CA Unpub Decisions

Following a bench trial, the court convicted appellant, Angelito Garin Williamson, of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10 (count 1/Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b))[1]; oral copulation with a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years younger than the defendant (count 3/§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)); forcible oral copulation (count 4/§ 288(a), subd. (c)(2)); and lewd and lascivious conduct by force with a child under the age of 14 (count 5/§ 288, subd. (b)(1)).
On appeal, Williamson contends the court violated his federal right to due process by its failure to question him regarding his rejection of a plea offer. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Raymond Matthew Fierro of possession of a weapon while in a penal institute (Pen. Code,[1] § 4502, subd. (a)).[2] The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.
Defendant’s primary arguments on appeal are that the prosecution failed to make an election of the factual basis for weapons possession and the court misinstructed the jury based on CALCRIM No. 2745 and by not giving instructions based on CALCRIM No. 3502 [unanimity] and CALJIC No. 1.24 [constructive possession]. Defendant also raises related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, defendant criticizes defense counsel at trial for not cross-examining a witness based on his testimony at the preliminary hearing. Defendant’s claims of error lack merit. We affirm the judgment.

In October 2012, the court revoked Miguel Christopher Castaneda's probation, sentenced him to 12 years in prison and imposed fines of $2,400 each for restitution
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and probation revocation (§ 1202.44), in addition to fines of $200 each for those purposes previously imposed in June 2011.
Castaneda contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. He also contends the court improperly imposed the additional $2,400 fines. The People concede the trial court erred in imposing those fines, and we agree. We modify the judgment to strike those fines, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Following a bench trial on their declaratory relief cause of action (Code Civ. Proc.[1], § 1060), Eric Ireland and San Diego Natives Holding Co., LLC (collectively appellants) appeal from the portions of a judgment finding (1) they had contracted to form a partnership with respondents Ralph Hughes and the Hughes Family Trust relating to certain commercial property (at the times, the property); (2) the parties are barred from selling the commercial property for less than $100 per square foot; (3) Hughes is entitled to rent from appellants under a temporary lease and (4) each party should bear its own costs and attorney fees.
We reject Hughes's request to dismiss this appeal. Appellants do not challenge the court's orders voiding a 2007 lease agreement or ejecting Hughes from the premises; therefore, those parts of the judgment are affirmed. We also affirm the costs and attorney fee award because appellants forfeited their right to such an award by failing to timely file a motion for it. We conclude the evidence does not support the court's finding that the parties had contracted to form a partnership; therefore, we reverse that finding and other findings based on it. We remand for the trial court to make additional factual findings as directed below and enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion.

In July 2012, defendant Anthony James Katello willfully and unlawfully inflicted corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon V.B., his cohabitant, within seven years of a previous conviction of infliction of corporal injury.[1] Defendant also committed acts constituting false imprisonment.
Defendant pleaded no contest to infliction of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (e)(1); count two) and false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236; count five). In exchange, three related counts were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.) Defendant was to be sentenced to prison for three years eight months.
Defendant requested release to the custody of a law enforcement chaplain for an hour or less to obtain some personal belongings. He agreed that, should he fail to return for sentencing, he would be sentenced to five years eight months. (See People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1254, fn. 5.)
Defendant did not appear for sentencing as ordered. He was sentenced to prison for five years eight months, awarded 151 days’ custody credit and 151 days’ conduct credit, and ordered to pay a $480 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a $480 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked (Pen. Code, § 1202.45), an $80 court operations fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $60 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). On May 2, 2012, R.J. returned home to find that her home had been ransacked. Numerous items had been taken, including jewelry, coins, and keys to two vehicles. R.J. spent that night with a friend. The next morning, R.J. returned home to find that it had been broken into again and items had been taken, including a laptop computer, a television and a pickup truck.
On May 17, 2012, J.D. returned home and found a man in his garage. The man fled in a pickup truck which matched the description of the pickup stolen from the R.J.’s home. Numerous items had been taken from J.D.’s home. Police found the truck at a ski resort and arrested defendant Christina McCurtain and David Gish who were in the truck.
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to vehicle theft (R.J.’s truck) (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count III), second degree burglary (J.D.) (Pen. Code, § 459; count V), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); count VII) in exchange for probation for five years and subject to certain terms and conditions including 180 days in county jail.
On September 4, 2012, the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation for a period of five years subject to certain terms and conditions including 180 days in county jail. The court ordered restitution for the benefit of R.J. in the amount of $6,135, plus 10 percent interest, and reserved jurisdiction to order victim restitution to J.D., assuring defense counsel that victim restitution would be joint and several with Gish who was also convicted of offenses arising from the two burglaries.

