CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Priceline.com, Inc. (Priceline) and Trump Ruffin Tower I LLC and Trump Ruffin Commercial LLC (collectively Trump) on claims for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (the CLRA) and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (the UCL) brought by plaintiff and appellant Michael Freeman. The trial court simultaneously denied appellant’s motion for summary adjudication. Using Priceline, appellant booked a hotel room at a Trump property in Las Vegas, Nevada, and sought to hold Priceline and Trump liable for allegedly failing to disclose that he would be required to pay a resort fee and that Priceline received a service fee as part of the reservation price.
We affirm. The undisputed evidence established Priceline disclosed that resort fees charged by hotels were excluded from the total charges a customer pays to Priceline and that the sum paid to Priceline included an amount designated as a service fee. In view of the disclosures, there was no triable issue of fact showing that Priceline made a false or misleading representation or omission, or that it included an unconscionable provision in its terms and conditions. Nor was there a triable issue of fact as to whether it engaged in an unfair business practice. The evidence likewise failed to establish any basis to hold Trump liable.

Marie Jackson (Marie)[1] was found dead in the trunk of her car in 1994.[2] Her husband, defendant and appellant Andre Jackson, was convicted in 2012 of first degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. The only substantive issue[3] on appeal is whether the trial court erred in overruling objections to expert testimony of a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), explaining his assessment of various aspects of the murder. We hold the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony, modify the judgment to award 225 days of conduct credits, and otherwise affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Carlos Jackson (Jackson) appeals from the April 13, 2012 order granting a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (§ 425.16) special motion to strike his complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and awarding attorneys fees of $10,800 to defendants and respondents Katten Muchin Rosenmann, LLP, Joel Weiner, Gail Migdal and Gloria Franke (collectively the Katten defendants). Jackson’s sole contention is that it was error to deny him an opportunity to file an amended complaint. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Brandi Carter filed a complaint against defendant and respondent Figueroa Group, Inc., alleging a number of Labor Code violations and other employment-related claims. She sought to certify a class of individuals who performed as nude or semi-nude dancers at a club owned and operated by the Figueroa Group. The trial court denied the motion, ruling appellant failed to meet her burden to satisfy each element of the community of interest requirement necessary for class certification. She did not show either that common questions predominated or that she was a typical and an adequate class representative.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s order.

Appellant Jessica Marie Williams appeals from the judgment after her conviction by jury of the attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Joshua Earles (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1),[1] the first degree murder of Fenton Brown (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury found true the allegations that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury and death (§12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)), and the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (C)). The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for a total term of 75 years to life plus life.
Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss based on the prosecution’s failure to notify the defense of a witness’s deportation and by excluding the deported witness’s statement to the police; (2) her Wheeler/Batson[2] motion was erroneously denied; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her Pitchess[3] motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Petitioner C.M. (Father) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the San Francisco City and County Superior Court terminating his reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the minor children, C.M., Ch.M. and G.M. Finding substantial evidence to support the findings challenged by Father, we shall deny the petition for extraordinary writ on the merits.

Charles Frank Rickard entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of possession for sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351),[1] one count of possession for sale of ecstasy (§ 11378), and one count of maintaining a place for selling or using controlled substances (§ 11366). A stipulated term of the plea agreement was that Rickard would be sentenced to a prison term of two years on each count, to be served concurrently. The trial court imposed the agreed term of imprisonment, but also imposed a $10,000 fine, pursuant to section 11352.5, and ordered Rickard to pay $500 in attorney fees, pursuant to Government Code section 27712 and Penal Code section 987.8. Rickard appeals, challenging the sentence insofar as it imposed the section 11352.5 fine and ordered the reimbursement of attorney fees. We conclude that the attorney fees order must be reversed and that the section 11352.5 fine must be stricken.

This action was brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)[1] to challenge a proposed mixed-use commercial and residential project approved by the City of Berkeley. Appellants are Parker Shattuck Neighbors and two individuals (collectively Parker Shattuck),[2] who contend the City violated CEQA by approving the project without an environmental impact report (EIR). Parker Shattuck petitioned for a writ of mandate, maintaining that an EIR was required because pre-existing contamination on the site poses health risks to the project’s construction workers and future residents. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the writ because Parker Shattuck has failed to identify substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that there may be a significant effect on the environment because of these potential health risks.

