CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, Christopher Surico, appeals from the trial court’s April 24, 2013 post-judgment order denying his motion to modify his sentence in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. GA073764. We affirm the trial court’s order.

The father, Pedro C., and the child, Jasmine C., appeal from the juvenile court’s February 13, 2013 jurisdiction and disposition orders. They challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j).[1] The juvenile court found the child was at substantial risk of harm based on the father’s prolong sexual abuse of Michelle V. Michelle is the child’s half-sister. In addition, the father and the child object to the disposition order removing Jasmine from the father’s custody. We affirm the jurisdiction and disposition orders.

Appellant Jasmin S. (Mother) filed this appeal after the juvenile court’s December 4, 2012 order terminated her parental rights over her infant daughter X.Z. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother seeks to revive issues arising out of the court’s decision to terminate her reunification services at the September 12, 2011 six-month review hearing based on its understanding that Mother would be incarcerated for a period that exceeded the maximum reunification time permitted by statute. She contends reasonable reunification services were not provided prior to September 2011, that the caseworker misled the court about when she was likely to be released from prison, and that the court failed to make statutorily-mandated findings.
Mother does not dispute that orders terminating reunification services are ordinarily reviewable solely by way of writ, or that the court provided notice at the September 2011 hearing of the writ review requirement. She contends she is entitled to raise issues related to the reunification period in this proceeding because the notice the court provided did not inform her of the deadline to file a notice of intent to seek a writ. We conclude that Mother received sufficient notice of the writ requirement to preclude her from raising issues pertaining to the September 2011 order at this late date, and that, in any event, she raises no issues with respect to the September 2011 order requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Delfino Quezada, appeals from the judgment entered following a court trial which resulted in his conviction of the serious felony of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] during which he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, not an accomplice to the offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and the court’s findings he previously had been convicted of the serious felony of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and had served a prison term for the offense pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Quezada to 12 years in prison. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellants Adam Ortiz, Cesar Garcia and Michael Montelongo were found guilty of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)[1] and attempted first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 664). The jury also found the offenses were committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Garcia admitted having a prior conviction within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Montelongo admitted having a prior conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 667.5, subdivision (b). A state prison sentence was imposed for all three men as follows: Garcia—13 years, 4 months; Ortiz—14 years, 4 months; and Montelongo—21 years.
Appellants contend there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts of attempted first degree burglary and the finding that the crimes were gang related. They also argue the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of attempted burglary. We find the evidence of attempted burglary sufficient and, although the trial court misinstructed on an element of attempted burglary, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. These contentions are, therefore, rejected.

At an initial trial, a jury convicted defendant, Floyd Grey Greene, of: pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a));[1] pimping a minor (§ 266h, subd. (b)(2)); and procuring a child under 16 for lewd or lascivious acts (§ 266j). At the first trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder charge. Following retrial, a second jury convicted defendant of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms plus a determinate term of 9 years, 4 months. We modify defendant’s presentence credits. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiff Samuel Sferas, as executor and administrator of the estate and living trust of Julie A. Caravello, appeals from judgments of dismissal in favor of defendant Premier America Credit Union and defendant New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation after the trial court sustained their demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court ruled that the judgment in a prior lawsuit between the parties operated as res judicata to bar this lawsuit. We affirm.

After a serious industrial accident involving a commercial meat grinder, plaintiff Jose Herrera sued his employer, defendant Unistar Food Processing, Inc. (Unistar), pursuant to Labor Code section 4558 (section 4558), the power press exception to the exclusivity provision of the worker’s compensation law. Unistar successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that the meat grinder was not a power press within the meaning of section 4558. Herrera appeals from the judgment. We conclude the trial court properly granted the motion and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Brayon Martin Martinez appeals from the judgment entered after two trials. Prior to the first trial, defendant pled guilty on count 5 to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The jury convicted defendant in count 4 of evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court declared a mistrial after the jury deadlocked on counts 1-3 and 6-7.
After the information was amended, defendant was convicted in the second trial on counts 6 and 7 of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)) and on count 8 of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on an unidentified victim (§ 245, subd. (b)). The jury found true the allegations defendant used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), as to counts 6 and 7, and he used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivisions (a) and (d), as to all three counts.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 33 years 8 months in state prison.
Defendant contends insufficient evidence, instructional error, improper exclusion of evidence, and cumulative error require reversal of the judgment. We affirm.

At issue in these two consolidated actions is whether plaintiffs Jose Diaz and Ferdinand Rabanal (collectively plaintiffs) are employees of, or independent contractors for, defendant Rideshare Port Management LLC d/b/a Prime Time Shuttle (RPM), and managing member Rattan Joea and his wife, Parminder Joea (collectively defendants). Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking to recover for various alleged violations of the wage and hour laws. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, ruling as a matter of law that plaintiffs were not employees who would be entitled to the protection of the wage and hour laws but independent contractors. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold there is no triable issue of material fact and so, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are independent contractors. Plaintiffs exercised control over the manner and means of the work. Although RPM set some standards of dress, implemented to an extent a demerit system, and utilized a centralized dispatch system, many aspects of the dress code and dispatch system were required by the City of Los Angeles (the City) and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in order for RPM to operate at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and the evidence fails to show that the demerit system went beyond the right to ensure satisfactory performance to the public. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

American Surety Company (American) appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate a $1 million bail forfeiture and exonerate two $500,000 bail bonds that were posted on behalf of Randall Rudy Quaid and Evegenia Helena Quaid (Randy and Evi, respectively) after they fled to Canada. (Pen. Code, § 1305.)[1] American claims that the bail bonds are void ab initio because the Quaids were not released from "custody" in exchange for the posted bond amount.
We reverse and remand with directions to enter a new order to vacate Randy's bail forfeiture and exonerate his $500,000 bail bond. Bail was forfeited nunc pro tunc in violation of section 1305, subdivision (a). The order denying American's motion to vacate Evi's bail forfeiture and exonerate her $500,000 bail bond is affirmed.

Chilico David Hart (appellant) was convicted and pled no contest to various offenses in four criminal cases, and the trial court imposed a total prison term of five years eight months. Appellant’s counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has filed a supplementary brief contending that his sentence is unlawful because the total sentence exceeds the maximum authorized sentence, if periods of probation for which appellant waived custody credits are treated as part of the total sentence. We find no arguable issues and affirm.

Terrell Gibson (appellant) appeals following his conviction by a jury of unlawfully taking or driving a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court erred in imposing two one-year prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) because there was insufficient evidence to support imposition of the enhancements. Respondent concedes the error.

Defendant Ellen Maria Hansen was charged with felony infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] On April 11, 2013, the court, based upon the opinions of two psychologists, determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)), suspended criminal proceedings, and ordered defendant committed to a locked psychiatric facility for a term of no more than three years. Defendant filed a timely appeal. We will affirm.