CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, Scott Anthony Hill, pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance in a jail facility (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)[1] and admitted allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Defendant Jimmy Omar Castro was convicted by jury of evading an officer, a felony (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1), and resisting an officer, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1);[1] count 2), based on a high speed car chase by two different patrol vehicles. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years on the evading count, plus one year for a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On the resisting count, the court awarded credit for time served to satisfy the sentence. The court also awarded 237 days’ presentence credit.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court should have stayed the sentence on the resisting count pursuant to section 654, (2) the trial court miscalculated his days of credit, and (3) the abstract of judgment reflects an incorrect offense. We will stay the sentence on count 2 and order the abstract of judgment amended. We will affirm as modified.

Appellant, Darrell Williams, pled guilty in case No. 11CM3946 to petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666), and in case No. 11CM2989, he admitted violating his probation. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

After a bench trial, the court convicted appellant, John Frederick Colombero, of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211).[1] In a separate proceeding, the court found true six prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that Colombero had four prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

A modification decision.

Appellant Hayward Mayhan filed an appeal from an order denying his motion for substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) following a remand by this court. We affirm.

Appellant, Terry Glenn Jones, pled guilty to domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)),[1] and was placed on probation for five years. After Jones violated his probation, on June 18, 2012, the court sentenced him to a four-year prison term. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.

Appellant, Ardell Moore, Jr., appeals from an order requiring him to submit to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Defendant Harold Wayne Blake, Jr., (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of willfully inflicting corporal injury on his spouse, during which he personally inflicted great bodily injury.[1] (Pen. Code,[2] §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (e).) Following a bifurcated court trial, he was found to have suffered a prior conviction under the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e).) His motion for a new trial was denied, but his request to dismiss the prior strike conviction was granted. He was sentenced to a total of seven years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and various fees, fines, and assessments. On appeal, he raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.

On March 21, 2012, a jury convicted defendant and appellant William Ray Green III of six counts of committing a lewd act upon Desiree S.,[1] a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 1-6), and three counts of molesting Ann A., a child under the age of 18 years (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a); counts 7-9). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted extrajudicial statements under the fresh complaint doctrine or, if properly admitted, failed to give adequate limiting instructions. He also claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Following jury trial, defendant Isaac Arano appeals his conviction on the following grounds: (1) the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when it excluded prospective jurors without determining whether they understood English sufficiently to participate in the proceedings; (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to instruct on third party culpability; (3) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 370, undercutting the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the street terrorism charge; (4) the trial court erred in imposing enhancements pursuant to Penal Code[1] sections 186.22, subdivision (b), and 12022.7 because the enhancements arose from a single assault inflicting great bodily injury; therefore, the latter three-year enhancement must be stricken; (5) the trial court violated the provisions of section 654 by imposing a two-year term pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (a); and (6) the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the sentence imposed.

A.P. appeals the judgment entered following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her minor daughters, Z.P. and M.S. She contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court's dispositional order removing Z.P. from her custody. We affirm the judgment.

K. B., the mother of 13-year-old M. B., appeals from an order of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court granting a request to change a court order filed by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (department). (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 388, 395.) The order removed M. B. from mother’s custody, placed her in her father’s custody under dependent supervision, and granted mother regular visitation as frequent as is consistent with the well-being of M. B.
Mother appeals contending the visitation order, as orally pronounced by the juvenile court, erroneously delegated to M. B. discretion to determine whether any visitation would occur. Mother claims this is so even though the formal written order expressly provides that “the child shall not be given the option to consent to, or refuse, future visits.” Mother argues her claim is cognizable notwithstanding her failure to raise it in the juvenile court.
The department responds that the appeal is moot , mother forfeited her contention by failing to raise it in the juvenile court, and the court did not delegate its authority to the child. We affirm.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
Because this matter was resolved by plea, the facts are taken from the stipulated factual basis in the sheriff’s report, as described in the probation report.
Defendant and his girlfriend Nichole Wagner got into an argument over a child custody issue. He grabbed her by the throat, lifted her off the ground and slammed her against a wall. He chased her outside, picked up a firewood log and threw it at her. Defendant then left with their daughter. A complaint deemed the information charged defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)) and battery on a cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). The complaint also alleged defendant had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Defendant pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted one prior prison term enhancement allegation. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges and enhancement allegations with a Harvey[2] waiver. The parties agreed to a sentencing lid of three years in prison.