CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants Leo Dalton Price and Kristina Pelache appeal a judgment entered following a jury trial. On appeal, Price asserts the trial court erred by not declaring a doubt during his trial and sentencing as to his competence pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.[1] Pelache asserts the trial court erred by imposing probation conditions that were unconstitutionally overbroad.

R.F. (Father), and M.R. (Mother), appeal from the order made at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (hereafter the .26 hearing)[1] terminating their parental rights to their son, D.F. They contend there is insufficient evidence to support the adoptability finding. We reject their contentions and affirm the order.

Federal bank regulators took over Corona’s Vineyard Bank in 2008. Then the regulators and a group of the bank’s unsecured creditors sued eight officers and directors of the bank for making the risky and improvident loans that got the bank into trouble in the first place. Hoping to recoup their outlays, the regulators and the unsecured creditors looked to the “Director’s and Officer’s” (often called “D&O”) insurance carried by Vineyard Bank’s officers and directors.[1]
For each of the two years 2008 and 2009, the eight officers and directors had $25 million of D&O insurance. But the composition of each year’s insurance was different. For 2008, the insureds had $15 million in primary coverage provided by defendant St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, then another $5 million on top of St. Paul’s $15 million provided by first level excess insurer National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg, then finally yet another $5 million provided by second level excess insurer Lexington Insurance Company. But for 2009, the primary coverage provided by St. Paul was only $5 million. On top of that $5 million was another $5 million provided by National Union as the first level excess insurer and, finally, the remaining $15 million was provided by plaintiff XL Specialty Insurance Company.

Defendant Jarret Wade Holmes was convicted of various offenses, including vehicle theft and methamphetamine possession, pursuant to plea bargains in five cases. The first three cases were based on crimes committed before January 1, 2012, and the last two cases were based on crimes committed after January 1, 2012. When the trial court sentenced defendant on the five cases, it imposed a five-year aggregate prison sentence, plus five $240 restitution fines pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4.[1] The court stated only the following regarding the restitution fines: “He’s to pay a restitution fine in the sum of $1,200. He’s to pay a fine in the sum of $1,200, that’s $240 per case pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4.”
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court applied the law retroactively because it relied on the amended version of section 1202.4, effective on January 1, 2012, to impose the $240 fine in the first three, pre-2012 cases. He asserts this alleged reliance on the amended statute was a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Plaintiff Diamond Manufacturing & Engineering Co. (Diamond) entered into a contract with defendant Equipment Parts Wholesale, LLC (EPW) under the terms of which Diamond was to manufacture certain quantities of a machine known as a scissor lift, which would be purchased by EPW for resale. After delays and other problems occurred in Diamond’s manufacturing efforts, EPW elected to terminate the contract. Diamond then sued for damages based on alleged breach of contract and related causes of action, and EPW filed a cross-complaint against Diamond. The parties agreed to resolve their dispute in binding arbitration. Arbitration proceedings were held and, after considering the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of Diamond in the sum of $386,847.14. Diamond petitioned the trial court to confirm the arbitration award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.[1] In response, EPW requested that the trial court either (i) vacate the award since the arbitrator allegedly failed to disclose a potential conflict creating an appearance of bias or (ii) correct the amount of the award based on an alleged evident miscalculation of figures. The trial court denied both of EPW’s requests, confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Diamond. EPW timely appealed.[2] We conclude that the trial court properly confirmed the arbitration award. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

In People v. Barnes (Feb. 10, 2012, E050704 [nonpub. opn.]) this court noted that defendant had been convicted by a jury of three counts of robbery, during which he used a firearm, and two counts of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm. (Id. at p. 2.) We further noted that in bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true allegations that defendant had suffered convictions for two serious offenses and two strike priors and that he had been sentenced to prison for two terms of 25 years to life, plus 23 years, four months. (Ibid.) We affirmed his convictions and the true findings for his 1992 prior, but reversed the true findings for his 1997 federal bank robbery conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 2, 13.) We gave the People the option of retrying defendant on the allegations concerning that prior (id. at p. 13), which they did. The trial court again made true findings as to it. Defendant here contends that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the trial court’s findings. We disagree.

After the juvenile court declared H.R. a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c),[1] and removed him from the custody of his father, the court found that H.R.'s noncustodial mother, Griselda R., was not capable of caring for him and placed him in a licensed group home. Griselda appeals from the court's order and challenges the court's denial of H.R.'s placement with her. We affirm.

Patrick D. appeals after the juvenile court denied his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions requesting an additional period of reunification and terminated his parental rights to his daughters, H.N. (born 2006) and C.C. (born 2012). (Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) C.C.'s mother, Gabriella C., joins in Patrick's arguments pertaining to C.C. We affirm.

artin D. appeals the juvenile court's order denying his request for paternity testing in the dependency case of child Maya C. Martin contends the court erred as a matter of law by denying the request.[1] We affirm.

A jury convicted Daniel Anthony Ruvalcaba of the first degree murder of Michael Benge (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)[1] and the second degree murder of Benge's sister, Denaya Shanks (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2).[2] As to count 1, the jury found true a multiple murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). As to both counts, the jury found true gang benefit enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and vicarious firearm use enhancement allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). Ruvalcaba also admitted having a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and a prior prison commitment conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole, plus 80 years to life, plus five years.
Ruvalcaba appeals, contending his conviction must be reversed because the court once again prejudicially erred in admitting double hearsay against him (see fn. 2, ante). He further contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to:
(1) request the court strike portions of two prosecution witnesses' testimony, object to portions of the prosecution's gang expert's testimony, and elicit certain favorable testimony from a defense witness. We conclude these contentions lack merit and affirm the judgment.

Albert Salazar appeals an order enforcing a settlement agreement he entered into with his brother, Joel Salazar.[1] His opening brief, however, violates basic rules of appellate practice, and thus he has forfeited the matter. In any event, he purports to raise a jurisdictional issue on behalf of a third party, which he lacks standing to do.
Joel also appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying him contractual attorney fees as the prevailing party before he even filed a motion for fees. We agree with him, and reverse the order in part with directions.

In this negligence action, plaintiff Michael Longhenry appeals a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of defendant Pete Hill Construction Company, Inc. (Hill). Longhenry contends the trial court erred by: granting his attorney's request to be relieved on the eve of trial; denying his new counsel's request to reopen discovery; granting Hill's motions in limine; and denying Longhenry's request to make a "mini opening statement" accompanied by presentation of demonstrative evidence.

Defendant Troy Lee Wallace pleaded no contest to unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation with a minor. Among other things, the trial court sentenced defendant to lifetime registration as a sex offender and imposed a $1,140 fine, including a $300 fine pursuant to Penal Code section 290.3.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s discretionary order requiring him to register as a sex offender. Defendant claims the order violates equal protection, and further claims the record does not establish that the trial court understood and exercised its discretion in ordering sex offender registration. In addition, defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to support the order for sex offender registration, and the trial court did not state on the record that it had applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Defendant further challenges the sex offender registration requirement on the ground that the residency restriction is punitive, and thus a jury must make the necessary factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, defendant claims the trial court imposed an unauthorized fine.

Defendant Darrell Ryan Longacre appeals from a conviction for petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. He now contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing in its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 224 [use of circumstantial evidence to find guilt], because the prosecution substantially relied on circumstantial evidence to establish that he committed petty theft.
Finding no prejudice, we will affirm the judgment.