CA Unpub Decisions

M.P. (mother), the mother of No.P. and his four siblings, petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (petition). Mother seeks review of an order setting a permanent plan hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] as to No.P. Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by previously ordering No.P. separated from his siblings despite the reports of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) not stating the reason why the juvenile court should do so; erred by requiring an offer of proof from her counsel prior to setting the permanent plan hearing as to No.P.; and erred in that there was not substantial evidence that mother’s visitation of No.P. was harmful to No.P. The Department filed an answer to the petition, and No.P. joined in that answer. We deny the petition.

Appellant Lisa W. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 over her two children, 14-year old Jordan and 11-year old “Jamie.”[1] Finding no error, we affirm.

Appellant Sherry E. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders removing her four-month-old daughter, C.C., from her custody and denying mother reunification services. We conclude substantial evidence supports the removal order, and under both the substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards, the trial court did not err in denying reunification services. Accordingly, we affirm.

Alexis K.T. (Mother) and S.B. (Father), the parents of 16-year-old Julienne B. and three other children, appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring Julienne a dependent child of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c) (serious emotional damage),[1] removing the child from Father’s care and custody and placing her with Mother under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). The Department cross-appeals from the court’s dismissal of the sexual abuse allegations in the dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse) and (j) (abuse of sibling), and its dismissal of the petition as to Julienne’s 10-year-old sister J.B. We affirm the dismissal as to J.B., reverse the subdivision (c) jurisdiction findings and disposition order regarding Julienne and remand the matter for further proceedings in the juvenile court.

Appellant Sara Wright appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion seeking certification of certain classes in her action against respondents Menzies Aviation Inc., Menzies Aviation Group (USA), Inc., and Aeroground, Inc. (collectively “Menzies”), her former employer. Appellant moved to certify four distinct classes encompassing current and former nonexempt (hourly) employees of Menzies whom she contended suffered various employment-related injuries. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying certification of three of the four proposed classes.[1] Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Joshua Sardinha appeals from his conviction of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; counts 1 & 2), two counts of assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), (2); counts 3 & 4), and the associated firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c) & 12022.5). Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of an uncharged crime, and, alternatively, failed to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of this evidence. He contends the errors amount to a constitutional violation of his due process rights by rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. Finding no merit in any of defendant’s contentions, we affirm.

Litigation by class action has long been recognized as a superior method of resolving wage and hour claims in California (see Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1033 (Brinker)), including those seeking redress for unpaid overtime wages. Nonetheless, when confronted with the myriad individual facts asserted by employers in support of the executive exemption as a defense to a wage claim, courts at all levels have struggled to answer the question central to certification of a class—that is, “whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.” (Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (Sav-on); accord, Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531.)[1] Here, the trial court, after wrestling with the factual issues raised by Defendants Crab Addison, Inc., Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc. and Landry’s Restaurants, Inc.,[2] denied class certification to a putative class consisting of managerial employees allegedly misclassified as exempt on the grounds plaintiffs had failed to establish (a) their claims are typical of the class, (b) they can adequately represent the class, or (c) common questions predominate the class claims such that a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. (See Brinker, at p. 1021; Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) We reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of our recent decision in Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701 (Benton) and our discussion below.

Ulises Munoz purportedly appeals from an order committing him to state prison without requiring he be housed at a facility of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). We dismiss the appeal.

In the underlying action, the probate court appointed respondent Sandra N. Baldonado under Evidence Code section 730 to evaluate the interests of Louis Mouton, Jr., regarding whom appellant Craig A. Smith serves as conservator. Smith challenges a $4,319.25 fee award to Baldonado. We affirm.

A modification decision.

Bryan C. (appellant) appeals from a judgment declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him on probation with home supervision after he pled no contest to an allegation he had carried a concealed firearm on his person. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.778(e).)[1] He contends the case must be remanded for a hearing on his suitability for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) under section 790 et seq., and further argues the failure to follow the statutory procedures for determining his suitability deprived him of due process of law. The Attorney General agrees the case must be remanded so the court can comply with the statutory requirements for determining suitability. We remand the case for this purpose.

David L. (father) appeals a juvenile court order denying his petition to modify the dispositional order denying him reunification services for his daughter Caitlyn L. (daughter) under the bypass provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b).[1] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Defendant Deante Stewart appeals after conviction of two counts of second degree robbery, one count of assault with a firearm, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(2), 29800, subd. (a)(1).)[1] Defendant personally used a firearm in each of the first three counts and had one prior strike conviction and one violent prison prior. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to more than 21 years in prison. He claims his convictions must be reversed because he was denied discovery of a police report relating to a similar crime committed while he was in custody by an individual with a similar appearance, and because the court did not allow him to present a third party culpability defense based on that other crime. We find no error and we affirm.

A modification decision.