CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants Donyae Nase, Andre Love, and William England were driving through a residential neighborhood in the Meadowview area of Sacramento when they came upon two cars stopped in the middle of the street. Unable to pass, they pulled over, got out of their car, and exchanged words with several people from the neighborhood. Defendants identified themselves as members of a gang called the Meadowview Bloods (MVB) and a confrontation ensued, during which one of the victims was punched in the head, another was choked until he passed out, and others were threatened at gunpoint as one of the defendants tried to force his way into a victim’s home. The incident ended after several witnesses saw Love fire several shots. Defendants fled, eventually dropping Love off near an emergency room with a gunshot wound to his leg.

C.C. (mother) and F.R. (father)[1] appeal from the dependency court’s February 26, 2013 order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 [2] and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their child, C.R. Father also appeals the court’s denial of a section 388 petition for reunification services and a continuance of the permanency hearing. We affirm.

Father, Eduardo B., appeals from a dependency court order declaring his children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).[1] Father contends there is no substantial evidence that his minor children suffered or are at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm such that dependency jurisdiction is appropriate. He also contends there is insufficient evidence to support the dependency court’s order removing the children from his custody. He challenges the court’s order requiring him to submit to random drug testing as part of his reunification plan, and he argues that the visitation plan is inappropriate. We affirm.

Modesto Murrietta appeals from the judgment after conviction by plea of no contest to second degree robbery in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. LA068609. (Pen. Code, § 211.) Murrietta admitted that he suffered a prior prison sentence. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court dismissed charges against Murrietta in an unrelated consolidated case (No. LA068321) and sentenced Murrietta to three years in state prison consisting of a two-year low term for the robbery and a one-year term for the enhancement.

Plaintiff Lorenz Weidl appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendants Jose Gil and Sanjuana Gil on the grounds that Weidl's action was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In his first amended complaint, Weidl sought damages and injunctive relief for causes of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence and unjust enrichment. We conclude, among other things, that the trial court did not err because: 1) Weidl's causes of action were subject to a three-year statute of limitations, 2) his action was untimely, and 3) he did not meet his burden to produce evidence to show that he fell within the continuing nuisance doctrine. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Tony Lee Hill of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and found true allegations that defendant had suffered nine prior convictions of serious or violent felonies or juvenile adjudications (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison, striking the prior prison term allegation.
During the course of the proceedings, the trial court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial (§ 1368), pursuant to defense counsel’s request. After reviewing psychiatric evaluations of defendant, it concluded he was competent. Thereafter, defense counsel repeatedly declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence but the trial court refused to hold a second competency hearing. On appeal, defendant argues this constituted reversible error.
In addition, defendant requested pro. per. status on the day trial commenced. The trial court denied that request as untimely. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the request untimely because defendant did not request a continuance. We disagree with both contentions raised by defendant and therefore affirm the judgment. In addition, we have reviewed at defendant’s request the sealed transcript of the trial court proceedings on his Pitchess[2] motion to determine whether the trial court failed to provide him with all discoverable information. We find no error in the trial court’s handling of those proceedings.

Appellant Sung J. Lee appeals the trial court’s order approving and settling the final report and accounting of the receiver, respondent Kevin Singer, and approving final compensation for respondent. Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay the fees and expenses incurred by respondent in taking over and operating a business owned by appellant’s judgment debtor, which generated insufficient income to provide either a recovery for appellant or payment to respondent. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Plaintiff James A. Redeker brought this case against his former employer, Collateral Specialists Inc. (CSI), for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and Labor Code section 1102.5, unfair business practices, and invasion of privacy. In this appeal, he challenges the trial court’s order granting CSI summary judgment. We affirm summary adjudication of Redeker’s claim for invasion of privacy, but we reverse summary adjudication of his other three claims.

B.C. (the minor) is the child at issue in this juvenile dependency case. She has filed a petition for extraordinary writ seeking review of the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services for her mother, E.C. (Mother), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] permanency planning hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(h)(15).[2])
In her petition, the minor claims: (1) the juvenile court failed to make the statutorily required findings to support denial of reunification services, and the disposition report failed to provide sufficient information upon which the court could make appropriate findings; (2) negligence cannot support the denial of reunification services based upon infliction of severe sexual abuse pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6); and (3) the juvenile court failed to make a finding that denial of reunification services would be in the minor’s best interest.
Mother has filed a letter indicating she joins in the minor’s challenge to the juvenile court’s orders. For the reasons stated below, we will deny the petition for writ of mandate.

