CA Unpub Decisions

At a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court declared X.M. a dependent of the court and removed X.M. from the physical custody of his guardian, defendant and respondent P.M. (Guardian). Guardian contends substantial evidence does not support the findings that (1) she has an unresolved mental illness that placed X.M. at a risk of suffering harm; (2) X.M. was harmed or at risk of harm due to excuses Guardian made for X.M.’s sexually abusive behavior; and (3) X.M. needed to be removed from her home. We affirm the judgment.

At a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court (1) found N.D. came within the court’s jurisdiction, and (2) terminated the guardianship that defendant and respondent P.M. (Grandmother) had over N.D. The guardianship had been granted by the probate court. Grandmother contends (1) the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by terminating the guardianship established by the probate court, (2) substantial evidence does not support the court’s best interests finding, and (3) the juvenile court misapplied the “best interests” standard. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Donna Sanfilippo (Sanfilippo) sued defendants and respondents Wells Fargo Advisors, Inc. (Wells Fargo), her ex-husband, Joe Sanfilippo,[1] and three Wells Fargo employees in their individual capacities: Gary Endres, Don Overbeck and Michael Barnes (collectively respondents). Sanfilippo alleged causes of action for (1) marital status discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (2) gender discrimination under FEHA; (3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (4) interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) violation of California's unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. and Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.); (6) violation of Labor Code section 300; (7) violation of Labor Code section 2800; (8) conversion and conspiracy to commit conversion; and (9) fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to defraud.

Leslie Ligons and defendant Delanious Aubra Ward began as friends, but over time their relationship deteriorated. Defendant left numerous threatening messages on the phone Ligons shared with her longtime companion, James Dalbert. Defendant’s threats escalated and he made several trips to the couple’s home. Ultimately, defendant pulled a knife and began to tussle with Dalbert. Dalbert and Ligons both suffered stab wounds.
An information charged defendant with making criminal threats, misdemeanor vandalism, and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 594, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1] The jury convicted defendant of all counts except misdemeanor vandalism. Sentenced to state prison for a determinate term of 65 years plus four consecutive terms of 25 years to life, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel, sentencing error, and erroneous calculation of custody credits. We shall affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Cortez John Sullivan of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term of eight years.
Defendant appeals. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a prior incident of molesting children and in allowing the prosecution to reopen to present this evidence just prior to closing argument. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Bart Loran Lyons contends the prosecutor in his trial for possessing a controlled substance for sale and other drug offenses committed misconduct when, during cross-examination, he asked defendant’s expert witness about defendant’s prior arrests and convictions for possession and transportation for sale. Defendant admits his counsel did not object. Having forfeited a direct challenge to this issue, defendant claims he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree, and, except to order the abstract of judgment amended to record the correct amount of presentence credit, we affirm the judgment.

Erik John Michael Espinoza appeals a judgment of conviction after he expressly waived his constitutional rights, pleaded nolo contendere to arson of property, and admitted suffering a prior arson conviction and a serious felony strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 451, subd. (d), 451.1, subd. (a)(1), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)[1] In accordance with a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Espinoza to seven years in prison, consisting of a doubled two-year midterm (four years), plus three years for a prior arson conviction. The court awarded him 225 days of presentence custody credit and imposed a $240 restitution fine, a $240 parole revocation restitution fine (stayed), a $40 court security assessment, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45, 1465.8, subd. (a); Gov. Code, § 70373.) It also dismissed the remaining counts and allegations on the motion of the prosecutor.

The father, T.D., appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. At the time the jurisdictional and dispositional orders were entered as to the father, they were likewise entered as to the mother. The mother has not appealed. The judgment is final as to the mother. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906; In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393; Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1395.) Thus the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the father based upon the findings as to the mother. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Finally, the father’s challenge to dispositional order has no merit. No objection was interposed to the dispositional order. In fact, the father consented in writing to the dispositional order and its drug related conditions. (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 640-641; Hasson v. Ford Motor Company (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 420-421; In re John M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 419; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 167; Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 686.)

Dean Wayne Nation (Nation) appeals from the judgment entered on his plea of no contest to attempted first degree burglary, person present, in violation of Penal Code sections 664/459.[1] His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441 (Wende), raising no issues. On August 13, 2013, we notified Nation of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he wants us to consider. That time has elapsed and Nation failed to submit a letter or brief. Upon review of the entire record, we conclude that there are no arguable issues. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs Anabel and Jose Rodriguez appeal the judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants Bank of America, N.A. (BofA),[1] Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) following the trial court's order sustaining without leave to amend their demurrer to the first amended complaint. In that complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants wrongfully foreclosed the deed of trust on their home. Among other things, they allege that representatives of BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (BAC) told them they had qualified for a loan modification and assured them the trustee's sale had been cancelled. In the meantime, the trustee, ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust), sold the property to Fannie Mae.
Generally, a borrower must tender the full amount of the debt to maintain an action to cancel a completed trustee's sale. (Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 (Karlsen).) The trial court invoked this rule to dismiss the causes of action seeking to avoid the sale. Plaintiffs allege the tender rule does not apply here because the substitution of trustee and assignments of the deed of trust from the original lender to BAC were void. The test, however, is not whether these documents were void, but whether the sale itself was void. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating that the substitution and assignments affected the trustee's statutory authority to foreclose and sell the property. As both the original and substitute trustee, ReconTrust had that authority regardless of whether the substitution was valid.

This case arises out of an attempted amendment to the Water and Power Employees’ Retirement Plan (WPERP). WPERP’s Board of Administration (Board) enacted the amendment and the Board of Water and Power Commissioners (Commissioners) approved it, but the Los Angeles City Council (City Council) vetoed it. The City of Los Angeles (City) demurred to the complaint by real parties in interest—WPERP, the Board, and four current and former members of the Board—in part on the ground that WPERP and the Board are sub-units of the City and lack the capacity to sue the municipal corporation of which they are a part and do not have standing to maintain this action. The trial court overruled the demurrer.
The City filed this petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint by WPERP and the Board[1] and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. We deny the petition.

George K., father of nine-year-old F.K., appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court. He challenges the court’s jurisdictional findings that father’s drug use and the presence of weapons and illicit drugs around the home endangered F.’s health and safety. Father also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s order removing F. from his custody. We disagree and affirm.

On February 17, 2012, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that 17-year-old appellant Paris L. had committed one count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211, a felony. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared appellant a ward of the court. Appellant was subsequently detained on November 19, 2012, in connection with an adult case, and the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction as of that date.
Appellant contends (1) the juvenile court committed prejudicial error by admitting testimonial and hearsay statements of a 911 call, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the robbery count. We affirm.

H.M. (mother) appeals from the dependency court’s orders declaring E.M. a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c),[1] and removing E.M. from mother’s custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). Mother contends substantial evidence does not support either the jurisdictional findings that E.M. was at substantial risk of harm and at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, or the court’s disposition order removing E.M. from mother. Mother also contends the dependency court violated due process by declining to appoint an expert witness on her behalf. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s requests for an expert witness appointment. We affirm.