CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jose Perez challenges his convictions for kidnapping to commit rape, attempted kidnapping to commit rape, and other offenses. He contends the trial court erred in declining to suppress his statements to police, arguing that he asserted his right to remain silent and his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We reject the contentions and affirm.

This appeal is untimely and must therefore be dismissed. The court granted respondent’s summary judgment motion and entered judgment in its favor on August 28, 2012. Respondent served a notice of entry of judgment on September 10, 2012. Appellants did not file their notice of appeal until December 21, 2012, more than 60 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment. Timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and we may not entertain an appeal when the notice is filed too late.

Appellant Curtis James Hill stands convicted of special circumstances murder for causing the death of Cecil Warren in the course of a robbery. Although Warren did not die until nearly four years after the robbery, the jury determined he did so as a result of the injuries appellant inflicted on him during that crime. Appellant contends his trial was unfair because the prosecution introduced statements that were taken in violation of his Miranda rights,[1] his attorney negligently allowed the jury to hear about other crimes he may have committed, and the state’s expert medical witnesses referenced the findings of a nontestifying physician in rendering their opinions as to the cause of Warren’s death. Appellant also contends cumulative error compels reversal and California’s special circumstances law is unconstitutional. Finding appellant’s contentions unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial defendant BJ Sanders III was convicted of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,[2] former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 2). In a bifurcated proceeding the trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered three prison priors. Defendant was sentenced to 199 days in county jail on count 1, for which he received credit for time served. On count 2 he was sentenced to three years in state prison, plus three consecutive years for the prior prison terms, for a total sentence of six years. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify himself upon learning that he was the prosecutor on one of defendant’s prior cases.

Gresham Savage Nolan & Tilden, Nicholas Firetag and Marlene Allen-Hammerarlund for Movant and Respondent.
The City of Riverside (City) filed a nuisance abatement action as to property owned by William and Kelly Horspool, and sought the appointment of a receiver pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980 et seq. Defendant William Horspool (William)[2] appealed from the order appointing the receiver in case No. E051500,[3] but failed to obtain an undertaking on appeal. Kevin Randolph, in his capacity of receiver, obtained an order permitting the sale of the property to a party who rehabilitated the property after defendants frustrated his efforts to do so. A notice of appeal on behalf of both Horspools was filed in case No. E053605, from the order permitting the sale of the property and an order awarding the receiver extraordinary costs and fees. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, the holder of the mortgage on the property, did not appeal.

Steven Apostolas was charged in an amended complaint with numerous counts and appended enhancements, and with 10 prior serious felony convictions and 10 prior strike convictions. He faced life sentences if convicted. Instead, he entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to numerous counts and appended enhancements, and to admit to a prior serious felony conviction and prior strike conviction in return for a stipulated determinate prison term of 30 years. On appeal, he asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Luke H., age 18, appeals from an order of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court denying his petition for an order compelling his mother, Deborah H., to make his nondependent sister, five-year-old Angel H., available for weekly visitation.[1] Luke contends (1) the juvenile court erred when it relied on In re A.R. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1160 (A.R.) to deny his petition, (2) the court had authority to enter a visitation order against mother with respect to a nondependent sibling, (3) the denial of his petition seeking sibling visitation violated his constitutional right to due process, and (4) the court denied him a meaningful hearing. We conclude the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to grant Luke’s modification petition for visitation with a nondependent sibling. We find the A.R. case to be controlling on this issue. Luke’s attempts to distinguish A.R. are not persuasive. The fact that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over mother does not mean the court had jurisdiction to compel visitation with a sibling who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Further, in this case, Luke did not have a constitutional right to visitation with his nondependent sibling. Finally, Luke has forfeited his argument that there was no evidentiary hearing. In any event, this argument fails because the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to order visitation with a nondependent sibling regardless of any evidence that would have been presented. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Michael Bret Vanheuver killed his mother, Lisa Vanheuver, by strangulation. He then called the police. Officers arrived at the house, took him in to custody and he confessed almost immediately. Vanheuver also confessed to his aunt when she visited him in jail. He pled no contest to second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years to life and now appeals.

Christopher L.’s parental rights with respect to three of his children were terminated pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] Christopher L. claims on appeal that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the parent-child relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption. He further argues that there was insufficient evidence of unfitness to permit termination of parental rights. We affirm.

Emil Shokohi, proceeding in propria persona, purports to appeal from an order denying his motion for reconsideration after the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Aubrey Kachmarik, respondents. "An order denying a motion for reconsideration . . . is not separately appealable." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).) "An order granting . . . a motion for judgment on the pleadings is [also] not an appealable order because it is not final, but only a preliminary or interlocutory order. The proper appeal is from an actual judgment. [Citations.]" (Neufeld v. State Bd. of Equalization (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476, fn. 4.)

Andrea P. (mother) and Wilson T. (father) are the parents of Prince T. (Prince, born Feb. 2007), Savannah T. (Savannah, born July 2008), and Grant T. (Grant, born Aug. 2010). The juvenile court sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j),[1] against both parents and removed the children from parental custody. Mother appeals, arguing that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) concedes that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding by the juvenile court.
We agree with the parties that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the jurisdictional finding and the resulting dispositional findings and order.

W.H. appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to his daughters T.H., Ciara H., and C.H., on the ground that the children are not adoptable. We affirm.

Shawn C. (father) appeals from the dispositional order removing his newborn daughter, K.S., from his custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, and ordering father to drug test.[1] He contends: (1) the order was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) requiring father to drug-test was an abuse of discretion; and (3) there was non-compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We conclude the dispositional order is supported by substantial evidence, but agree that the case must be remanded for ICWA compliance.

Richard Joseph Sams pled guilty to two counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 495)[1], identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3)), two counts of forgery of a check (§ 470, subd. (d), §476), and possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) He also admitted to having served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced appellant to a "realignment" sentence of five years, eight months in county jail. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) Execution of sentence was suspended with respect to two years, eight months of that time, which appellant was ordered to serve on supervised release.
In November 2011, law enforcement officers arrived at appellant's Grover Beach motel room to conduct a probation search. Appellant ran from them and discarded a bag containing 92 grams of methamphetamine. A search of the motel room disclosed more drugs, cash and drug paraphernalia. In August 2012, law enforcement searched another motel room of appellant's and found equipment used to falsify debit cards. Officers later discovered numerous forged checks linked to appellant.