CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Wesley Gutierrez (defendant) appeals from an order revoking his probation and executing a previously suspended prison term. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On April 30, 2013, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed and defendant has submitted no letter or brief. We have reviewed the entire record and finding no error or other arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.
In 2011, defendant pled no contest under a plea agreement to possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5, as charged in the information, and admitted two prior narcotics convictions specially alleged pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), as well as four prison priors alleged pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). On January 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant according to the plea agreement to an aggregate term of 14 years in prison, comprised of the high term of five years, plus three years for each prior narcotics conviction, and one year for each of three prison priors. The court suspended execution of the sentence, placed defendant on probation for five years conditioned upon the completion of one year in a Salvation Army residential drug rehabilitation program, as well as other conditions.

F.R. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after the court sustained a petition alleging a single count of possession of a controlled substance, dihydrocodeinone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)).[1] On appeal F.R. contends there was insufficient evidence he knew the pills in his pocket were a controlled substance, a necessary element of the offense. We reverse.

D.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings in connection with the jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding her minor children, seven-year-old J.G. and one-year-old R.R., whom the juvenile court held to be dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).[1] Mother contends that there is not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings. We affirm.

Appellant S.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders adjudging father’s three minor children with C.B. (mother) to be dependents of the court and removing them from parental custody. Father challenges only one of the jurisdictional findings, namely the allegation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), regarding storage of his medical marihuana.[1] Father contends there is no substantial evidence supporting the determination he improperly stored his medical marijuana in a manner accessible to the children. Father also challenges that portion of the dispositional orders directing him to participate in random drug testing.
Father’s arguments are unavailing. Father’s jurisdictional challenge is nonjusticiable because the court declared the three children dependents of the court based on multiple findings concerning both mother’s and father’s conduct, such that jurisdiction over the children would remain proper even without the challenged allegations. Further, we find no exceptional circumstances warrant our discretionary review. Father forfeited his challenge to the dispositional order by expressly consenting to participate in drug testing. We therefore affirm.

Jaime Aguayo appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial of one count of inflicting injury on a cohabitant (including a special allegation of using a deadly or dangerous weapon), two counts of assault, one count of criminal threats, two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon. Aguayo also pled nolo contendere to two counts of disobeying a domestic relations court order. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on three counts. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109-110; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442. After examination of the record, we affirm.

Adrian Deon Hunter appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions after a jury trial on three counts of robbery with related firearm-use and criminal-street-gang enhancements. No meritorious issues have been identified following a review of the record by Hunter’s appointed counsel and our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Hunter in a typed supplemental brief. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Olivia Marquez and Bridgette Angulo appeal from the trial court’s order granting a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) filed by respondent Alexander Haus. However, they failed to provide this court with any of the relevant pleadings upon which the trial court based its decision. Accordingly, we presume that the trial court’s decision was correct and affirm the judgment.

In 2009, appellant, then age 20, pled guilty to one count of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed appellant on probation. After two violations of probation, but subsequent reinstatement thereof in 2011 and 2012, earlier this year appellant was found to have violated probation for the third time. The trial court then revoked probation and sentenced appellant to the six-year maximum term provided under the 2009 plea agreement. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant appeals from the sentence imposed or from other matters occurring after his entry of his guilty plea. Finding no error in that or any other regard, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, including the sentence imposed.

Appellant, Lamar Louis Tate, appeals from a judgment entered on his no contest plea to second degree burglary. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. As the appeal is based solely on grounds occurring after entry of the plea and does not challenge the validity of the plea, it is authorized. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4).)

Less than 48 hours after being released from state prison, defendant Iann Lewis McDonald was the subject of a parolee search that found him in constructive possession of a firearm and ammunition forbidden to him. He entered pleas of no contest to felony charges of being a past-convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).) He also admitted the truth of enhancement allegations that he had a prior serious or violent conviction that qualified under the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12), and that he had served a term in state prison. (Pen. Code, § 667.5.)

After revoking probation, the trial court sentenced defendant Jeffrey Jones to an aggravated, five-year prison term for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously considered the nature of his probation violation when selecting an aggravated term and erroneously sentenced him without a sufficiently current probation report. We affirm.

Appellant Laquain Larry Scott appeals from a jury determination that he is a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA or Act).[1] He contends that the Act violates the equal protection clause and that the use of a standard jury instruction defining SVPs was improper and violated his rights to due process. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Christopher Thevenot was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of possession of illegal substances in a jail facility (Pen. Code, § 4573.6[1]), with three priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) He raises only one issue on appeal—the denial of his motion to suppress. He contends he was detained without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the marijuana found during a subsequent body cavity search should have been suppressed. We conclude the detention was lawful, and affirm the judgment.