CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Arthur Copuz Pagaduan, Jr. pleaded guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).[1] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions. Relevant to this appeal, one of the probation conditions prohibits defendant from possessing or consuming alcohol, and from going to places where alcohol is the primary item of sale.
On appeal, defendant contends that the alcohol-related probation condition is unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad because it does not expressly include a knowledge requirement.
For reasons that we will explain, we will modify the judgment relating to the challenged condition of probation and affirm the judgment as so modified.

Mother M.L. and father J.P. (collectively, parents) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment finding jurisdiction over their infant son J.P.[1] pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).[2] Father separately appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order terminating father’s physical custody of J.P. pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1). For the reasons stated here, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings, and we will affirm the orders.

Defendant Ellis T. California Jones III appeals after he was resentenced following a prior appeal.[1] At the resentencing proceeding, which was conducted without defendant or a defense attorney present, the trial court reduced the previously-imposed prison term by eight months, and it reduced the amount of victim restitution by $400.
Defendant, who had represented himself in the earlier trial proceedings, contends the trial court erred by conducting the resentencing proceeding without him or the presence of an attorney on his behalf. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Walter Ray Slone of: (1) forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2));[1] (2) forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); (3) two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); and (4) criminal threats (§ 422). The jury also found true allegations that defendant kidnapped the victim in the commission of the offenses. (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e).) Following a bench trial, the court found true allegations that defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes Law.” (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 325 years to life, consecutive to 50 years.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s nonresponse to defendant’s question whether she was a virgin––a question defendant contends is related to the victim’s credibility on the issue of consent. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, and we affirm the judgment.

K.B. (father) and R.L. (mother), parents of K.B. (the child), appeal from an order issued after the permanency planning hearing that chose adoption as the permanent plan for the child and terminated father’s and mother’s parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to this code). Both appellants contend the juvenile court erred in concluding the parent-child relationship exception to terminating parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply in this case. In addition, father argues the order must be reversed because the lower court failed to provide proper notice as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). Finding no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.

The court denied a Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 790 deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) to a 17 year old who, together with some friends, burglarized the garage of a vacationing homeowner. The minor claims the court abused its discretion in so doing. We disagree, given the court’s compliance with the requisite DEJ procedures and the minor’s marijuana use and unexcused absences from school. We affirm.

A series of unfortunate events led up to the controversy now before us. In November 2008, wildfires wreaked havoc in southern California; the path of destruction included 27995 Alpine Lane, Yorba Linda, California (the Property). An owner of the Property, Ulrike Schneider, died of cancer shortly thereafter in July 2009. Schneider died intestate, unmarried, and without children. In the aftermath of her death, acrimony arose between Schneider’s long-term, live-in boyfriend (plaintiff Daniel A. Noroski) and Schneider’s family in Germany. A multiplicity of legal actions ensued.
This case began with the March 2011 filing of a complaint by Noroski against four defendants: the insurer of the Property, Century-National Insurance Company, and its parent company, Kramer-Wilson Company, Inc. (collectively, Century-National); Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America), the beneficiary of a deed of trust recorded against the Property; and ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust), the trustee named in the deed of trust. Basically, Noroski was dissatisfied with the resolution of the claim that was filed with Century-National following the destruction of the Property.
In August 2012, Jim Travis Tice (as administrator of the Schneider estate) sought leave to file a complaint in intervention against Noroski and the four defendants. Tice reiterated many of Noroski’s claims against the four defendants, but with the added wrinkle that Schneider’s estate (and not Noroski) was the true owner of the Property and the right to any insurance proceeds (both those already paid and those still owing). The court denied the motion. We reverse. The court wrongly addressed the merits of some of the claims made in Tice’s proposed complaint in intervention rather than addressing his application to intervene pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387.[1]

