hearing, instead of appearing by telephone; and (2) was Chinchilla’s right to be present at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against him violated by trial counsel’s waiver of Chinchilla’s presence.
We granted Chinchilla 30 days to file a supplemental brief. That time has passed, and he did not file a supplemental brief. We have reviewed the information counsel provided, and we have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The judgment is affirmed.

Fernando L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing his nine-year-old son, Thomas, from his custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.[1] Father contends the order must be reversed because there was no evidence Thomas was at risk in his care and there were less restrictive alternatives to removal. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Kevin appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders denying him reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (13)[1] as to his 12-year-old son and 11-year-old daughter. We affirm.