Mortgage lender Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar), decided in early 2011 to make licensed escrow agent Integrity Escrow, Inc. (Integrity), ineligible to do business with Flagstar. Flagstar included Integrity’s name on a list of ineligible escrow agents; the list was made available to the mortgage brokers with whom Flagstar does business. Flagstar also told one mortgage broker that Flagstar had “blacklisted” Integrity.
Integrity sued Flagstar for intentional interference with contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage, unfair business practices, and defamation. The trial court granted Flagstar’s motion for summary judgment. We conclude there was no triable issue of material fact as to any of Integrity’s causes of action against Flagstar, and Flagstar was entitled to judgment against Integrity as a matter of law.
In brief, the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations fails because Integrity did not produce evidence of the requisite contracts. The claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and defamation fail because the evidence shows Flagstar’s actions were privileged (in accord with uniform federal cases facing the same issue), and Integrity failed to show malice. Finally, the evidence does not support the unfair business practices claim, under any theory advanced by Integrity. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Mortgage lender Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar), decided in early 2011 to make licensed escrow agent Complete Escrow Service Corporation (Complete) ineligible to do business with Flagstar. Flagstar included Complete’s name on a list of ineligible escrow agents; the list was made available to the mortgage brokers with whom Flagstar does business. Flagstar also told one mortgage broker that Flagstar had “blacklisted” Complete.
Complete sued Flagstar for intentional interference with contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage, unfair business practices, and defamation. The trial court entered a stipulated summary judgment in favor of Flagstar. With respect to the first cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, Complete showed the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the elements of Flagstar’s knowledge of and intent to induce the breach of three executed escrow agreements. As a result, the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations survives summary judgment. We conclude, however, that there was no triable issue of material fact as to Complete’s second and fourth causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and defamation because the evidence shows Flagstar’s actions were privileged, and Complete failed to show malice. We further conclude there was no triable issue of material fact as to the third cause of action for unfair business practices.

Tina C. (mother) in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from a juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her one-year-old son.[1] Mother makes no claim of error, however, in her petition. At most, she checks boxes on the form petition requesting orders for reunification services, visitation, and return of custody without explanation. Due to the inadequacy of mother’s petition, we will dismiss it.

Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found that appellant, Steven C., a minor, committed two counts of battery (Pen. Code,[1] § 242; counts 4, 6) and individual counts of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1), second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2) and grand theft (§ 487; count 3). The court also found true an enhancement allegation that appellant, in committing the count 1 assault, personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (section 12022.7(a)). Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court ordered appellant committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities and set his maximum term of physical confinement at nine years four months.
On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the true finding on the great bodily injury enhancement allegation and his adjudications of robbery and grand theft. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Maxx Matthew Lopez, of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 1), willfully discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 2), assault with a firearm on Dana Macklin (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 4), possession of a firearm within 10 years of a conviction of an enumerated misdemeanor (§ 29805; count 6), making criminal threats (§ 422; count 7), possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning a firearm due to a prior conviction (§ 30305, subd. (a); count 8), and resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148; count 9). In addition, the jury found true the following special allegations: in committing the count 1 offense, appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and in committing the count 4 and count 7 offenses, appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury acquitted appellant of shooting a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3) and assault with a firearm on Nakisha Warwick (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5).
The court imposed a prison term of 25 years, consisting of the five-year upper term on the count 1 substantive offense and 20 years on the accompanying discharging a firearm enhancement. The court imposed concurrent three-year upper terms on each of counts 6 and 8; stayed imposition of sentence on the count 1 personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (f); and imposed, but stayed pursuant to section 654, the following upper terms: on count 2, three years; on count 4, four years on the substantive offense and 10 years on the accompanying enhancement; and on count 7, three years on the substantive offense and 10 years on the accompanying enhancement. On count 9, the court imposed a 365-day county jail term and awarded appellant credit for 365 days served.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Thereafter, on March 22, 2013, appellant, apparently in response to this court’s invitation to file supplemental briefing, filed a document entitled “FORMAL NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL BRIEFING VIA SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS,” in which he lists what he claims are “PREJUDICIAL TRIAL ERROR[S]” and, as best we can determine, faults appellate counsel for not raising these issues. We will treat this document as a supplemental brief and address appellant’s claims of error below.
On June 21, 2013, this court denied appellant’s request for an extension of time to file another supplemental brief, noting that appellant had previously been granted a total of 61 days to file such an additional supplemental brief. We affirm.