CA Unpub Decisions

Vanessa P. appeals from an order placing her on probation without wardship after the juvenile court found she had committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) and sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Will Scott Carter, appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant or child’s parent (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and his admissions he previously had been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Carter to 14 years in prison. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Ivory R. King, appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to petty theft with three priors (Pen. Code, § 666, subd. (a))[1] and his admission he previously had been convicted of residential, first degree burglary (§ 459) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced King to 32 months in state prison. We affirm.

Edward Plummer, Jr. appeals the dismissal of his action under Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 425.16. We affirm.

Defendant Laurie Dana Dollar appeals from the judgment entered following her no contest plea to two counts of sale or transport of a controlled substance, cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), for which the trial court imposed a five-year prison term. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by imposing a jail booking fee as part of her sentence without making a finding on her ability to pay the fine. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Gerald Luis Gonzales of the first degree murder of Gerald Ramirez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (id., § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true the allegations that Gonzales personally used a firearm (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (id., § 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d)), committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). After the trial court found true the allegations that Gonzales suffered two prior strike convictions (id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), the court sentenced Gonzales to state prison for a total term of 110 years to life.
Gonzales’ sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements he made to police during an interrogation. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Gonzales’ motion to suppress the statements, and affirm.

Plaintiff Marcella Mitchelson appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted defendant Sunset Marquis Hotel’s motion for summary judgment. Mitchelson fell on a public sidewalk adjacent to the Hotel’s property and filed this action for personal injuries. The Hotel filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that it did not owe a duty to maintain the sidewalk because it did not own, control, maintain, or possess the area where Mitchelson fell. The Hotel also argued that the defect in the sidewalk was trivial as a matter of law. Because we conclude that the Hotel did not meet its burden on summary judgment of showing that Mitchelson could not prove the element of duty and that the defect is not trivial as a matter of law, we reverse.

A modification decision.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it calculated an award of contingent attorney fees to a client’s discharged attorneys, who claim they are entitled to additional fees. We find no abuse and affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute involving a trust established by Kenneth and Rachel Goodall for the benefit of their only son, Michael. In the 1990s, the Goodall parents died, and Bank of America assumed responsibilities as trustee of the trust. In 1999, Michael initiated the instant action in San Francisco and petitioned to have Bank of America removed as trustee. The petition was denied. Michael died in 2010, and the Marin County Superior Court appointed appellant Sloan as the administrator of Michael’s estate.
The San Francisco case was inactive for approximately 11 years until 2011 when Bank of America filed two motions: one to confirm the assets of the Goodall Trust and another to determine the trust’s proper beneficiaries. Shortly thereafter, Sloan retained attorney Sam Ware to represent him. The superior court ordered the assets of the Goodall Trust to be distributed to Rachel Goodall’s siblings and a charity, Guide Dogs for the Blind, Inc.

Tyler Neal Scott (defendant) killed a man in a car accident while driving drunk. He pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a) (Count 2))[1] and driving while intoxicated causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a) (Count 3)). The court sentenced him to the upper term of 10 years in state prison on Count 2 and the midterm of two years in prison on Count 3, to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 2.
Defendant appeals. He contends the court improperly imposed the upper term on Count 2 by relying on “improper aggravating factors.” He also makes an ineffective assistance of counsel argument based on trial counsel’s failure to object to the sentence in the trial court.
We affirm.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), appeals from the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication. Chase contends the court erred in denying its motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff LDI Growth Partners LLC’s (LDI) cause of action for statutory conversion, and in granting LDI’s motion for summary adjudication on that claim. Chase argues LDI’s claim fails as a matter of law because LDI admitted in response to a request for admissions that the entity who received certain checks allegedly converted by Chase was not acting as an agent for LDI; it is undisputed that LDI must have directly or through an agent received delivery of the checks to state a claim for conversion. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3420.) We reverse, concluding that LDI’s admissions are dispositive.

On August 22, 2011, defendant Ronald Evans was arrested following numerous alleged instances of domestic violence between him and his then girlfriend. He was acquitted of the domestic violence charges but convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. On November 17, the trial court sentenced him to five years in state prison, awarding him 105 days credit for time served, comprised of 88 actual days in custody and 17 conduct credits.
On appeal, Evans challenges the trial court’s calculation of his credits on two separate grounds. First, he contends that the trial court erroneously limited his conduct credits to 20 percent of his actual days in custody, a limitation, he claims, applicable only to postsentence conduct credits. Second, he argues that the trial court should have applied a “hybrid” calculation to his time in custody, applying one formula for the period ending September 30, and a different formula for the period commencing October 1. This was so, he reasons, because the statute governing conduct credits was amended effective October 1, 2011, becoming more favorable to defendants on that date.
We agree with Evans’s first argument and reject his second. We order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect 44 days of conduct credits, for a total of 132 credits. In all other regards, we affirm.

Defendant Mark Steven Simmons appeals from an order extending his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), arguing that insufficient evidence supports the order. We will affirm.