Betty W., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification and terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code].) Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her petition for modification without a hearing. We affirm.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
On October 19, 2010, defendant Arnold Roshawn Livingston was detained outside a department store by an off-duty Department of Corrections officer after defendant grabbed, choked and forced his girlfriend to leave the store. Defendant threatened to retrieve a knife from his pocket and stab the off-duty officer. In 1992, defendant was convicted of second degree robbery.
After the court found defendant incompetent to stand trial, defendant was placed at Napa State Hospital until competency could be restored. A month later, Napa certified defendant as competent and he returned to county jail. After the trial court found defendant competent to stand trial, defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to attempted criminal threats (Pen. Code, §§ 664/422; undesignated section references are to this code) and admitted a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) in exchange for a stipulated 16-month term and dismissal of the remaining counts (false imprisonment with violence and misdemeanor battery). The court imposed the 16-month term (the low term of eight months, doubled for the strike prior), and released defendant as time served with 547 days of actual custody credit. The credits exceeded the sentence and were applied to the payment of the fees and fines.

M.R., the mother of 11-year-old Peter R., nine-year-old Matthew R., and six-year-old Michael R., appeals from orders of the Butte County Juvenile Court denying her request to return the children to her care and terminating her parental rights.
On appeal, mother contends (1) the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights was in error because the children shared a beneficial bond with her and would suffer significant detriment if their relationships with her were severed, and (2) the court’s order denying her request to return the children was not supported by evidence and is thus an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

After the trial court found defendant Lois Ballard had disobeyed a 2002 judgment restraining her and her agents from trespassing, blocking, or putting debris on the neighboring property of plaintiffs Madelyn M. Ripken, Ryan D. Ripken and Susan J. Ripken (the Ripkens), it ordered Ballard to pay the Ripkens’ attorney fees and costs (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] § 1218, subd. (a)).
In this pro se appeal, Ballard contends the court erred in awarding attorney fees because the Ripkens failed to “provide[] competent evidence” to support their claim. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Lennart Christian Schauman was charged with involuntary manslaughter and battery with serious bodily injury after he punched the victim, Adam Martinez, in a nightclub, causing Martinez to fall and strike his head on the floor. Martinez died approximately two and one-half weeks later. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the manslaughter charge, but found defendant guilty of battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years.
Defendant makes two arguments on appeal. The first claim is that the trial court erred in failing to grant his request for change of venue. We shall conclude he has forfeited this claim for failure to raise it following jury selection.
His second claim is that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 371, which informed the jury it could consider an attempt by the defendant to create false evidence or obtain false testimony. This instruction was based upon testimony given by defendant and his friend Anshul Khetarpal. We shall conclude there was a factual basis for the instruction, and shall affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Jaroslav Marik, M.D. (Marik) and Letkov Financial Partners, LP (Letkov) (sometimes collectively referred to as Marik) appeal a judgment confirming an arbitration award, insofar as the judgment awards defendant and respondent University Village, LLC (UV-LLC) reasonable attorney fees of $51,575 incurred in the arbitration, as well as post-arbitration attorney fees of $6,450, for a total fee award of $58,025.
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment to the extent it awards UV-LLC post-arbitration attorney fees of $6,450 and otherwise affirm.

J.S. was adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1),[1] the court terminated the parental rights of her mother April S. (mother) and ordered J.S. placed for adoption. Mother contends the court’s order was erroneous because there existed two statutory exceptions to the requirement that the juvenile court order adoption: (1) mother has a beneficial relationship with J.S. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)); and (2) adoption would substantially interfere with the child’s relationship with her siblings (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). We hold the juvenile court properly found neither exception applicable and affirm the court’s order.

Oscar J. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court orders adjudicating his son, Daniel J. (the child), a dependent pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (b) and removing the child from Father’s custody. In a cross-appeal, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) challenges an order dismissing a domestic violence count from the dependency petition. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders declaring the child a dependent and removing him from the custody of Father. We reverse the order dismissing the domestic violence count.