Appellant Milpitas Coalition For A Better Community (Coalition) challenges the trial court’s judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandate. The trial court’s judgment followed from its grant of the motions of respondent City of Milpitas (the City) and real party in interest David M. Jordan for judgment on the pleadings. The City and Jordan contended that Coalition’s action could not proceed because it had failed to join Walmart as an indispensable party. Coalition contends on appeal that Walmart was neither a necessary nor an indispensable party. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Walmart was a necessary and indispensable party. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julius Robinson (appellant) pleaded no contest to one count of possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), admitted that he had a prior drug conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2,[1] and that he had a prior strike conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). In exchange for his plea, appellant was promised a seven year prison term. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the sentencing hearing. However, while that appeal was pending, counsel filed a motion for an order "correcting the erroneous computation of presentence credits." That motion was denied; thereafter appellant filed a notice of appeal from that denial on June 14, 2012.[2]
As the sole issue on appeal concerns the award of presentence custody credits, the facts underlying appellant's case are not relevant to the appeal. However, briefly, we set forth the proceedings from the sentencing hearing that occurred on December 8, 2011, the hearing on appellant's motion to correct his custody credits, and other pertinent facts.

Dan W. Baer appeals from a postjudgment order in favor of Banyan Limited Partnership (Banyan), Pear Tree Limited Partnership (Pear Tree), and Orange Blossom Limited Partnership (Orange Blossom) (hereafter referred to collectively as the Grammer Limited Partnerships). In a court trial, the Grammer Limited Partnerships obtained a judgment totaling about $1.1 million against two corporations owned by Baer—IBT International, Inc. (“IBT”) and Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. (“SCSD”)[1]—for loans they made to the corporations that had not been repaid. Although the Grammer Limited Partnerships’ complaint alleged Baer was an alter ego of his corporations, no evidence concerning the alter ego relationship was presented at trial and in its statement of decision, the court found the Grammer Limited Partnerships had affirmatively abandoned the alter ego claim. The trial court subsequently granted the Grammer Limited Partnerships’ motion for new trial and amended its statement of decision to delete the abandonment finding. The Grammer Limited Partnerships filed a motion to dismiss Baer’s appeal, contending the order is not separately appealable. We reject their contentions and deny the motion to dismiss. Baer contends the order must be reversed because the time for ruling on a new trial motion had expired. We agree and reverse the order.

This litigation has spanned almost two decades. The original complaint, filed in 1996, arises out of business dealings between Dan W. Baer and an attorney, David H. Tedder, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It began as an action filed by Tedder as general partner of a multitude of Nevada limited partnerships he created for clients as part of “asset protection” services he provided for those clients. Tedder sued on behalf of the limited partnerships to recover on loans they allegedly made to Baer’s corporations, IBT International, Inc. (“IBT”) and Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. (“SCSD”) (hereafter “Defendants” unless the context indicates otherwise), to acquire real estate owned by the corporations, but in which Tedder claimed he and Baer were to be partners. Defendants and Tedder cross-complained against each other seeking to determine their respective interests in the real estate and their other business pursuits, which included Tedder’s law firm from which the two men had agreed to equally split the profits. The action ended up as one asserting that Baer, as a
non-lawyer partner in Tedder’s law firm, was liable for Tedder’s breaches of fiduciary duties to the three law firm clients who funded the limited partnerships, and who claimed they had each lost millions of dollars entrusted to Tedder as a result of Tedder’s making self-interested loans of their money.[1]

Plaintiff and appellant, Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), appeals a judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent, County of Riverside (the County), after the trial court sustained the County’s general demurrer to Zurich’s second amended complaint against the County without leave to amend. The complaint asserts causes of action for breach of contract, interference with contractual relations, interference with prospective economic advantage, and declaratory relief.
The gravamen of Zurich’s claims is that the County wrongfully “impaired” Zurich’s subrogated right against Lim Nascimento Engineering Corp. (LAN), to collect from LAN over $377,000 in attorney fees and costs Zurich paid to defend the County in a personal injury action by John and Sarah McLauchlin (the McLauchlin action). Zurich claims the County is therefore liable to Zurich for the defense costs that Zurich is unable to collect from LAN.