CA Unpub Decisions

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Julie R. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her daughter E. (born August 2008).[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) before terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26.[2] Mother argues that this error requires reversal of the judgment. We find mother has failed to show reversible error and affirm.

In this consolidated appeal and petition for writ of mandate, Los Angeles Community College District (District) challenges the denial of its motions for entry of injunction and judgment. As to the appeal from the October 1, 2012 order denying District’s request for a preliminary injunction and judgment against GS Roosevelt, LLC, we reverse with directions. As to the petition for writ of mandate from the January 10, 2013 order denying District’s request to enter a judgment and injunction against Roosevelt Lofts, LLC, and its successor in interest, we dismiss the petition as moot.

Delfino Cardenas Machado appeals[1] from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 1 – forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2))[2] with a finding he committed the offense against multiple victims (former § 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), and three counts of forcible lewd act upon a child (former § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 2 through 4) with findings as to each of the three counts appellant committed kidnapping (former § 667.61, subd. (e)(1)), personally used a deadly weapon (former §§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4), 12022.3, subd. (a)), and committed the offense against multiple victims (former § 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), and with court findings appellant suffered two prior felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (d)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court resentenced appellant to prison for 210 years to life. We modify the judgment and, as modified, affirm it with directions.

In Campbell v. Ford Motor Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 15 (Campbell), the court applied the Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) factors, as further clarified in Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 (Cabral), to hold a “property owner has no duty to protect family members of workers on its premises from secondary exposure to asbestos used during the course of the property owner’s business.”[1] (Campbell, supra, at p. 34.) In this secondary asbestos case, we must determine whether to follow Campbell in an action against a premises owner brought by its employee who initially was exposed to asbestos used in manufacturing the premises owner’s products, but also allegedly was secondarily exposed off the premises to respirable asbestos on his work clothes or on his son’s work clothes, who also was an employee.
Although the factual circumstances differ here, like Campbell, we conclude that based upon the Rowland public policy factors, a premises owner has no duty to protect an employee from secondary exposure to asbestos off the premises arising from his association with a family member and fellow employee who wore asbestos-contaminated work clothes home. To hold otherwise would impose limitless liability on premises owners. We further conclude an employee’s secondary asbestos exposure when wearing home his own work clothes is a collateral or derivative injury barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of nonsuit.

Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP (Allen Matkins) appeals an order denying its motion to compel Howard F. Ruby to arbitrate a legal malpractice action. Ruby is not a party to the engagement letter agreement between Allen Matkins and its client R&B Realty Group, LP (R&B) containing an arbitration clause. We conclude, however, that Ruby as a nonparty is nonetheless bound by the arbitration agreement because he voluntarily accepted the benefits of Allen Matkins’s representation under the engagement letter. We therefore will reverse the order with directions to grant the motion to compel arbitration.

We affirm an order granting a special motion to strike a complaint pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)

Juan Z. (father) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court, challenging the adjudication findings in relation to his own children after he sexually abused his stepdaughter on two occasions and physically abused her on one occasion. Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or respondent) contends that the appeal is moot and has filed a cross-appeal. We address father’s contentions but find them to be without merit, and as such we affirm the judgment. We dismiss respondent’s cross-appeal as moot.

Plaintiff and appellant Keystone Construction, Inc. (Keystone) appeals from the $1,712.70 default judgment entered in its favor and against defendant and respondent Juan Briseno Cabrera (Cabrera) on Keystone’s complaint for breach of contract, conversion, fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Keystone contends: (1) the undisputed evidence supported a larger damage award; (2) it was entitled to punitive damages; and (3) it was entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm.

Jane Siskin appeals from a judgment of dismissal, following an order granting summary judgment in favor of respondents Peter Koral (Koral) and L’Koral Incorporated (L’Koral). Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining that her causes of action were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellant Matthew Murphy appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 1 – first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with a robbery special circumstance finding (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and count 2 – second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) with a finding as to each offense that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)) and committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for a total unstayed term of life without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant George Halimi is a lawyer who represented defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Dennis Grant in regard to his rights as a beneficiary of the trust of his late mother. After the trust action was settled, Halimi sued Grant for unpaid legal fees. Grant filed a cross-complaint against Halimi pleading professional malpractice and other causes of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer to Halimi’s first amended complaint without leave to amend as to the first through fourth causes of action but permitted the filing of a second amended complaint for quantum meruit. At the beginning of trial, Halimi voluntarily dismissed this complaint, and a three-day court trial ensued on the cross-complaint. The trial court awarded Grant $200,000 on the cross-complaint. Halimi and Grant each appeal from the judgment. We affirm.

Crystal Merrill (Merrill) and Fi Tran (Tran) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a putative class action against Action Educational Services, Inc. also known as West Coast University, Inc. (defendant) for fraud, misrepresentation, and violation of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (UCL) and other statutes, following their enrollment in defendant’s nursing school program. As part of their enrollment, plaintiffs each signed an enrollment agreement (EA) and one or more retail installment sales contracts (RICs). All of the RICs, and the EA signed by Merrill, contained a provision requiring arbitration of disputes. The EA signed by Tran did not contain an arbitration clause.
Defendant filed a petition to compel arbitration of all of plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted the petition to arbitrate plaintiffs’ individual claims under the RICs as well as Merrill’s individual claims under the EA. The court denied the petition to compel arbitration of Tran’s claims under the EA, and stayed those claims, along with plaintiffs’ class claims and their claims under the UCL.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration of Tran’s claims under the EA. Defendant also appeals from the order staying plaintiffs’ class claims. Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting the petition to compel arbitration of their individual claims under the RICs and Merrill’s claims under the EA.
We reverse the order denying the petition to compel arbitration of Tran’s claims under the EA. We dismiss defendant’s appeal of the order staying the class claims. We also dismiss plaintiffs’ appeal.

Jonathan San Roman (appellant) appeals from a final judgment entered against him after the trial court granted the City of El Monte’s (the City) motion for summary judgment on appellant’s cause of action against the City for dangerous condition of public property. We affirm.
CONTENTIONS
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a reasonable juror could conclude that the conditions at the crosswalk where appellant was injured created a substantial risk of injury. Appellant further contends that the immunities provided under Government Code sections 830.4 and 830.8[1] do not shield the City from liability in this case.[2]

Defendant and appellant Demageo Hall (defendant) challenges his murder and attempted murder convictions, asserting instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. He also contends that the trial court erroneously described his sentence on the attempted murder, and that he is entitled to seven more days of presentence custody credit. We find no error in the instructions and no prosecutorial misconduct. We modify the sentencing on count 2, but find that defendant has not shown he is entitled to additional custody credit. We affirm the judgment as modified.