Tragically, Ulrike Schneider died of cancer on July 10, 2009 at the age of 46. She died intestate, unmarried, and without children. Ulrike’s mother Erika stands to inherit the estate (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (b))[1] and would ordinarily be entitled to appointment as administrator of the estate (§ 8461, subd. (e)). But Erika is a resident of Germany, precluding her appointment as administrator. (§ 8402, subd. (a)(4).) And prior to the recent amendment of section 8465, Erika was also precluded from nominating an administrator to serve in her stead. (Estate of Damskog (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 78, 79; Stats. 2012, ch. 635, § 1 [effective January 1, 2013, court may now appoint as administrator nominee of heir who is precluded from acting as administrator by reason of foreign residency].)
Against this legal backdrop, two competing petitions for letters of administration were on file with the probate court as of mid-2012. One was submitted by appellant Daniel Noroski, Ulrike’s long-term, live-in boyfriend. Noroski petitioned to have the public administrator (see § 7600 et seq.) appointed; the public administrator’s office opposed its own appointment in this case. The second petition was filed by respondent Jim Travis Tice. Although Tice himself had no special status that would have entitled him to priority for appointment (§ 8461), the Tice petition was filed by the same attorneys who represented Erika in objecting to the Noroski petition. Tice sought appointment to pursue claims against Noroski and others on behalf of the estate. Noroski claimed it would be inappropriate to appoint Tice because Tice was biased against Noroski on account of Tice’s relationship with Erika’s law firm and his announced intention to pursue litigation against Noroski on behalf of the estate.
The court issued letters of administration to Tice and denied Noroski’s petition, an appealable order. (§ 1303, subd. (a).)[2] We affirm.

This court has before it several appeals arising from a long drawn out dispute between the beneficiaries of a family trust formed in 1973. This appeal concerns a challenge to the probate court’s order granting the interim trustee’s petition for instructions about what conditions, if any, should be placed on the required distribution of one-half of the trust’s principal to beneficiary David M. Denholm (Denholm), in light of the over $5 million civil judgment Denholm may owe the trust if he loses his appeal challenging that judgment. We affirm the probate court’s order holding (1) Denholm had a vested interest in 50 percent of the trust assets, which will include the civil judgment entered in Clunies A. Holt, et al. v. David M. Denholm, et al. (Super. Ct. No. 06CC12290) (hereafter the Civil Action), and (2) the distribution of those assets must be made whenever the remittitur issues in the pending appeal of the Civil Action.

This court has before it several appeals arising from a long drawn out dispute among the beneficiaries of a family trust formed in 1973. This appeal concerns a challenge to the probate court’s order granting the interim trustee’s petition for instructions about leasing real property of the trust and directing the payment of net income to one of the beneficiaries. Two of the beneficiaries who are mother and daughter, Clunies A. Holt and Clunies E. Holt (hereafter collectively referred to as the Holts unless the context requires otherwise), argue the trustee lacked standing to bring the petition and they are entitled to additional income. We affirm the probate court’s order.

Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gilette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina, Sean M. Rodriguez and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Paul Casas responded to a house belonging to defendant Antonio Hernandez to investigate a report that defendant had been in an altercation with his neighbor. When the sheriff’s deputy arrived, defendant was intoxicated, belligerent and refused to cooperate. Defendant pushed his wife and Deputy Casas attempted to arrest him. Defendant hit the sheriff’s deputy several times with a cane he was using because of recent knee surgery.
Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury on someone who he should have known or knew was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)).[1] Defendant was placed on three years of formal probation and was to serve 180 days in the San Bernardino County jail on a work release program.
Defendant now contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for assault on a peace officer, or in the alternative, the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury with a lesser included offense of non-aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires reversal.
We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Hiram Brinson guilty of (1) attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); (2) driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); (3) obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); and (4) driving without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).
The trial court found true the allegations that defendant (1) suffered two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)),[1] and (2) two prior convictions for which he served prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of two years and an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.

In this case, by way of his designation of record, appellant elected preparation of a clerk's transcript and a reporter's transcript. Appellant also filed an application for a waiver of the cost of preparing the clerk's and reporter's transcripts. We denied his request and, when he failed to timely file the fees needed to prepare a reporter's transcript, we ordered preparation of a clerk's transcript.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jonathan Mayhew Watson asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)