CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jeremy Valentin appeals from the judgment in which a jury convicted him of one count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211,[1] a felony. The jury also found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found true that appellant had served four prior prison terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 13 years, consisting of the midterm of three years on the robbery count plus 10 years on the firearm enhancement. The trial court struck the prior prison terms.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding him from presenting expert testimony on eyewitness identification. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and respondents Sheryl Crow and Harvey Weinstein sought restraining orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6[1] prohibiting defendant and appellant Phillip Gordon Sparks from engaging in harassing conduct and requiring Sparks to stay at least 300 yards away from them. The trial court granted the requested orders after a hearing on August 14, 2012. Sparks timely appealed.[2] Sparks raises a number of contentions, none of which are supported by citations to the record or to legal authority. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s orders, we affirm.

Eduardo Cervantes Lopez appeals his conviction by jury of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] with special findings that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and committed the assault for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). Appellant admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to eight years state prison. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not giving a Hecker instruction (People v. Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451) on the use of deadly force to repel a sudden and perilous threat by an opponent in a fist fight. We affirm.

Appellant Ricky Andre Pickett appeals the judgment resulting from his conviction for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of former Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4). He contends the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of a garage which ultimately led to the discovery of his concealed knife. He also contends section 12020 violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm the order denying the suppression motion and the judgment of conviction.

Attorney Paul Stanton and his law firm, the Law Offices of Paul Stanton, appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying them relief in their complaint for breach of a fee agreement against their former client, Don Fleischman, and ordering them instead to return to Fleischman several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees that Fleischman paid to Stanton and his firm. Former client Fleischman is satisfied with the trial court’s judgment, but filed a protective cross-appeal in the event the judgment were reversed. We hold the trial court erred (1) in ordering attorney Stanton to disgorge the fees he received from Fleischman and (2) in awarding Fleischman his attorneys’ fees and costs. As for Fleischman’s cross-appeal protectively alleging instructional error and error in the valuation date of real estate that Fleischman recovered while Stanton represented him, we affirm.

Defendant J.H. appeals from an out-of-home placement probation order, following her admission of a third violation of her probation. Her appointed counsel on appeal has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), in which counsel raises no issue for appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly).) Counsel has averred defendant has been informed of her right to file a supplemental brief. We have received no such brief.
We summarize only the facts and procedural background relevant to review of the challenged probation order. On May 24, 2011, defendant admitted count 3 of an amended section 602 wardship petition, alleging misdemeanor disturbing the peace (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (2)). Wardhsip was declared on June 21, and J.H. was placed on probation subject to numerous terms and conditions, including that she serve one weekend in juvenile hall and thereafter reside with her grandmother.
One year later, on May 30, 2012, J.H. admitted a probation violation, namely failing to attend and being suspended from school. Wardship was continued, and she was ordered to complete 30 days of home supervision and attend substance abuse counseling.

D.M. (Father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, J.M., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] His arguments challenge the juvenile court’s findings of detriment to J.M.'s well-being made at earlier status review hearings, and are therefore not subject to review on appeal from the section 366.26 order. In any event, the orders Father challenges are constitutionally sound and supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Anthony Lee Baldwin appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, subd. (a)), petty theft with a prior theft conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 484, subd. (a), 666, subd. (a)), and brandishing a knife (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1)). His sole contention on appeal is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Baldwin claims his counsel provided ineffective assistance in the conduct of plea negotiations with the prosecution and in failing to request a continuance after Baldwin fell asleep during the proceedings below.
We conclude Baldwin’s claims fail because he has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly inadequate performance. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty by jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187);[1] special circumstances allegations that the murder occurred during the commission of attempted robbery and burglary or attempted burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)) were found true. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.[2] Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in admitting his statement to the police, as it was involuntary; and (2) that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct upon the required elements for felony murder special circumstances if the jury determined that defendant was not the actual killer (those elements being that he either had the intent to kill, or that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life). The trial court’s determination that defendant’s statement was voluntary was not error. While we accept the concession of the Attorney General that the trial court erred in omitting the referenced elements of the felony murder special circumstances from its instructions to the jury, we find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).) Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Jeremy R. Despois appeals from his conviction of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child. He maintains the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a psychiatrist who would testify as an expert witness regarding questioning techniques and suggestibility of a child witness, and that it was error to deny his motion for new trial on the basis his counsel was ineffective. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Andrew Barrientos of attempted murder of a police officer, among other crimes. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664.)[1] Defendant is serving a life sentence in prison. He appeals upon contentions that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of gang evidence and in admitting gang evidence. He also contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that his firearm possession was gang related. We address these contentions in the discussion that follows and shall affirm the judgment.

In separate gang-related incidents on the same day, defendant Ivan Ordaz shot and killed 19-year-old Tomas Melero-Smith, and with others shot at and killed 22-year-old Allan Mejia. Ordaz admitted shooting at Mejia and Melero-Smith because he thought they were rival gang members (he was mistaken), but argued to a jury that the killings were voluntary manslaughter because he acted in unreasonable self-defense. The jury found Ordaz guilty of second degree murder of Mejia, first degree murder of Melero-Smith, and related offenses. Enhancements and special circumstances were found true. He was sentenced to multiple prison terms including life without the possibility of parole.
Ordaz contends that the judgment must be reversed in whole or in part because of evidentiary and instructional errors, and prosecutorial misconduct. He also challenges portions of his sentence. We modify the sentence but otherwise affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Desmen Lankford of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegations that he personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1203.075) when he committed the murders. He was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). Sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, Lankford appeals. He contends reversal is required because the trial court erred by admitting his statements to a jailhouse informant because they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. Lankford further contends that various evidentiary errors require reversal. Court affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Steve P. Acosta of multiple offenses against his former spouse, including attempted murder, torture, criminal threats, and infliction of great bodily injury involving domestic violence, and felony vandalism. Defendant contends his convictions must be reversed in whole or in part because (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to represent himself during trial, and (2) there was insufficient evidence he committed vandalism. Finding no merit in defendant’s arguments, we affirm the judgment.